Dealing with anti-competitive behaviour 
– an Oftel Guide

December 1997

Contents

Summary

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 What is anti-competitive behaviour?

Chapter 3 The legal framework

Chapter 4 Oftel’s approach to competition casework

Chapter 5 Sources of information and advice

Chapter 6 Helping us to help you

Annex A Complainant check list

Annex B Key contacts within Oftel


Summary

Oftel’s goal is to provide the best possible deal for the customer in the telecoms market in terms of quality, choice and value for money. We believe that a fully competitive market in telecoms networks and services will deliver this goal by spurring innovation, offering choice, delivering improvements in quality and driving prices down.

Oftel therefore commits a large amount of resources and focus on investigating potential anti-competitive behaviour in the telecommunications industry, and in 1996 commenced 72 such investigations. Although some investigations are launched on Oftel’s own initiative, the majority were launched as a result of complaints from, among others, network operators, independent service providers and large users.

This document is aimed at potential complainants and is designed to increase the speed with which Oftel can handle complaints by making complainants aware of Oftel’s procedures in handling competition casework. It summarises the type of behaviour Oftel considers to be anti-competitive, the legal framework within which Oftel can take action to stop such behaviour, the procedures which Oftel follows to investigate complaints, sources of other useful information on Oftel’s competition casework and, finally, the type of information which should, wherever possible, be provided by complainants to Oftel when a complaint is first made.

CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT

Director, Competition and Fair Trading

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Oftel’s goal is to provide the best possible deal for the customer in the telecoms market in terms of quality, choice and value for money.

1.2 We believe that a fully competitive market in telecoms networks and services will deliver this goal by spurring innovation, offering choice, delivering improvements in quality and driving prices down.

1.3 One of our key objectives is therefore ensuring fair, efficient and sustainable competition. We are strongly committed to the development and maintenance of competition from both network operators and from service providers offering telecoms services over the networks of others.

1.4 Oftel therefore commits considerable resources and focus on investigating potential anti-competitive behaviour in the telecommunications industry. In 1996, Oftel opened 72 cases into potential anti-competitive behaviour. Oftel opened 10 of these on its own initiative, but the great majority of cases were instigated following complaints from, among others, network operators, service providers and large users.

1.5 Since June 1996, Oftel has operated a two-phase approach to the assessment of complaint-generated cases of anti-competitive behaviour. A preliminary enquiry is first conducted to gather the basic facts of a complaint and to establish whether the behaviour complained about may have an anti-competitive impact on the relevant market. Oftel aims to complete this preliminary enquiry within 30 working days, though many will be completed much earlier.

1.6 If Oftel considers that there is a case to answer, a complaint is moved to the investigation phase, where further information may need to be gathered and considered to form a final view. This may result in formal action being taken. Oftel’s target is to complete 75% of investigation phase cases within 3 months and all cases within 6 months, though, again many are completed much sooner.

1.7 This two-phase approach - alongside other Oftel initiatives begun over the last 18 months such as the Competition Bulletin and the suite of guidelines - has led to an improvement in the speed with which cases are handled, by eliminating at an early stage complaints where there is clearly no case to answer and allowing Oftel to concentrate resources on complaints where there is reason to believe there may be concerns. These changes have also improved the transparency of our decision making process.

1.8 Highlighting this improvement, only 24% of investigations opened in the first half of 1996 were closed within 6 months. The comparable figures for cases opened in the second half of 1996 and the first half of 1997 were 81% and 90% respectively.

1.9 Oftel is aiming to make further improvements in the speed with which investigations are handled. In Oftel’s experience, obtaining adequate and reliable information is crucial at all stages to the efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with fair trading matters. The more focussed and relevant the information which Oftel receives when a complaint is made, the better equipped it is to tackle the problem.

1.10 To this end, this document is aimed at potential complainants and is designed to increase the speed with which Oftel can handle complaints by making complainants aware of Oftel’s procedures in handling competition casework. It summarises the type of behaviour Oftel considers to be anti-competitive, the legal framework within which Oftel can take action to stop such behaviour, the procedures which Oftel follows to investigate complaints, sources of other useful information on Oftel’s competition casework and, finally, the type of information which should, wherever possible, be provided by complainants to Oftel when a complaint is first made.

