November 1997
This consultative document sets out Oftel’s approach to identifying Significant Market Power (SMP) and explains which operators it proposes to determine as having SMP, in compliance with Article 18 of the Interconnection Directive (97/33/EC) (ICD) as implemented in the UK.
Chapter 2 – The Interconnection Directive and its Significant Market Power framework
Chapter 3 – Identifying the relevant market under the ICD
Chapter 4 – Identification of SMP in the UK
The consultation period will run until 19 December 1997. Written comments should be submitted to:
Sally Trebble, Consultation on Significant Market Power and the Interconnection Directive, Oftel, 50 Ludgate Hill, London, EC4M 7JJ.
Written comments will be made publicly available in Oftel’s Library except where respondents indicate that their response or parts of it are confidential. Respondents are therefore asked to separate out any confidential material into a confidential annex which is clearly marked as such. In the interests of transparency, respondents are requested to avoid confidentiality markings wherever possible.
Comments on this document can also be sent to Oftel on the Internet (if they are relatively short) by filling in the form on the Web pages or by using the following e-mail address: press.office.oftel@gtnet.gov.uk
Oftel intends to set up a link between this document on Oftel’s pages and any responses placed on respondents' own Internet pages. Please contact Cate MacLaurin at Oftel on 0171 634 8752 to organise this.
Confidential responses should not be sent via the Internet.
Copies of the DTI consultation document on implementation of the Interconnection Directive are available from:
Philippa Lloyd
Communications and Information Industries Directorate
Department of Trade and Industry
Room 203, 151 Buckingham Palace Road
London SW1W 9SS
The document is also available on DTI’s Web pages at http://www.dti.gov.uk/interconnection/condoc
– fixed networks and services;
– mobile networks and services;
– leased lines services.
1.1 For the purposes of identifying which UK operators have Significant Market Power (SMP) under the Interconnection Directive (Directive 97/33/EC) (the ICD), the UK National Regulatory Authority (NRA) is Oftel. This document sets out Oftel’s proposals for identifying operators who have SMP in the UK and the methodology which Oftel intends to adopt for SMP determinations. As foreshadowed in the current DTI consultation on implementation of the ICD, Oftel proposes to determine that four operators – BT, Kingston (and Kingston-upon-Hull City Council as dual licensee), Cellnet and Vodafone – have SMP.
1.2 On completion of the consultation process, Oftel will issue a formal determination, which will be transmitted by DTI to the European Commission in accordance with Article 18 of the ICD. DTI has consulted on its proposed measures for implementing the ICD. These documents are complementary and should be read together. The DTI document is available on the DTI Web pages, or directly from DTI at the address above.
1.3 Separately, Oftel intends to consult shortly on which operators are considered to have SMP on the leased lines market for the purposes of the ONP Leased Lines Directive (as amended).
2.1 The objective of the ICD is to establish a regulatory framework for securing interconnection of networks and interoperability of services, while ensuring the provision of universal service. Recital 2 of the Directive states that “a general framework for interconnection to public telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services, irrespective of the supporting technologies employed, is needed in order to provide end-to-end interoperability of services for Community users.“ Fair, proportionate and non-discriminatory conditions for interconnection and interoperability, it goes on to say, are key factors in fostering the development of open and competitive markets.
2.2 All operators who are subject to the provisions of the ICD once it has been implemented into Member State law have rights and obligations to negotiate interconnection with one another and must respect certain other requirements, such as the obligation to provide information to the NRA. Operators become subject to these obligations following notification to the Commission by the DTI of their inclusion in Annex 2 of the Directive. These principles are explained in the DTI consultation document on implementation of the ICD in the UK, available from DTI at the address above.
2.3 The ICD also creates a framework in which operators who have been determined by Oftel to have SMP are subject to a further set of obligations designed to ensure transparency, non-discrimination and cost orientation. SMP is described in terms of the operator’s position and status within a Member State’s telecommunications industry, and particularly its role in end-to-end communications for consumers. The SMP test for the purposes of the ICD does not require consideration of individual product markets (eg local or long distance calls; voice telephony or value added services) as would happen in the case of a competition case investigation. The objective of the SMP framework is similar – to control an operator’s ability to distort competition or to maintain barriers to entry, but this is assessed across end-to-end communications rather than in individual product markets.
