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A
statement issued by the Director General of Telecommunications
9
October 2002
Contents
Summary
Chapter
1 Introduction, Background, Legal framework, The
new European framework, Scope
Chapter
2 The essential requirements Guidelines
Chapter
3 The Criteria of restriction of network access
Annex
A Licence Condition 20
Annex
B Analysis of responses to the consultation
Annex
C Glossary
Annex
D References
Summary
S.1 This statement
presents the conclusions of a consultation carried out by the Director
General of Telecommunications from December 2001 to March 2002 on two
draft documents:
S.2 The Guidelines
(see reference 1) concern the interpretation of the network security
and integrity provisions of Condition 20 of the Public Telecommunications
Operators’ (PTO) Licence. The Criteria (see reference 2) document
presents a set of criteria for restriction of access to the network
on the grounds of network security and integrity, as cited in the same
licence condition.
S.3 The Guidelines
document is based on the output from the Essential Requirements Task
Group (ERTG) of the Network Interoperability Consultative Committee
(NICC). The NICC is an industry committee set up to advise the Director
General on interoperability issues and to provide guidance to standards
bodies on such issues. The Criteria document was also prepared
by the ERTG. The ERTG was set up by the NICC in response to Oftel’s
July 2000 request for advice on the network security and integrity provisions
of Condition 20. The ERTG delivered drafts of the Guidelines
and Criteria to the NICC in July 2001 and October 2001 respectively.
These documents were accepted by the NICC for onward transmission to
Oftel, subject to the understanding that a public consultation on both
documents would be carried out.
S.4 Oftel would
like to take this opportunity to record its thanks to the NICC and in
particular the members of the ERTG for their extremely valuable contribution
to the production of the draft Guidelines and Criteria.
S.5 Prior to consultation
on the draft documents, Oftel made some modifications for reasons explained
in the consultation document. These modifications particularly related
to the addition of the so-called ‘lifeline’ requirements to the draft
Guidelines, which included requirements for line-powering of
end-user equipment in certain circumstances.
S.6 Oftel sought
comments on both the draft Guidelines and the draft Criteria.
This consultation process was primarily aimed at members of the Industry,
however it was also hoped that consumer groups would particularly wish
to note the line-powering issue referred to above, and reflected in
question four of the consultation.
S.7 Oftel received
17 responses from network operators, equipment manufacturers and consumer
groups during the consultation period. Three of these responses were
confidential.
S.8 In general,
respondents agreed that it was appropriate for Oftel to publish the
Guidelines and Criteria. Some respondents made detailed
suggestions for modifications to the text of the Guidelines and
Criteria, many of which have been implemented by Oftel. Most respondents
also agreed that it was appropriate for Oftel to assume the network
operators were using the Criteria as the basis for implementing
network access restrictions on the grounds of network security and integrity,
if network operators did not identify their own criteria in advance.
S.9 A particular
concern raised by many respondents was whether or not the annexes describing
the telephone emergency service and the so-called ‘lifeline’ requirements
should be included in the Guidelines. Oftel considered these
arguments in detail, and decided to address these concerns by publishing
the description of the telephone emergency service as a separate stand-alone
document. Whilst the ‘lifeline’ requirements remain in an annex to the
Guidelines, Oftel has re-worded some of the more controversial
elements of these requirements to make Oftel’s expectations in this
area clearer.
S.10 Oftel received
a variety of responses to its question about line powering obligations
for one and two line telephony. Most network operators considered that
these requirements should be relaxed. Most consumer groups were against
any relaxation of these requirements as they considered that any change
would adversely affect consumers, particularly vulnerable consumers.
Several respondents suggested that a wider debate was required.
S.11 On balance,
Oftel’s view is that no change can be made at the moment to the policy
requiring that provision be made for line powering for one and two line
telephony services, as this reflects current consumer expectations.
Any change would require further and wide-reaching work to identify
appropriate alternative protections for consumers.
S.12 Having considered
comments received during the consultation process, Oftel is now formally
adopting and publishing final versions of the Guidelines and
Criteria.
S.13 At the time
of publication, it is clear that the risk environment has changed due
to global events, in terms of risk both to commercial interests and
to wider public interests. In Oftel’s view, this does not change the
guidance contained in these documents, but it will change the degree
to which operators will wish to implement security measures. Oftel will
continue to give emphasis to network security in general, and to compliance
with these Guidelines in particular.
S.14 Chapter one
of this document sets out the background to this statement, and the
relevant requirements of PTO Licence Condition 20. Chapter two explains
the changes made to the Guidelines, both before and after the
consultation process. Chapter three explains the changes made to the
Criteria. The text of Licence Condition 20, an analysis of the
responses received during the consultation process and a glossary are
contained in annexes to the document.

Chapter
1
Introduction
Background
1.1 'Essential requirements'
are so-called because they are non-market requirements that must be
delivered in recognition of the important role that telecommunications
plays in the wider economic and social well-being of a country.
1.2 There has been
an essential requirements condition (now Condition 20) in public telecommunications
operators’ licences since July 1998 (see Legal framework below).