1.11 It is not Oftel’s intention to place the burden of proof solely on complainants and Oftel will follow up any non-frivolous representation in whatever form it is made, provided there is some indication of a possible licence contravention. However, it is hoped that this document, by increasing awareness of Oftel’s procedures, will contribute to the expeditious investigation of complaints of anti-competitive behaviour.

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Chapter 2

What is anti-competitive behaviour?

2.1 Fundamentally, one of Oftel’s key roles is to enforce those conditions in Telecommunications licences which prohibit behaviour which has, or may have, a material impact on competition in the relevant market, ie the market in which the behaviour is taking place.

2.2 Oftel views a fully competitive market as being one in which no firm is able to act independently (in terms of either pricing or output decisions) of any other firms competing in that market, or a market in which an incumbent firm’s behaviour is effectively constrained by the threat of entry from firms outside the market. In this situation no firm should be able to raise and sustain its prices above the competitive level or act in such a way that effected competition by foreclosing market entry or competition.

2.3 Therefore, Oftel’s assessment of complaints of anti-competitive behaviour focusses on identifying the relevant market, identifying the level of competition in that market and then assessing the impact of the behaviour on competition.

2.4 Oftel’s guidelines on the implementation of the Fair Trading Condition give an extensive, although not exhaustive, account of the type of behaviour which may be anti-competitive, such as:

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Chapter 3

The legal framework

Licences granted under the Telecommunications Act, 1984

3.1 Oftel’s primary instrument of enforcement at present is the Telecommunications Act and the licences granted under it, particularly the conditions designed to ensure fair trading.

Licence conditions

3.2 Listed below are those conditions in the licences of public telecoms operators (PTOs) which Oftel most commonly uses or considers using to ensure fair trading by licensees. Broadly speaking, these conditions fall into the following four categories:

Enforcement action

3.3 If following an investigation, Oftel concludes that a licensee is or has been in contravention of one or more of its licence conditions and that it is likely to contravene again, the Director General will take forward enforcement action, such as issuing an order. If it appears to the Director that the licensee is contravening and is likely again to contravene he can issue a provisional order requiring the licensee to do such things as specified or described in the order to secure compliance. A provisional order will lapse after two months, unless confirmed. If the Director is satisfied that there has been a contravention and it is likely to reoccur or continue, he is normally required to issue a final order.

3.4 If a licensee fails to comply with an order and any person suffers damage as a result, that person is entitled to bring an action for damages or other appropriate relief against the licensee. The Director General can also obtain an injunction or other appropriate relief from the courts to perfect compliance with his order.

Licence modification

3.5 If necessary, licences can be modified either by agreement between the Director General and the licensee or by the Director General after referring the matter for investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Commission finding that the practice in question is against the public interest. However, most foreseeable types of anti-competitive behaviour can be controlled by the conditions referred to above.

Fair Trading Condition

3.6 The need for licence modifications to tackle anti-competitive behaviour should recede with the implementation of the fair trading condition into all PTO licences. Due to the detailed specific nature of licence conditions, in the past it was often very difficult for the Director General to take immediate enforcement action because the behaviour complained of does not come within the precise terms of the licence condition, if it is covered at all.

3.7 As competition has now emerged and continues to grow, it is vital that Oftel has the power to take effective and speedy action against anti-competitive practices while beginning the essential process of withdrawing from prescriptive rule-making. Therefore a Fair Trading Condition (FTC) prohibiting the making of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position was introduced into BT’s licence, coming into effect on 31 December 1996. At present, the FTC has been incorporated into the licences of around 100 operators and by the end of November 1997 will be in a further 200 licences.

3.8 The FTC closely mirrors the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the European Treaty and puts the onus clearly on dominant operators to ensure that they do not engage in the types of anti-competitive behaviour prohibited by the condition. The FTC gives Oftel effective and speedy tools to use against the full range of anti-competitive practices in whatever form they appear, without having first to go through the lengthy process of individual licence amendment.

3.9 The procedures for taking formal action under the FTC differ slightly from those for other licence conditions. Detailed guidelines on the operation of the FTC are available on this web site or can be obtained from Oftel’s Library.