Obligations imposed by the ICD on operators who have SMP
2.4 Operators who have SMP will be subject to the obligations set out in Articles 4(2), 6, 7, and 8(2) of the ICD (although most of the obligations set out in Article 7 and Article 8(2) do not apply to mobile operators). The obligations imposed on operators with SMP are explained in paragraphs 31 to 35 of the DTI consultation document on implementation of the ICD. Briefly, they are as follows:
The SMP Test
2.5 The SMP test is set out in Article 4(3) of the ICD. It lists various factors which the NRA must take into account when considering whether an operator has SMP. No single factor has decisive weight, although, given that the objectives of the Directive are end-to-end communications for all users and universal service, particular attention will be given to an operator’s ability to control access to customers. A presumption of SMP will arise when an operator has a market share of 25%. Nevertheless, the NRA is given discretion to determine, on the basis of the other factors, that an operator with a market share less than 25% has SMP, or conversely that an operator with a market share of more than 25% does not have SMP.
2.6 The other factors listed in the Directive are:
The text of the SMP test in the ICD is set out in Annex A.
3.1 The ICD sets out provisions for identifying the markets, or activities which are relevant for the purposes of identifying SMP. The ICD adopts a high level approach, concentrating on the activities considered to be of major importance at the European level and defining the relevant geographic market for the calculation of market shares.
The 'relevant geographic market'
3.2 For the purpose of identifying whether an operator has SMP, this is the geographical area within which an organisation is authorised to operate. This means that the limits of an organisation’s licence authorisation define the limits of the geographic market which the NRA must look at when considering whether an operator has SMP. This is not necessarily the same as the geographic market identified for the purposes of competition investigations, which is defined according to demand and supply conditions.
The 'relevant product market'
3.3 The Commission have indicated that the relevant markets for determining SMP under the Directive are set out in Annex 1 of the ICD. They are:
It is these three categories of services which must be looked at for the purposes of identifying SMP. The Directive makes no provision for sub-dividing these markets into specific products or services. SMP obligations could not therefore be imposed on operators who have market power in some individual product markets but do not meet the SMP test, which must be determined across one or more of the broad sectors set out in Annex 1 of the ICD (eg the entire fixed network market).
The relevant market for fixed public telephone networks and services
3.4 The network market is defined in Annex 1 of the Directive as the public switched telecommunications network which supports the transfer between network termination points at fixed locations of speech and 3.1 kHz bandwidth audio information. Access to the end-user’s network termination point is via a number or numbers in the national numbering plan.
3.5 The relevant market for fixed public telephone services is defined by reference to the Voice Telephony Directive (95/62/EC), as the provision to end-users at fixed locations of a service for the originating and receiving of national and international calls, and may include access to emergency (999/112) services, the provision of operator assistance, directory services, provision of public payphones, provision of service under special terms and/or provision of special facilities for customers with disabilities or with special social needs. Access to the end-user is via a number or numbers in the national numbering plan.
The relevant market for leased lines services
3.6 Leased lines, as defined in Annex 1, means the telecommunications facilities which provide for transparent transmission capacity between network termination points, and which do not include on-demand switching (switching functions which the user can control as part of the leased line provision). They may include systems which allow flexible use of the leased line bandwidth, including certain routing and management capabilities.
The relevant market for public mobile telephone networks and services
3.7 A public mobile telephony network is defined by Annex 1 as a public telephone network where the network termination points are not at fixed locations.
3.8 Public mobile telephone service is defined as a telephony service whose provision consists wholly or partly in the establishment of radiocommunications to one mobile user and makes use wholly or partly of a public mobile telephone network.
The geographic market
4.1 Consistent with the UK government’s implementation of other EU Directives to date, Oftel proposes to take an 'organisation' to be the licensee (defined as a “public operator“ in the draft Regulations which implement the ICD). The alternative approach of treating the organisation, for the purposes of identifying SMP, as an 'undertaking' ie a group of companies including wholly owned subsidiaries, would not be consistent with the draft Regulations.
4.2 The UK markets for networks and services have been liberalised for some considerable time and there is now a multiplicity of operators, great diversity of services, and developing re-distribution of market share. One feature of the UK market is the tendency of the smaller operators to extend the area of their operations, either by network roll-out under licences covering wider areas (often including a national licence), or by mergers with other licensees. Operators deemed to be “public operators“ for the purposes of implementation of the Interconnection Directive may in fact hold several licences, some of which overlap – with the result that a single organisation may in fact exist as several different licensees.