The licence condition refers to the licensee taking "all reasonably
practicable steps to maintain to the greatest extent possible"
network security and network integrity. However, these terms are not
defined in either the licence condition or in the Revised Voice Telephony
Directive 98/10/EC (RVTD) (see reference 3) from which these requirements
stem.
1.3 Additionally,
the licence condition requires that any restrictions imposed by the
licensee on access to the Fixed Public Telephone System on the grounds
of network security or network integrity are proportionate, non-discriminatory
and based on objective criteria identified in advance. Once again, neither
the licence condition nor the RVTD (see reference 3) provides clear
statements on who should create these objective criteria. Oftel has
noted that no operator has yet published any such criteria.
1.4 Therefore, in
the absence of guidance elsewhere, Oftel set up a project to produce
and publish guidelines on the network security and integrity requirements
in Condition 20, along with criteria for the restriction of network
access on the grounds of network integrity or security. Oftel did not
take this action because it was aware of major shortfalls in network
security, but was doing so simply to address the gap in guidance. Oftel
considered that there should be a common understanding between Oftel
and the industry of what might represent appropriate measures to protect
network security and integrity, and what actions an operator might legitimately
take to restrict network access in pursuit of this goal. Oftel also
made it clear that Oftel will continue to monitor and investigate compliance
to Condition 20, proactively seeking extra information and taking enforcement
action if needed, and will ensure the provisions of any new European
Directives in this area are taken into account.
1.5 In July 2000,
Oftel asked the NICC to advise the Director General on:
- the publication
of guidelines on the network security and integrity essential requirements
licence condition; and
- objective, proportionate,
non-discriminatory and industry-agreed criteria for restriction of
access to the network on the grounds of network security or network
integrity.
1.6 In response
to Oftel’s request, the NICC set up the ERTG, which held its first meeting
in September 2000. Membership of the ERTG was open to:
- the Public Network
Operators Interest Group (PNO-IG) of the NICC (representing both fixed
and mobile public network operators);
- the Special Systems
and Public Equipment Interest Group (SSPE-IG) of the NICC (representing
manufacturers of public network exchanges and associated equipment);
and
- interested government
departments.
1.7 The ERTG delivered
a draft of the Guidelines to the NICC in July 2001 and draft
Criteria in October 2001. The NICC approved these documents and forwarded
them to Oftel, subject to the proviso that there would be a period of
consultation when further comments could be made.
1.8 In December
2001, Oftel launched a public consultation on the draft Guidelines
and Criteria. The consultation period ran until March 2002.
1.9 This statement
summarises the comments Oftel received during the consultation period,
along with Oftel’s response to those comments. The statement also explains
the consequential changes that have been made to the text of the Guidelines
and Criteria and sets out Oftel’s decision to formally adopt
and publish these documents. It is important to note however that the
resulting Guidelines and Criteria are not binding on the
Director General and do not fetter the Director General’s discretion.
1.10 In this document
(and in the Guidelines), the term ‘network security’ is used
to refer to protecting the availability of the network and services
from threats due to the inherent reliability of the network, and its
vulnerability to hazards such as weather, natural disaster and malicious
acts
1.11 ‘Network integrity’
concerns threats to the normal operation of the network that enter via
the network itself, and also those that are introduced from outside
sources such as customers or other networks. Examples of such threats
include electrical conditions, signalling and traffic loads.
Legal framework
1.12 Article 13
of the RVTD (see reference 3) identifies five ‘essential requirements’
that apply to all fixed public telephone networks and fixed public telephone
services:
- the first essential
requirement in the RVTD (see reference 3) is the security of network
operations. The RVTD (see reference 3) requires that Member States
take all necessary steps to ensure the availability of fixed public
telephone networks and services in the event of catastrophic network
breakdown or force majeure such as earthquake, flood and fire;
- the second essential
requirement in the RVTD (see reference 3) is the maintenance of network
integrity. The RVTD (see reference 3) requires that Member States
take all necessary steps to ensure that the integrity of the fixed
public telephone network is maintained;
- the RVTD (see
reference 3) also states that National Regulatory Authorities must
ensure than any restrictions on access to and use of the fixed public
telephone network on the grounds of network security or integrity
are non-discriminatory and based on objective criteria identified
in advance; and
- the remaining
three essential requirements identified in the RVTD (see reference
3) (which relate to interoperability of services, protection of data
and effective use of the frequency spectrum) are beyond the scope
of this statement.
1.13 The RVTD (see
reference 3) was transposed into UK law by the RVTD Regulations (see
reference 4), and thence into Licence Condition 20 of the PTO licence.
In particular, the relevant licence conditions for the purposes of this
statement are:
- Condition 20.3,
which requires the licensee to take "all reasonably practicable steps"
to maintain availability in the event of catastrophic network failure
or force majeure (eg fire, earthquake or flood);
- Condition 20.4,
which requires the licensee to take "all reasonably practicable steps"
to maintain integrity against malfunctions caused by electrical conditions,
signalling protocols or traffic loads; and
- Conditions 20.5
and 20.6, which relate to restrictions on access to the network on
grounds of network security or integrity.
1.14 The full text
of Condition 20 of the PTO licence can be found at annex A.