General Competition Law

3.10 Oftel can also investigate allegations of anti-competitive behaviour under the Competition Act, 1980 and the Fair Trading Act, 1973 under which the Director General has powers concurrent with the Director General of Fair Trading to take action in telecoms related matters. This may be appropriate in areas where the activity in question is not covered by a licence or where licence modification is not appropriate. Furthermore, Oftel could recommend action under the provisions relating to restrictive trade practices in the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (RPTA), 1976. The RTPA is administered and enforced by the Director General of Fair Trading and the Restrictive Trade Practices Court. Action could also be taken under Article 85 (prohibition of agreements or other arrangements with an anti-competitive effect) or Article 86 (prohibition of abuses of dominant market positions) of the EC Treaty. Articles 85 and 86 are enforced by the European Commission but form part of English law and can therefore also be enforced in civil actions in the English Courts by private parties suffering damage from their breach.

The Competition Bill

3.11 The Competition Bill, introduced into Parliament in October 1997, proposes major changes in general competition law. Like the FTC, the Competition Bill introduces two prohibitions based on Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty; namely a prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position and a prohibition on anti-competitive agreements. It is proposed that Director General of Telecommunications will have concurrent powers of enforcement alongside the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT).

3.12 The Bill provides for new investigatory powers and would permit the imposition of fines for breach of the prohibitions. Decisions by the Director General of Telecommunications (or the DGFT) would be appealable to a new Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal. Unlike Judicial Review, appeals will be on the substance of the case and not just process.

3.13 The Bill also provides for the DGFT and regulators to publish guidelines on the interpretation of the prohibitions. Oftel will be working closely with the Office of Fair Trading and other regulators in the coming months on the development of these guidelines.

3.14 The Bill is expected to finish its progression through Parliament around summer 1998, but there is likely to be a transitional period of at least one year before prohibitions come into force.

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Chapter 4

Oftel’s approach to competition casework

Adapting to changing needs

4.1 The rapid growth of the telecoms industry in the UK in the 1990s in terms of both the number of products available and the number of players involved in network and service provision, has had two main consequences for Oftel in the type of complaints received:

4.2 This has required Oftel to: 4.3 At present, 19 members of staff across Oftel have as the main focus of their work the investigation of complaints of anti-competitive behaviour. They are supported by expert advice from internal lawyers, accountants, economists, statisticians and technical experts. Weekly panel meetings with representatives from all the expert branches assess all new complaints to identify the potential competition issues and evaluate what further information may be needed. The panel meetings also revisit/reassess investigations phase cases shortly before they reach the 3 and 6 months stage to assess case progress.

The two-phase approach to investigations

4.4 Upon receipt of a complaint (unless it is clearly without merit), Oftel will assign a case officer to consider the case. The case officer will acknowledge receipt of the complaint within 5 working days. In order to assess complaints of anti-competitive behaviour Oftel adopts a two stage approach.

Preliminary Enquiry phase

4.5 During the Preliminary Enquiry phase, initial consideration is given to determine whether there is a case to answer and whether to proceed to an investigation. Oftel will ascertain whether it has the jurisdiction to consider the complaint under the existing legal framework and take a view on whether there may have been any anti-competitive practice, abuse of monopoly power or other breach of the operators licence.

4.6 At the end of the preliminary enquiry phase, it is Oftel’s aim to understand:

4.7 This process may involve exchanges of correspondence or meetings with the complainant and/or the target of the complaint and/or other interested or potentially interested parties as well as reference to precedents in previous investigations.

4.8 Once the necessary information has been gathered, Oftel will be in a position to decide whether or not to take forward the complaint as a full investigation. Once, this go/no go decision has been taken, the complainant will be updated.

4.9 Oftel’s target is to complete this phase within 30 working days of receiving a complaint. However, if the initial evidence presented to Oftel clearly indicates a potential licence breach, a decision to proceed may be taken almost immediately.

Investigation phase

4.10 During the investigation phase, Oftel will use the information gathered in the preliminary enquiry phase and, if necessary, collect and consider the further information to form a judgement on whether the conduct complained about is having a damaging effect on competition in the relevant market.