4.3 Where a licensee reaches or approaches 25% market share within the geographic limits of its licence, Oftel would consider whether it should be deemed to have SMP. Oftel considers that in such cases, the relevant geographic area would have to be decided on a licence by licence basis. Where a single organisation has more than one licence, the geographic area to be considered will be decided on a case by case basis. This exercise would include consideration of which licences may be relevant in defining the relevant geographic market.
4.4 In any such exercise, Oftel would look closely at all the factors set out in Article 4(3) and where several factors were compelling – particularly the operator’s ability to control access to end-users or its economic market power – Oftel would consider exercising its discretion under the Directive to determine an operator as having SMP even though they had a market share in the relevant licensed area or areas which was less than 25%.
4.5 Similarly, where a licensee had more than 25% of the market within the geographic area within which it is licensed to operate, Oftel would consider the other factors in the Directive when deciding whether a determination of SMP was justified in all the circumstances.
Measuring market share
4.6 A market share of 25% or more gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that an operator has SMP. It is therefore crucial to adopt consistent and reliable indicators of market share as the starting point for identifying operators who have SMP. The method of calculating market share will depend on the availability of reliable data. A great deal of information is collected by Oftel from operators at a national level. However, because of the difficulty of collecting consistent information from all operators without imposing undue burdens on the operators, only limited information is available for areas defined by regional licences.
4.7 Oftel considers that revenues are the most appropriate measure for calculating market shares for broad markets as defined in the directive. On a national basis revenue data is available and will be used to calculate the market shares of those operators who are nationally licensed for the purposes of determining whether an operator has SMP. For operators who are licensed regionally, Oftel will use available information, such as number of exchange lines, to estimate market share. Given that these estimates on a regional basis will be less robust than market shares calculated on a national basis, Oftel will pay particular regard to the other factors set out in paragraph 9, which must be taken into account when determining SMP.
4.8 Revenues will be calculated over a 12 month period between April and March. For the purposes of these determinations the period taken is April 1996 to March 1997.
4.9 For the calculation of revenue market shares, the relevant sectors are defined in terms of services provided to end users rather than interconnect services supplied to other operators. Thus, although the objective of the ICD is to regulate interconnection, Oftel proposes to measure market share for the purposes of the SMP determination on the basis of retail revenues received from end users. Using interconnect services as the basis would also be misleading as this would not take account of the majority of traffic in the UK, which originates and terminates on one network (BT’s).
Measuring BT’s market
4.10 BT is currently licensed to operate everywhere in the UK except the Hull area. Thus for the purposes of calculating BT’s market share in terms of revenues, the total from which BT’s share will be calculated is all UK operators' revenues less revenues from the Hull area (ie Kingston’s revenues – see below)
Measuring Kingston’s market
4.11 Kingston has historically been the monopoly supplier of telecommunications in the Hull area. Kingston’s licence only allows it to operate in the Hull area, where it still faces no local access competition and thus controls access to 100% of customers. Because of this, its market share can be measured in retail revenues from the Hull area.
Regional operators
4.12 The market share for those operators with regional licences will follow the approach outlined above. The relevant geographic market is bounded by the scope of the licence(s) under which they are offering telephony services.
4.13 In the case of CWC, where the telephony operations of the merged Mercury, NYNEX, Videotron and Bell Cablemedia are all being run under a single national licence (the Mercury licence), the relevant market is the national market.
Measuring the market for fixed networks and services
4.14 For fixed network and services, the most appropriate measure of market share is share of the combined retail revenues for exchange line rental, exchange line set up/connection charges and call charges. Including all three types of charges ensures consistency across operators as each individual operator may choose to set its prices, and hence revenues, differently between connection, rental and call charges. Using this data gives the following market shares:
| 1996/97 Retail revenues for the fixed sector | ||
| Revenues (£million) | Share of relevant market | |
| Total UK | 10,702 | 100% |
| BT | 8,960 | 84% |
| All other operators combined | 1,687 | 16% |
| Kingston | 50 | 100% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
4.15 BT and Kingston are the only operators with more than 25% share – and it is very considerably more. Kingston has close to 100% of revenues for the Hull area, even after deducting revenues paid to indirect access operators who provide long distance and international services to Kingston customers. Kingston’s revenues are at least three times the 25% market share threshold. All other national operators (including CWC) together have well below 25% share in their relevant markets.