The new European
framework
1.15 Article 23
of the new European Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC (see reference
5) places broadly similar obligations on Member States in relation to
network security and integrity as the existing RVTD (see reference 3)
obligations. Although the title of the article implies that it only
relates to network integrity, it is clear from the content of the article
that both network security and integrity are covered. The Commission
has recently shown renewed interest in these areas. It is likely therefore
that much of the content of the Guidelines will continue to be
appropriate under the new regulatory framework. However, the new Directives
will not be implemented in the UK until mid-2003. In order to avoid
delaying publication of guidance on network integrity and security,
Oftel has decided that the Guidelines and Criteria should
be published now under the existing regulatory framework.
Scope
1.16 This statement
relates to the essential requirements for network security and integrity
only, and to criteria for restricting network access on the grounds
of network security and integrity. The other essential requirements
(relating to interoperability, data protection and effective use of
the frequency spectrum) are beyond the scope of this statement.
1.17 Both the Guidelines
and the Criteria apply to Fixed Public Telephone Systems and
Fixed Publicly Available Telephone Services only and are independent
of the technologies used to deliver these services. For the avoidance
of doubt, these could include IP or other packet-based systems if used
to deliver Fixed Publicly Available Telephone Services. The terms Fixed
Public Telephone System and Fixed Publicly Available Telephone Service
are defined in the PTO licence.
1.18 The guidance
in these documents is not intended to define the requirements that may
be placed on operators by government in times of a national emergency
or in order to protect national security. This is the responsibility
of other government departments, principally the Cabinet Office, and
queries on these requirements should be addressed to them.

Chapter
2 The
essential requirements guidelines
2.1 The final version
of the Guidelines referred to in this chapter is available on
Oftel’s website from www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/ind_guidelines/index.htm.
2.2 The ERTG’s Draft
Guidelines on the essential requirements for network security and integrity
were accepted by the NICC in July 2001, subject to the understanding
that there would be an opportunity for further comments during a period
of consultation.
2.3 Oftel made some
changes to the Draft Guidelines after they were accepted by the
NICC – these are set out in Oftel’s consultation document (see www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/ind_guidelines/esre1201.htm).
2.4 In Oftel’s consultation
on the Guidelines and Criteria, Oftel asked:
- whether it was
appropriate for Oftel to publish Guidelines on the essential requirements
for network security and integrity;
- whether stakeholders
had any comments on the draft Guidelines; and
- whether stakeholders
had any comments in particular on the line powering requirement for
one or two line telephony as described in the draft Guidelines.
2.5 Most respondents
agreed that it was appropriate for Oftel to publish the Guidelines.
Detailed and helpful comments on the text of the Guidelines were
received. Oftel has therefore decided to formally adopt the Guidelines
having made modifications to the text as set out below.
2.6 A number of
respondents expressed reservations about the inclusion of annexes on
lifeline requirements and the telephone emergency services in the Guidelines,
and these respondents felt the annexes mixed obligations and recommendations,
and did not have sufficient visibility as annexes to another document.
Oftel has made some changes to the text of the Guidelines (see
below) that it hopes will go some way towards addressing these concerns.
2.7 In relation
to the line-powering requirement for one- and two-line telephony described
in the Guidelines, the views of respondents were divided. Most
network operators considered that these requirements should be relaxed.
They pointed out the adverse impact on costs of having to provide power
back-up in network equipment sited on the customer’s premises, the increasing
availability of alternative access methods such as mobile phones and
the apparently arbitrary distinction between one and two line telephony
and multi-line telephony. Most consumer groups were against any relaxation
of these requirements as it would adversely affect consumers, particularly
vulnerable consumers who might be more likely to make emergency calls
in the event of mains power failure. Several respondents suggested that
a wider debate was required, and that Oftel’s consultation on the Guidelines
and Criteria may not have given this issue sufficient visibility.
2.8 On balance,
Oftel’s view is that no change can be made at the moment to the policy
requiring that provision be made for line powering for one and two line
telephony services, as this reflects current consumer expectations.
Any change would require further and wide-reaching work to identify
appropriate alternative protections for consumers.
2.9 The comments
received on the Guidelines, and Oftel’s response to these comments,
are set out in more detail in annex B of this statement. In the light
of these comments, Oftel has made several changes to the Guidelines
before adopting them formally.
2.10 Oftel has added
two paragraphs to the introductory text of the Guidelines to
indicate that they do not define requirements in times of national emergency,
and they should not be used to specify contractual obligations between
network operators and their customers.
2.11 For clarity,
the full text of Licence Conditions 20.3 and 20.4 has been added to
the introductory section of the Guidelines.
2.12 Oftel has noted
the interdependency between physical separation, re-routing and redundancy
in delivering availability in the section on physical security.
2.13 Oftel has referred
to the need for more general Operations and Maintenance (O&M) procedures
between interconnected operators in the section on network management.
2.14 Oftel has reiterated
its view that effective accounting management is an essential part of
network security in the section on network management.
2.15 Oftel has referred
to the possibility of radio signal ingress in the section on abnormal
electrical conditions.