4.11 To make a sound judgement, Oftel needs to answer the following questions:

4.12 Requests for information will not only be directed at the licensee which is the subject of the complaint. Oftel may also seek information from the complainant, other market players, customers and research sources.

4.13 Once Oftel has answered these questions, it would usually be in a position to make a provisional judgement on the merits of the complaint whether any enforcement action should be taken or whether the complaint should be rejected. Comments would usually be sought from the licensee who is the subject of the complaint, and potentially, the complainant and other interested parties. Oftel will then make and implement its final decision, including formal action, if appropriate.

4.14 Oftel’s target is to complete 75% of investigations within 3 months of the date they were moved to that phase and all investigations within 6 months. These targets are maxima and the Director General has issued a provisional order less than a week after a complaint was received. However, some cases, particularly those involving allegations of cross-subsidy, may take longer than 6 months, as financial information needs to be gathered and assessed. In all circumstances, the case officer will keep the complainant informed of the progress of the complaint at regular intervals.

Defining the relevant market

4.15 The approach that Oftel has proposed to adopt in respect of market definition in the enforcement of all licence conditions follows that approved by the European Court of Justice in the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. Oftel will also have regard to decisions and notices of the European Commission and relevant pronouncements of the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.

4.16 A starting point is whether goods or services are considered substitutable by consumers having regard to their characteristics, price or intended use. The approach to market definition taken by these organisations therefore focuses on the existence of constraints on the price-setting behaviour of firms in the absence of price control. There are three main aspects to consider:

Monitoring and Compliance

4.17 In certain investigations, the behaviour complained of has no clear impact on competition in the relevant market at that time, but there is a concern that it may have an effect in the future. In this case, Oftel closes the investigation, but commits to monitoring the relevant market or licensee at regular intervals. The recent investigations into some of BT’s Internet services resulted in such a decision (a statement on these investigations is available on this web site or from Oftel’s library).

4.18 Furthermore, where the Director General has taken formal action against a licensee, Oftel will monitor the licensee’s compliance with the requirements of the enforcement action and/or until it is satisfied that the problem has ceased.

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Chapter 5

Sources of information and advice

Competition Bulletin

5.1 Since June 1996, Oftel has published a quarterly Competition Bulletin (or from Oftel’s library). The bulletin provides summaries of all new complaints and of all cases closed in the previous three months.

5.2 The aims of the Competition Bulletin are:

to make more visible the focus of Oftel’s work in relation to competition policy and complaint casework, and provide a record of its results;

to establish improved routes for communication with all players in the industry so that Oftel can take full account of current developments in the market; and

to invite, where appropriate, broader input to, and comment on, reviews and investigations that Oftel undertakes and any enforcement measures that are proposed.

5.3 Over time Competition Bulletin should help the industry to understand better the analytical background to Oftel’s work and thus the approach likely to be adopted in particular problem situations. This should help equip the industry to operate within well understood parameters of fair and effective competition without excessive reliance on regulatory intervention.

Guidelines

5.4 Over the last year Oftel has produced a number of guidelines both in relation to specific telecommunications licences and associated licence conditions (eg Fair Trading Condition, Conditional Access class licence) and more general issues (eg affinity deals, trials of new services). They provide information not only on Oftel’s procedures but also on how specific competition issues are dealt with.

5.5 The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure that the industry and others have a proper understanding of Oftel’s approach to competition issues, thus helping to promote fair, efficient and sustainable competition and to secure fair trading.

5.6 Existing guidelines relate to:

Competition Hotline

5.7 Oftel’s Competition Hotline (0171 634 8833) is available from 9am to 5pm, Monday to Friday and provides a direct line to a member of the Competition and Fair Tradingbranch and is designed to provide advice to potential complainants.

Competition surgeries

5.8 Every last Wednesday in the month a senior member of Oftel’s Competition and Fair Trading branch will be available in person or on the Competition Hotline for consultation on competition issues. The surgeries aim to give potential complainants guidance on the approach to be taken by casework officers in dealing with complaints and details of the type of information needed by Oftel to pursue a particular issue.

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Chapter 6

Helping us to help you

6.1 The purpose of this document has been to increase the transparency of Oftel’s operations in relation to dealing with complaints of anti-competitive behaviour. We hope that by doing this and by referring to the suite of guidelines and to the precedents summarised in Competition Bulletin complainants will be aware of both the type of behaviour we are able to take action against and the type of information we would need to acquire during the course of an investigation.