Measuring regional markets
4.16 Oftel is aware that several regionally licensed operators who do not run their operations under a national licence, are approaching, or have passed the 25% market share threshold within their franchises. In no case is this significantly above 25%. Penetration measured in terms of homes passed may be well above 25% – but this is not relevant to identifying SMP which looks at the whole area covered by the licence. For the reasons set out below, Oftel does not consider it appropriate to determine any of these regional operators as having SMP and consequently, figures are not reproduced here.
Measuring the mobile market
4.17 For mobile networks and services, the measurement of market share is complicated by the structure of the industry in the UK. Two operators, Orange and One 2 One, mainly offer their services directly to end users, ie they are vertically integrated operations, which means that retail revenues accrue directly to the group. The other two operators, Cellnet and Vodafone, offer services through mobile service providers who procure services on behalf of their end-user customers. Some of the mobile service providers are tied to the Cellnet or Vodafone networks while others remain independent. This means that not all retail revenues accrue direct to the Cellnet and Vodafone groups. Comparing the retail revenues for Orange and One 2 One with revenues from service providers for Cellnet and Vodafone would overstate Orange and One 2 One’s share of the market. However, for regulatory purposes, Orange and One 2 One report the value of the internal transactions corresponding to the transactions between Cellnet and Vodafone and their respective service providers. Hence for mobile services, the measure of market share can be calculated as share of net revenues from service providers (or the equivalent imputed revenues) for subscriber rental, set up/connection charges and call charges. This gives the following market shares:
| 1996/97 Retail revenues for the mobile service sector | ||
| Revenues (£million) | Share of relevant market | |
| Total UK | 1,987 | 100% |
| Vodafone | 877 | 44% |
| Cellnet | 751 | 38% |
| Orange | 208 | 10% |
| One 2 One | 150 | 8% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
4.18 Both Vodafone and Cellnet have a market share significantly greater than 25%, with Orange and One 2 One each having a share significantly less than 25%.
4.19 Article 7 of the ICD requires operators who have SMP on the “national market for interconnection“ to offer cost-orientated interconnection charges. The ICD does not itself impose any of the obligations in Article 7 on mobile operators who do not have SMP identified on this basis. Oftel has looked at the mobile operators' share of total interconnect revenues for fixed and mobile operators. This gives the following results:
| 1996/97 UK national interconnect revenues | ||
| Revenues (£millions) | Share of revenues | |
| All operators (fixed and mobile) | 2,090 | |
| Vodafone | 250 | 12% |
| Cellnet | 202 | 10% |
| One 2 One | 35 | 2% |
| Orange | 45 | 2% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
4.20 This shows that each of the four operators has significantly less than a 25% share of the national interconnect market as defined by the ICD.
4.21 However, where disputes about interconnection charges are referred to Oftel for resolution, Oftel would generally view a cost-basis as appropriate for resolving disputes according to the criteria in Article 9 of the Directive, and the SMP test would not be treated as a relevant factor when deciding whether to do so in a dispute involving a mobile operator.
Leased lines
4.22 For leased line services the appropriate measure is share of retail revenues for rental and setup/connection charges. Market share is measured across all leased circuits together, both analogue and digital, and for both domestic leased circuits and the UK half of International Private Leased Circuits. This gives the following market shares:
| 1996/97 Retail revenues for the leased lines sector | ||
| Revenues (£million) | Share of relevant market | |
| Total UK | 1,468 | 100% |
| BT | 1,169 | 80% |
| CWC | 257 | 18% |
| All other operators (together) | 38 | 3% |
| Kingston | 3 | 100% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
4.23 BT has a market share which is considerably greater than 25%. Kingston has close to 100% in the Hull area. CWC’s position is boosted by high revenues from large capacity circuits both in the UK and internationally, but it remains well below 25%.
Other factors
4.24 While the market share tests give clear results, the ICD does not require the NRA to base SMP determinations solely on market share – indeed in some circumstances the further factors specified in the Directive may outweigh it. These factors and their application are discussed below.