2.16 Oftel has modified
the text on screening in the section on inappropriate use of signalling
protocols to make it clear that interconnect screening and policing
are the main forms of screening that Oftel would expect network operators
to consider. Oftel has modified certain other parts of the section on
inappropriate use of signalling protocols to avoid making the guidance
too detailed.
2.17 Oftel has included
explanations of effective and non-effective calls in the section on
excessive traffic loads, and clarified that the implementation of a
Congestion Control Process in accordance with the relevant NICC documents
is a specific requirement, rather than a general principle of network
traffic management.
2.18 Oftel has removed
the annex describing the telephone emergency service from the Guidelines.
Oftel has modified the text of this description in several places to
correct minor inaccuracies of terminology. Oftel is publishing this
description as a separate stand-alone document (available on Oftel’s
website at www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/ind_guidelines/index.htm).
2.19 Oftel has maintained
the annex on lifeline requirements as part of the Guidelines.
However, Oftel has modified the text of this annex in several ways:
- Oftel has included
a definition of ‘lifeline’ and ‘safety of life’ services and corrections
have been made to some terminology;
- a note has been
added explaining that specific technologies are only mentioned as
illustrative examples, and not because these are the only technologies
permitted;
- a comment relating
to the relationship between CLI and location for calls made over VoIP
networks has been added;
- Oftel has clarified
that, Oftel does expect network operators to provide access to the
‘safety of life’ numbers listed in the Annex. Oftel has also clarified
that if network operators wished to give special attention to calls
to these numbers (eg through faster restoration in the event of a
fault), and were capable of doing so, Oftel would not regard this
as undue discrimination;
- Oftel has added
a further explanatory note regarding minimum line power that must
be provided to TE under a loss of mains power condition; and
- Oftel has slightly
relaxed the text on interruption to 999/112 service, and the text
now states that such interruptions should be targeted to be less than
24 hours.

Chapter
3 The criteria for restriction of network access
3.1 The final version
of the Criteria referred to in this chapter is available on Oftel’s
website from www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/ind_guidelines/index.htm.
3.2 The ERTG’s draft
Example criteria for the restriction of access to the fixed Public
Telephone System were accepted by the NICC in July 2001, subject
to the understanding that there would be an opportunity for further
comments during a period of consultation.
3.3 Oftel made one
change to the draft Example criteria after they were accepted
by the NICC – this is explained in Oftel’s consultation document at
www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/ind_guidelines/esre1201.htm.
3.4 As was pointed
out earlier in this statement, these criteria are referred to in Licence
Condition 20, which in turn gives effect to the relevant part of the
RVTD (see reference 3). In keeping with the aim of proportionality in
regulatory obligations and consistent with Oftel’s strategy of appropriate
regulation, Oftel believes the Criteria strikes a reasonable
balance between ensuring the aims of the Directive are met whilst ensuring
that the limitations to access are kept to those that are strictly necessary.
A key factor in achieving this balance has been the close involvement
by network operators in developing the Criteria. Given that the
operators have to bear any costs of excessive restrictions, Oftel believes
the process used to develop the Criteria provides the necessary
safeguards that the Criteria are not overly burdensome.
3.5 In Oftel’s consultation
on the Guidelines and Criteria, Oftel asked:
- whether it was
appropriate for Oftel to publish Criteria for the restriction
of access to and use of the Fixed Public Telephone System on the grounds
of network security or integrity;
- whether stakeholders
had any comments on the draft Criteria; and
- whether stakeholders
considered that it was appropriate for Oftel to assume that network
operators were using these criteria if network operators did not identify
their own criteria in advance.
3.6 In general,
respondents either agreed that it was appropriate for Oftel to publish
the Criteria or did not respond to this question specifically.
Oftel received fewer detailed comments on the text of the Criteria
than on the Guidelines but has nevertheless made some changes
to the text of the Criteria to address some of the matters of
principle raised by respondents. Oftel has therefore decided to formally
adopt the Criteria subject to the textual changes set out below.
3.7 Most respondents
also either considered that it was appropriate for Oftel to assume that
operators were using these criteria as the basis on which to restrict
network access if operators did not identify their own criteria in advance,
or did not comment. Oftel therefore intends to use the Criteria
in this way in the future.
3.8 The comments
received on the Criteria, and Oftel’s response to these comments,
are set out in more detail in annex B of this statement. In the light
of these comments, Oftel has made several changes to the Criteria
document before adopting it formally:
- for clarity,
the full text of Licence Conditions 20.5 and 20.6 has been added to
the introductory section of the Criteria;
- a paragraph has
been added noting that although the scenarios in the Criteria
focus on the PSTN, the principles established in the Criteria
apply to Fixed Public Telephone Systems regardless of technology used;
- a note on the
legal status of the Criteria has been added, rather than referring
out to similar sections in the Guidelines; and
- Oftel has included
a paragraph acknowledging that appropriate action to restrict network
access on the basis of network security and integrity may depend on
circumstances not envisaged in the scenarios described in the Criteria.
In these cases, Oftel expects network operators to adhere to the principles
of proportionality and non-discrimination, and use the scenarios described
in the Criteria as a starting point for determining suitable
action to take.

