The title of
this forum is “Regulating for competition and convergence”.
A legitimate
question is should the regulator actually be for either
competition or convergence.
In the case
of competition I, like my predecessors, am generally in favour of
it.
Crucially, not
as an end in itself, but because the mechanism of competition delivers
much better services to customers than either a monopolist, or a
regulator, deciding what it is that – they think – customers want.
Am I for convergence?
Again, I am
for convergence, but not for its own sake. Convergence has the possibility
of delivering new, cost effective, telecommunications services as
well as existing services cheaper and better. To the extent that
it fulfils that promise, I am for it.
I see the role
of the regulator in relation to both competition and convergence
as being, at an absolute minimum, to make sure that regulation does
not get in the way of competition and convergence delivering better
services to customers. Even better, regulation should have an objective
of positively encouraging competition and convergence where this
will deliver better services for customers.
Setting out
these objectives is easy. The hard part is translating these thoughts
into real actions that produce real results for consumers.
So what should
a regulator do in the context of the UK market-place?
I want to concentrate
to-day on a particular example of where action could increase both
competition and convergence. That is using the existing local
loop as the means of delivering much higher bandwidth services.
There seems to be general agreement that the existing local loop
has the technical potential to deliver new services – high
speed Internet access, video on demand, and other services. The
question I face is how to get that potential released in the UK.
What, if any, regulatory changes are needed to help?
Oftel will shortly
be publishing a consultation document that sets out our preliminary
thoughts on these issues.
You will find,
in classic Oftel fashion, a large number of difficult and detailed
questions, to which we are seeking answers. You will also find that
the UK, along with other member states, will be influenced in its
actions by the need for decisions across European boundaries.
I do not want
to pre-empt the detailed questions here. In any case, speeches are
ill-suited to dealing with the kind of detail that Oftel goes into
in its consultation documents.
However, I do
want to bring out a more general issue that is touched on in that
document. It is an issue which has great importance in the general
approach taken to both convergence and competition. It is especially
important in relation to the development of European policy, which
is becoming increasingly important for us in the UK.
To keep life
simple, I want to proceed by way of a typical example. One of the
propositions that has been put forward in Europe is that Member
States should, as a matter of regulation, make operators with significant
market power "rent" their copper loops to new entrants at cost based
prices.
In certain respects
this is quite a drastic proposal. The owner of an asset (the loop)
is being required to sell the exclusive use of that asset to a competitor.
(This is the point where the lawyers get out their paying in books!)
The hypothesis
is that, at least in the short term, control of all the services
passing over that loop transfers to a competitor. In effect, the
transfer of the loop is being used as a means to transfer a monopoly
in the provision of services over that loop.
This can be
seen as giving the customer rights to choose which service providers
they want to have access to their local loop – the loop that
connects them to the wider telecommunications world. This is the
loop that, what ever else happens, they end up paying for. As customers
are generally a better judge of what they want, giving them the
ability to directly exercise this choice is only reasonable.
But there are,
of course, many other considerations.
Would the ability
of customers to make direct choices (and, therefore, allow competition
to operate) in this market frustrate the emergence of competition
in the provision of the local loop itself? And, would this possibly
make provision of alternative forms of local infrastructure more
difficult? There are also questions of the technical viability of
this approach. Would interference between local loops in the same
access network be so serious that the quality of service degrades
to unacceptable levels?
But lying behind
all these detailed (and difficult) questions is a rather fundamental
question of approach. Should I, as a regulator, see this as a consumer
rights issues – what should they be allowed to do with “their” loop?
Or is it a producer rights issue – what rights does the owner of
an asset have to frustrate consumer choice?
This dichotomy
of approach is clearly not absolute. In the end, customers are reliant
on someone making investment in assets. If the consumer approach
is too harsh, choice becomes non existent because no one will provide
the capital and effort required.
Similarly, the
producers, especially where there is very free competition, cannot
act independently of the consumer. In this case consumer choice
is effective without any special rules needing to be applied.
In reality,
of course, neither the consumer nor the producer get their absolute
rights.
There are some
general cases where the rights of the owner can be taken away if
the owner “misbehaves” in some way. For example, in competition
law terms, if the owner “abuses a dominant position” – whatever
precisely that might mean – action can be taken. In freely competitive
markets, the consumer still does not get everything that is possible.
Unfortunately
the world of convergence does not, and may not ever, conform to
the very free competitive model. Instead, it is characterised by
old companies with significant market power, or even dominance.
Companies – for example BT – may retain, high market shares or,
where totally new markets are being created, there is very high
probability that there will always be a small number of suppliers.
My guess is that the provision of mobile networks and conditional
access systems is always likely to be done by a small number of
players.
In these circumstances
the different approaches are likely to produce different results.
Coming at the problems from the customer end of the problem produces
a legitimisation of intervention to keep markets as open as possible.
This is true even when the producers are not dominant (at least
individually) or, even if they are, have not abused that position
by doing things to their customers that they would not do in a fully
competitive market.
Coming at the
problem from the producers end, intervention is only legitimate
where producers have at least a very strong market position, if
not dominance, and they have abused that position, and
the intervention deals only with that particular abuse.
To put this
in perspective let me try to give an example of what is at stake.
In the near
future high speed Internet access is likely to be available in various
guises on a number of different networks – BT’s POTs network with
suitable clever electronics, fixed radio access, the Cable TV network.
Looking at it from the consumer’s perspective it seems strange to
allow the controllers of those networks artificially to limit the
customer’s access to Internet service providers using these networks.
A regulatory requirement to allow the customer to access all
Internet service providers would ensure that that Internet service
market was as competitive as possible.
From the network
providers perspective, they have made the investment needed to provide
the high speed access capability. That investment is mainly new,
and none of them will have an obviously superior market position
than the others. (Even BT is likely to be a minor player in this
example.) And they will be supplying a new and innovative Internet
access service against at least some competition from the more traditional,
and slower, services.
Why should they
be required to provide this new infrastructure to benefit their
competitors in the Internet service business? Especially if there
is no indication that they are “overcharging” customers for their
Internet services? In the old world of plain old telephone services
(POTS) the different approaches produced similar results. BT was
dominant. The state needed to regulate to give customers an even
break. But in this world of convergence the different approaches
produce different policy prescriptions.
Which one is
the right one?
Quite frankly,
as of to-day, I do not believe that anyone can predict the answer.
But I do know that to create a coherent, and stable, regulatory
framework for convergence the question needs to be answered. It
needs an answer here in the UK and, as important, in Europe. It
can then inform the regulation needed. As the regulator, I want
to be for both the convergence and competition. I want to
see delivered maximum benefits for customers. And, very importantly,
I want a clear framework, for UK industry – so that we can build
on the existing skills and experiences in this area that put us
ahead of our competitors.
This is a complex
issue and the debate has only really just begun, especially in Europe.
Oftel has started to try to develop the framework within which sensible,
and coherent, answers can be developed. Our thinking needs development.
Help from those knowledgeable in the industry is essential.
I do believe
that the underlying principle that regulators should work towards
is freedom – freedom to operate in the open market place, freedom
to set prices that are fair, and freedom for the consumer to access
networks. I would like to see competition based on service quality
and choice.
I have a compelling
duty to protect the consumer – but this is complemented by a compelling
duty to promote the telecommunications industry in the UK. This
can, I am sure, best be done by working in a business like way to
produce worthwhile solutions. Over the next twelve months, as all
sides discuss our response to the EC review, my personal priority
is to seek a synthesis of view.
It is possible.
And, if we succeed, both consumer and the industry as a whole will
certainly be better off.
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