Market power
4.25 Oftel takes market power to be “the ability of an operator to raise and sustain prices above the competitive level.“ Oftel believes that BT has such power in the fixed and leased lines markets in the UK (outside Hull) and that Kingston has such power in the Hull area. In particular, Oftel believes that the Hull telecoms market is a distinct economic market in which Kingston’s control of access gives it market power. Oftel considers that CWC now has market power only in a few individual services markets, namely the markets for international facilities and services on “non-competitive“ routes. Oftel does not believe that CWC has market power in any of its purely inland markets; thus for the purposes of the ICD, the extent of its market power is insufficient to outweigh the market share test. Nor does any other cable PTO or any other UK licensed operator have the ability to influence market conditions to the extent necessary to distort competition.
4.26 In the mobile market, Oftel has concluded that both Vodafone and Cellnet have a degree of market power. This is explained in Oftel’s statement Fair Trading in the Mobile Telephony Market published in April 1997 (market power in the mobile market is discussed in Annex B of that document). Oftel believes that analogue and digital markets should be considered together for the purposes of identifying market power in the mobile market, primarily because customers are largely interested in services rather than technologies and that from the customer’s perspective, analogue and digital are effectively substitutes. Within this market, the entry of Mercury Personal Communications Ltd (One 2 One) and Orange has stimulated price competition, but it has not produced the reductions in mobile tariffs nor eroded the market shares of the established operators to the extent which some might have expected. Although various factors have probably contributed to this, such as switching costs and the lower coverage of their networks, on balance Oftel has concluded that although neither Vodafone nor Cellnet is necessarily dominant, each does possess market power.
Control of the means of access to customers
4.27 For fixed services the means of access to customers is an exchange line, for mobile services it is an activated mobile telephone and for leased circuits it is a local end. For fixed services, the number of exchange lines (including ISDN lines) is a good measure of operator’s control of access to customers. This gives the following shares:
| Fixed service sector: Number of exchange lines as at 31/3/97 | ||
| Lines (thousands) | Share | |
| Total UK | 30,678 | 100% |
| BT | 27,554 | 90% |
| All other operators (together) | 2,932 | 10% |
| Kingston | 185 | 100% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
4.28 This reinforces the conclusions resulting from the application of the market share test as BT has a greater share of customer exchange lines than its share of retail revenues and Kingston controls 100% of access to end customers in the Hull area. It also confirms that, collectively, other regional operators' control of access to end users is limited, although some regional operators control access to more than 25% of customers within their franchises.
4.29 For mobile services the number of individual subscribers can be used as an indicator (with each telephone number being counted for multi-user accounts). This gives the following shares:
| Mobile service sector: Number of subscribers as at 31/3/97 | ||
| Subscribers (thousand) | Share | |
| Total UK | 7,109 | 100% |
| Vodafone | 2,867 | 40% |
| Cellnet | 2,728 | 38% |
| Orange | 894 | 13% |
| One 2 One | 620 | 9% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
4.30 These shares closely reflect the market share information as revenues per subscriber are similar for all four operators.
4.31 For leased lines counting the capacity of local ends will give an indication of the relative market position of the operators. When calculating capacities, each inland analogue circuit is counted as two ends, each international analogue circuit is counted as one end, inland digital circuits are counted as twice the number of 64kbits equivalent circuits (so for example a 256 kbit circuit would be counted as 4 [ x 64kbits] x 2 = 8 local ends) and international digital circuits are counted as the number of 64kbits equivalent circuits. This gives the following shares as at 31 March 1997:
| Leased lines sector : Capacity of local ends as at 31/3/97 | ||
| Number/64kbits equivalents (000s) | Share | |
| Total UK | 3,183 | 100% |
| BT | 2,532 | 80% |
| CWC | 524 | 16% |
| All other operators (together) | 117 | 4% |
| Kingston | 3 | 100% |
| Source: Oftel Market Information | ||
Experience in the market
4.32 Both BT and Kingston (or their predecessors) have been supplying telephony services since the early part of this century. Kingston in particular has been and continues to be the dominant operator in Hull since no other fixed operator has direct access to customers in the Hull area. Cellnet and Vodafone first started offering mobile services in 1984, when cellular services were first launched in the UK. Thus each of these four operators has considerable experience of providing services (and entered the market well before their UK competitors).
4.33 Regionally licensed operators, such as cable operators, have all entered the market since 1992. None of them is particularly well-established and indeed the majority are still in the process of rolling out their networks.