Annex
A Licence Condition 20
Condition 20
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
AND ESSENTIAL PUBLIC INTERESTS
20.1 The
Licensee shall comply with any decision taken in accordance with the
procedures referred to in regulation 21(1) of the Revised Voice Telephony
Regulations which relates to proceedings to which the Licensee is a
party, subject to regulation 21(2).
20.2 The Licensee shall comply with any notice served on it pursuant
to regulation 21(6)(a) of the Revised Voice Telephony Regulations.
20.3 The Licensee shall take all reasonably practicable steps
to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, the availability of Fixed
Public Telephone Systems run by it and Fixed Publicly Available Telephone
Services provided by it, having particular regard to the needs of Emergency
Organisations, in the event of catastrophic network failure, or in cases
of force majeure, such as extreme weather, earthquake, flood, lightning
or fire.
20.4 The Licensee shall take all reasonably practicable steps
to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, the integrity of Fixed
Public Telephone Systems run by the Licensee and Fixed Publicly Available
Telephone Services provided by it, having particular regard to the needs
of Emergency Organisations; that is to say, protection of the physical
and functional operation of such systems and services against malfunctions
or failure caused by electrical conditions, signalling protocols or
traffic loads conveyed from telecommunication systems connected to the
Applicable Systems.
20.5 The Licensee shall ensure that any restrictions imposed
by it on access to and use of its Fixed Public Telephone System on grounds
of maintenance of network integrity, in order to protect, inter alia,
network equipment, software or stored data are kept to the minimum necessary
to provide for normal operation of the System.
20.6 The Licensee shall ensure that any restrictions imposed
by it on access to and use of its Fixed Public Telephone System on the
grounds of network security or network integrity are proportionate,
non-discriminatory, and based on objective criteria identified in advance.
20.7 The Licensee shall take all necessary steps in order to
maintain so far as practicable the highest level of Fixed Publicly Available
Telephone Services provided by it to meet any priorities specified by
the Director.
20.8 The Licensee shall not impose any restrictions on the use
of any Terminal Equipment relating to Fixed Publicly Available Telephone
Services provided by it on the grounds of interoperability of services
where such equipment complies with the Terminal Equipment Regulations
on the grounds of interoperability of services.
20.9 The Licensee may impose conditions on access to and use
of its Fixed Public Telephone System on the grounds of protection of
data only in accordance with Relevant Data Protection Legislation.

Annex
B Analysis
of responses to the consultation
Introduction
B.1 Oftel launched
a public consultation on draft versions of the Guidelines and
Criteria on 10 December 2001. The consultation period ran until
11 March 2002, with a further period until 25 March 2002 for comments
on comments.
B.2 During this
time, Oftel received 17 responses, of which three were confidential.
Non-confidential responses are available on Oftel’s website at www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/responses/2001/essre1001/index.htm.
Oftel received non-confidential
responses from:
- British Telecommunications
plc;
- Bulldog Communications
Ltd;
- Dr Martin Burrage;
- Cable & Wireless
plc;
- Consumer Communications
for England (CCE);
- Fibrenet;
- Hearing Concern;
- Marconi Corporation
plc;
- Mencap;
- One 2One;
- Operators Group
(on behalf of Cable and Wireless Colt, Easynet, Energis, Global Crossing,
Kingston Communications (Hull) plc, Thus, and Your Communications);
- PhoneAbility;
- Scottish Advisory
Committee on Telecommunications (SACOT); and
- Telewest Communications
plc.
B.3 In this annex,
Oftel has summarised the non-confidential comments received during the
consultation, and has explained Oftel’s view on the points raised.
Question 1
Do you agree
that it is appropriate for Oftel to publish guidelines on the network
security and integrity provisions of Condition 20 of the PTO Licence?
Principle
of publication
Comments
B.4 Most respondents
agreed that it was appropriate for Oftel to publish the Guidelines.
B.5 Another respondent
accepted that Oftel should publish this guidance, provided it did not
exceed the scope of the European framework. The respondent assumed that
the Guidelines were being published using the Director’s powers
to publish guidance on any licence condition.
B.6 A consumer organisation
welcomed the publication of the Guidelines, and noted that there
was a clear public interest goal (outside the competitive market) to
protect (amongst others) vulnerable and disabled consumers who are increasingly
relying on the telephone systems for both normal and emergency communications.
B.7 A mobile network
operator pointed out that if the Guidelines are to be extended
to mobile networks then the major differences in design and operations
between mobile and fixed networks must be recognised. A collective response
from a group of network operators urged Oftel to make the Guidelines
applicable to mobile network operators. A consumer organisation suggested
that Oftel should address security of Internet access (eg prevention
of ‘denial of service’ type attacks) as well as looking at the security
of traditional telephone services.
Response
B.8 Oftel can confirm
that Oftel is publishing the Guidelines using the Director’s
powers to publish guidance on any licence condition. Oftel can also
confirm that Oftel does not consider that the Guidelines exceed the
scope of the European framework.