6.2 It is not Oftel’s intention to place the burden of proof on the complainant. However, in Oftel’s experience of casework, the complainant’s supply of all available information and ongoing support can be crucial to the expeditious pursuit of a complaint by enabling Oftel to make well-informed initial decisions as to what the focus of the investigation should be.

Basic information required

6.3 The very least a complaint should contain is:

6.4 However, set out below is a list of questions which Oftel would usually have to answer during the course of an investigation. If potential complainants at least consider, and ideally answer, all or some of these questions before making a complaint, it would help to speed up the process of investigation.

Questions relating to market definition:

What do you consider to be the relevant market? How does this market operate? Do any other market definitions suggest themselves?

What function does the product fulfill?

Who are the target customers for the relevant products? What features are important to the customer? - marketing brochures or leaflets would be a useful source of information in this respect.

Are there any close substitutes to the product in question - how would customers react if the product went up in price ie what other products could they switch to?

Would there be costs involved in switching to alternative products eg is equipment dedicated? Is there any evidence of customers switching between products?

Does the product share a common technology or common network facilities with any other products?

Are there any firms which are in a position to switch existing capacity to supply this product? Would it be feasible for them to do this?

What is the relevant geographical scope of the market for the supply of this product eg regional, national (ie UK) or even international?

Questions relating to the level of competition in the relevant market

What are the (approximate) relevant turnover of the parties in the complaint? Annual reports would be an obvious source of information.

What is the approximate total size of the market - in value and volume terms (if relevant - it may be a completely new service)?

Which other firms compete in this market? What are their market shares? How have these moved over the last 3-5 years?

How do firms compete in this market? eg on price, on quality/service. How is competition organised - eg are there formal tendering processes? Do customers have a degree of buyer power?

How do the prices charged by different companies differ? What do we know about the price history of this market eg are prices on a downward or upward trend?

Are economies of scale or scope important in this market?

Are there any significant first mover advantages in this market?

Are there any significant barriers to entry into this market - ie what problems might a new entrant face eg are there large fixed costs which must be incurred; are any key elements/processes protected by intellectual property rights (eg patents, licences)?

Have any new firms entered in the last 3-5 years? Have any exited?

Questions relating to the effect on competition of the behaviour complained about

What is the effect on the business of the complainant? eg loss of market share, loss of revenues.

What is the effect on customers?

Questions relating to possible remedies

What licence conditions may have been breached, or what other legal provisions are relevant?

What remedial action is sought? - the complainant will often be better placed than Oftel to know what changes would deal with the matter of concern;

Have there been previous cases of the same or similar type?

6.5 Complainants should also consider sending supporting evidence, such as contracts, offending letters, etc. These should be marked confidential if necessary.

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Annex A

Complainant Check List

1. Name, address, telephone and fax numbers of contact.

2. Name of company against whom the complaint is made, including, if appropriate, the relevant part or business of that company.

3. Permission to disclose complainant’s name and full details of complaint to the target of the complaint.

4. Permission to disclose complainant’s name in Competition Bulletin.

5. Summary of complaint.

6. Urgency of complaint, with reasons.

7. Consider and, if possible answer questions relating to the definition of the relevant market;

6. Enclose any evidence supporting the above.

7. Mark all information that is to remain confidential.

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Annex B

Key contacts within Oftel

Please send all correspondence to:

Oftel

50 Ludgate Hill

London

EC4M 7JJ

In the first instance, complaints should be addressed to: 
for competition, licence enforcement and fair trading issues: for competition policy and pricing issues: 
Andreas Avgousti, 

Deputy Director 

0171 634 8825

William Lea, 

Manager, Competition Policy Group 

0171 634 8983

Competition Hotline: 0171 634 8833
Fax number: 0171 634 8949
e-mail: fairtrade.oftel@gtnet.gov.uk 
 Questions or comments on Competition Bulletin should be addressed to:

Philip Taylor

Competition Casework Team Leader

0171 634 8829

Questions or comments on guidelines should be addressed to:

William Lea

Manager, Competition Policy Group

0171 634 8983 


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