Turnover/access to resources
4.34 Kingston, BT, Cellnet and Vodafone are, or are part of, groups which offer a range of services other than the relevant services. All these groups have had access to capital sufficient to enable them to invest significantly in the UK and in businesses offering services outside the UK. The BT group and the Vodafone group have large turnovers relative to the relevant UK markets, of £14.9 billion and £1.7 billion respectively. The turnover of the Kingston group, at £108 million, is large in comparison to the Hull market.
4.35 Many other operators in the UK are members of groups with substantial turnover either in businesses in the UK unrelated to telecommunications or businesses overseas. This could materially affect the balance in identifying SMP should any of these operators be close to meeting the 25% market share threshold, or if other market factors also indicated that conclusion. Oftel considers that in the present circumstances of the UK market, this factor does not have decisive weight in any individual case.
4.36 The newer market entrants, notably regionally licensed cable operators have access to limited financial resources and operate in competitive markets. Most cable operators have a turnover which is small in comparison to the size of the market.
Conclusion
4.37 On the basis of the approach set out above, Oftel proposes to nominate BT and Kingston as having Significant Market Power in the fixed market and the leased lines market and Cellnet and Vodafone as having Significant Market Power in the mobile market.
4.38 Despite certain regional operators having a market share in excess of 25%, Oftel does not propose to nominate any other fixed operator as having SMP. It considers that it would be wholly inappropriate and disproportionate to impose SMP obligations on operators who are relatively new to the market and whose networks are, in many cases, not fully rolled out, and whose access to financial resources is consequently constrained. In particular, none has a market share exceeding 35% – unlike Kingston, which is regionally licensed but which controls 100% of customers and almost 100% of revenues in the Hull area; control of access to customers is still limited and considerably outweighed by BT’s share of customers; and cable operators ability to use market power in an anti-competitive way is virtually non-existent.
4.39 SMP obligations will apply to the relevant (interconnection) activities of the public operator deemed to have SMP. SMP obligations will not apply to the activities of an operator which are outside the sector in which it has SMP – thus should an operator have SMP in the mobile market but not in the fixed market, its fixed operations will not be subject to SMP obligations.
Decisions about SMP under other Directives
5.1 This document sets out Oftel’s proposed approach to identifying SMP for the purposes of the ICD only. Determinations made under the ICD will not be decisive for determinations under other Directives with an SMP regime, although Oftel would expect to apply a consistent methodology. Decisions about SMP under other Directives will have to be made on a case by case basis, considering the tests set out in the Directives in question and based on such information as is best suited to the purpose.
Future developments
5.2 The Commission will review the ICD before 31 December 1999. Oftel does not expect that it will be necessary to review its SMP determinations before 1999, unless there are significant changes to market conditions in the UK.
Relationship between SMP nominations and other Market Power Controls
5.3 It will be clear from this consultation that SMP is different from the usual approaches to competition analysis in competition cases. A determination that an operator has SMP is a reflection of the nature and status of that operator within the geographical limits of its licences. It is not a comment on its position or behaviour in a particular telecommunications service or product market. Conversely both EU and UK competition rules are generally applied by reference to an undertaking’s position in specific service or product markets. Accordingly, a determination that an organisation has (or does not have) SMP has no bearing on its position in an individual market under EU or UK competition rules. Likewise, use of UK or EU competition rules in terms of behaviour in a particular product market – such as exercise of the Fair Trading Condition in the UK or an action under Article 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty – does not imply that an operator has SMP in the wider sectors of activity set out in the Directive.
5.4 Oftel will shortly be issuing a further statement on market definition and competition analysis as part of its review of effective competition. This document will also discuss the relationship between these different tests as well as the interaction of other tests based on market power (eg Well Established Operator status).
An organisation shall be presumed to have significant market power when it has a share of more than 25% of a particular telecommunications market in the geographical area in a Member State within which it is authorised to operate.
National regulatory authorities may nevertheless determine that an organisation with a market share of less than 25% in the relevant market has significant market power. They may also determine that an organisation with a market share of more than 25% in the relevant market does not have significant market power.
In either case, the determination shall take into account the organisation’s ability to influence market conditions, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its control of the means of access to end-users, its access to financial resources and its experience in providing products and services in the market.