B.9 Oftel considers
that the legal framework for the essential requirements Guidelines
(the Revised Voice Telephony Directive) clearly restricts the scope
of the Guidelines to Fixed Public Telephone Systems and Fixed
Publicly Available Telephone Services only. Of course, steps to secure
the fixed public telephone system will also enhance the security of
Internet access services provided by means of dial-up connections using
that system. Although at this stage, the scope of the Guidelines
is limited to fixed public telephone systems and services, Oftel has
actively urged the European Commission to extend the scope of NRA powers
in this area to include security of mobile and data networks and services,
reflecting their increasing importance to the economic and social health
of the nation.
Technologies
Comment
B.10 One respondent
asked that a clear distinction be made in the Guidelines between
circuit switched and packet switched technologies, as best practice
measures might vary between these technologies.
Response
B.11 Oftel considers
that the text of the Guidelines makes it clear that the Guidelines
apply to Fixed Public Telephone Systems and Fixed Publicly Available
Telephone Services regardless of the technologies used to deliver these
services ie the Guidelines are technology neutral. Where specific
technologies have been mentioned, these are intended as examples only.
Review of
publications
Comment
B.12 One respondent
felt that the arrangements for reviewing both the Guidelines
and the Criteria should be made explicit in each document.
Response
B.13 Oftel considers
that the introductory text of both documents explain how they will be
reviewed and amended if necessary. This would be business as usual for
Oftel, in the light of representations from interested parties and experience
of their operation. Oftel does not consider it necessary to include
more detailed plans for reviewing the documents, as these could easily
be rendered irrelevant by future developments.
Proportionality
Comment
B.14 One company
commented that the guidance was too detailed, particularly as operators
already had commercial incentives to ensure security and integrity of
their networks. Therefore the respondent considered that the Guidelines
might be disproportionate. The respondent asked for more detail about
Oftel’s proposed activity to ensure compliance with the Guidelines.
Response
B.15 Oftel considers
that the Guidelines are proportionate and appropriate, particularly
as they were developed with detailed input from industry itself. Although
there are obvious commercial incentives on operators to ensure network
integrity and security, the standards might vary from one operator to
another. One of the purposes of the Guidelines is to ensure that
there are certain minimum measures which all network operators should
take in the public interest. The text of the Guidelines explains that
the Director General will take the Guidelines into account when
applying Condition 20, but that the Director General’s discretion cannot
be fettered. In Oftel’s view, this gives Oftel sufficient discretion
to ensure that the Guidelines are applied in a proportionate manner.
It is therefore not possible at this time to give more detailed guidance
as to how Oftel would monitor compliance with Condition 20.
Applicability
to PTOs
Comment
B.16 The same respondent
expressed concern about the scope of Condition 20, and whether Condition
20.1 and 20.2 would apply to only some operators and not all, and therefore
whether the subsequent parts of Condition 20 (Condition 20.3 onwards)
would apply to only some operators.
Response
B.17 In respect
of the scope of Condition 20, and in particular Condition 20.3 and Condition
20.4, Oftel considers that the text of the Condition does not in any
way limit these requirements to a subset of operators, but rather that
these requirements apply to all operators in relation to the Fixed Public
Telephone Systems run by them.
Applicability
to end-users
Comment
B.18 One company
was worried that business customers might start to use the Guidelines
in tendering for major contracts, and mandate compliance with the Guidelines.
This company also pointed out that there could be cases where the techniques
in the Guidelines would not necessarily be the most efficient
or effective solution, particularly where the traffic was of a sensitive
nature.
Response
B.19 Oftel notes
this concern, and has added a very clear sentence to the introductory
text of the Guidelines stating that the Guidelines should
not be used to specify requirements between network operators and their
customers. Oftel has also added a note about the fact that requirements
relating to national security and national emergencies would be likely
to take precedence over the recommendations contained in the Guidelines
and that end users with special operational needs may require further
measures to be taken.
Question 2
Do you agree
that it is appropriate for Oftel to publish criteria for the restriction
of network access on the grounds of network security or network integrity?
Principle
of publication
B.20 All respondents
either agreed that it was appropriate for Oftel to publish the Criteria
or made no comment.
Technologies
Comment
B.21 One company
asked that examples relevant to packet switching technologies be included.
Response
B.22 Oftel considers
that the Criteria should as far as possible be technology neutral.
Oftel acknowledges that the examples given in the Criteria focus
on the PSTN as this is where disputes are most likely to arise, but
the text of the Criteria does state that the examples are not
intended to be exhaustive.
Range of scenarios
Comment
B.23 Whilst agreeing
with the publication of the Criteria, one respondent noted that
there might be additional circumstances in certain cases not covered
by the examples given which would render the Criteria inappropriate.
The respondent requested that a clear statement be added that the Criteria
were only suggestions and would not necessarily apply in all circumstances.
Response
B.24 Oftel considers
that the text of the draft Criteria clearly set out that the
list of scenarios considered in the document was not intended to be
definitive or exhaustive (paragraphs four and 17 of the Criteria).
However, Oftel has added two sentences to the introductory text of the
Criteria to explain that an operator may need to take additional
unforeseen circumstances into account when determining the appropriate
level of action to take to preserve network security or integrity, but
that this action should always be based on the principles of proportionality
and non-discrimination.
Local loop
unbundling (LLU)
Comment
B.25 One company
was very keen to see more details included in the Criteria in
relation to co-mingling and escorted access for LLU, in order to ensure
to ensure that ‘security’ was not used in an anti-competitive manner.
Response
B.26 It is Oftel’s
view that in-depth guidance on aspects of co-mingling and escorted access
has been provided elsewhere by Oftel, and that these issues are too
specific and detailed for consideration in this document.
Payphones
Comment
B.27 One respondent
felt that any restrictions on network access should not reduce the availability
of public pay phones with amplification, inductive coupling and text
access for the hearing impaired.
Response
B.28 Oftel recognises
the importance of the availability of public pay phones to all consumers,
and in particular disabled consumers. Oftel would expect operators to
give due consideration to the needs of disabled consumers when implementing
any restrictions on network access on the grounds of network security
or integrity.
Question 3
What comments
do you have on the draft Guidelines on the essential requirements
for network security and integrity presented in this document?
Introduction
B.29 Comments on
the Guidelines fell into three main areas:
- comments on the
body of the Guidelines;
- comments on the
annex describing the 999/112 telephone emergency service; and
- comments on the
annex on requirements for ‘lifeline’ telephony
The body of the
Guidelines
Enforcement
Comment
B.30 One company
was concerned about whether the Guidelines were binding or not,
and whether Oftel would develop a detailed checklist to ensure compliance.
This company wished to understand the scope of the Guidelines,
whether or not they would apply to operators not offering voice services,
and whether they would apply to an operator providing wholesale LLU
services to another operator, or the operator using wholesale LLU services
to market and supply voice services to the end user.
Response
B.31 Oftel considers
that the Guidelines are sufficiently flexible to acknowledge
operators’ own internal procedures, and that the Director General will
be able to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis. Oftel’s compliance
activities are likely to be reactive (ie in response to a specific incident
or incidents) rather than proactive. As explained in the text of the
Introduction to the Guidelines, Condition 20 and therefore the
Guidelines apply to Fixed Public Telephone Systems and Fixed Publicly
Available Telephone Services provided over those Systems. Telephone
Services includes not just voice telephony but also other services such
as textphone. The licence condition makes it clear that the obligations
fall on the operator running the system – in the past Oftel has interpreted
‘running a system’ to mean having day-to-day management and control
of the system and how it is configured. In the example quoted by the
respondent, the operator marketing and supplying voice services to the
end user using unbundled local loops is likely to have day-to-day management
and control of the system, and therefore the obligations in Condition
20 would fall on that operator.
Home Office
guidance
Comment
B.32 One respondent
suggested that the published Home Office documents on disaster recovery
be included in the Guidelines, and felt that further consultation
with equipment suppliers could be of benefit.
Response
B.33 Oftel considers
that documents produced by the Home Office on disaster recovery and
other related subjects complement the Guidelines, but would point
out they could not be enforced under Condition 20. As such, it would
not be appropriate to include such documents with the Guidelines
themselves.
B.34 Representatives
of public equipment suppliers were invited to attend the NICC task group
that drafted the Guidelines, and several such representatives
did join the task group. Given that this was the case, and that equipment
suppliers were also able to respond to the public consultation on the
Guidelines, Oftel believes that there has been sufficient opportunity
for interested equipment suppliers to comment.
Text services
Comments
B.35 One consumer
organisation suggested that the Guidelines should make reference
to the need for special consideration to be given to ensuring the security
of text access. The respondent also considered that network operators
should collect traffic data from text accessible platforms, as well
as the other platforms explicitly mentioned in the Guidelines.
B.36 The same respondent
suggested that the Guidelines should contain a requirement that
network operators have line condition messages in text suitable for
text-only users.
Response
B.37 Oftel notes
this suggestion, and points out that in practice, text access services
are offered over basic conveyance services. Provided that the conveyance
services are being properly managed according to the guidance contained
in the Guidelines and the equipment at each end is serviceable,
then the text access services should be secured.
B.38 Oftel responds
to the second point by stating that this already applies to fixed networks
through SI 2410/2000 (see reference 6) and does not consider it necessary
to mention this explicitly in these Guidelines.
Detailed proposals
for change
Comment
B.39 Another respondent
made some detailed suggestions for changes to the text of the Guidelines,
almost all of which Oftel has implemented. This respondent:
a) questioned the
apparent focus in the Guidelines on physical separation for achieving
quality of service;
b) suggested that
reference to more general Operations and Maintenance procedures for
interconnected operators should be made;
c) asked why reference
was made to accounting management in the Guidelines;
d) asked for clarification
about screening;
e) suggested that
definitions of effective and non-effective calls be given; and
f) asked whether
there was an obligation to document measures to ensure the priority
of 999/112 traffic, or whether this was just a recommendation.
Response
B.40 Oftel:
a) would point out
that the Guidelines discuss physical and network security separately,
and in the section on network security the Guidelines do address
resilience and restoration. However, Oftel has added a sentence to the
physical security section in the Guidelines noting that availability
is usually delivered by a combination of both physical and network security;
b) has modified
the text accordingly;
c) accepts that
effective accounting management, whilst essential to the financial viability
of an operator’s business, does not have a direct bearing on ensuring
network security. The Guidelines have been amended accordingly;
d) has changed the
text to indicate the two forms of screening that Oftel considers most
important;
e) has added an
explanation to the document; and
f) does consider
this an obligation that arises from the text of Conditions 20.3 and
20.4, which refer to the Licensee having ‘particular regard to the needs
of emergency organisations’ when considering network security and integrity.
Therefore Oftel has not changed this part of the Guidelines.
Annex describing
the 999/112 telephone emergency service
Inclusion
in Guidelines
Comment
B.41 Several respondents,
whilst supporting the publication of the Guidelines, had detailed
comments on the annexes to the Guidelines. Some respondents questioned
the appropriateness of including the description of the 999/112 emergency
service as an annex to the Guidelines, particularly given that
this sort of information was relevant to both fixed and mobile networks.
Response
B.42 Oftel does
not entirely accept this point, as Oftel explicitly stated in this annex
that the description of the 999/112 emergency service applied to fixed
PTO networks only. However, Oftel acknowledges that wider visibility
of this information is important, and has addressed respondents’ concerns
by publishing the description of the 999/112 emergency service separately.
Mention of
LLU operators
Comment
B.43 One respondent
asked why LLU operators were mentioned explicitly in the 999/112 annex,
and why the information passed to the emergency organisation needs to
contain an indication as to whether the customer is ex-directory.
Response
B.44 Oftel has modified
the text to remove these two references.
Annex on requirements
for ‘lifeline’ telephony
Principle
of inclusion
Comment
B.45 Several respondents
did not consider that the annex on requirements for lifeline telephony
should be included in the Guidelines as it mixed obligations
(which should be in the body of the Guidelines) and recommendations
(which should be in a separate document elsewhere).
Response
B.46 Oftel continues
to consider that it is appropriate to set out the lifeline requirements
in an annex to the Guidelines. This is because the text of Conditions
20.3 and 20.4 refer to the Licensee’s obligation to have ‘particular
regard to the needs of emergency organisations’ when considering network
security and integrity. Oftel considers that it is of great use to the
industry to have these requirements set out in as clear a way as possible
in one place.
Access to
specific numbers
Comment
B.47 Several respondents
queried the obligation in the annex on lifeline telephony to provide
access to specific numbers other than directory enquiries, operator
services and emergency services for operators without significant market
power. One respondent pointed out that this implies an obligation to
establish interconnects in a regime which is currently a strictly commercial
issue. The ISUP MOU does not include 0800 and 0845 calls as being mandatory
interconnect obligations. This respondent also suggested that the list
of ‘safety of life’ numbers be placed in an external document for ease
of updating.
Response
B.48 Oftel has modified
the text to clarify that Oftel does expect all network operators to
provide access to these ‘safety of life’ numbers. If an operator had
the capability and wished to give these numbers a different level of
service to other numbers (eg faster restoration), this would not be
regarded as undue discrimination by Oftel. Oftel considers that the
ISUP MOU is not relevant to this issue. European Directives give NRAs
the powers to ensure end-to-end connectivity. There may be no ex-ante
obligations on operators in relation to ‘safety of life’ numbers at
the moment, however operators deliver such connectivity voluntarily.
Were this not to be the case, Oftel would consider making such access
mandatory in the future.
B.49 There are already
many documents arising from this consultation, and Oftel does not at
this stage see the benefits of creating an additional document to hold
this very small quantity of information. The list in the lifeline annex
to the Guidelines may be considered to be the definitive list
for the time being.
Treatment
of calls to ‘safety of life’ numbers
Comment
B.50 Several respondents
were concerned that the ‘safety of life’ numbers mentioned in the lifeline
annex meant that these numbers had to be treated the same way as 999
calls, which might be technically impossible in some cases.
Response
B.51 The Guidelines
simply state that access to the numbers listed must be provided. There
is no statement, either expressed or implied, that calls had to be treated
in a similar manner to 999/112 calls. Oftel recognises the special equipment
configurations which are applicable to 999/112 calls and the difficulties
which would arise were they to be applied to other numbers.
Power fail
back-up
Comment
B.52 One company
suggested that the requirements for power back-up set out in the annex
on lifeline requirements conflicted with the requirements set out in
the main body of the Guidelines, which is less prescriptive.
Response
B.53 Oftel does
not consider that there is any conflict between the body of the Guidelines
and the Lifeline annex as regards power back-up. The body of the Guidelines
addresses the requirements for power back-up to handle the generality
of calls, while the Lifeline annex gives more detail as to the power
back-up requirements in the context of handling emergency calls.
Definitions
and terminology
B.54 At the request
of respondents, Oftel has added definitions of ‘lifeline’ and ‘safety
of life’ services to be added to the document. Oftel has also made it
clear that where specific technologies are mentioned, these are examples
only, and not because these are the only ones permitted.
B.55 Some minor
changes to the terminology used in some parts of the annex on the requirements
for lifeline telephony were suggested. Oftel has implemented these changes,
and does not consider that these changes in terminology have materially
altered the meaning of the text concerned.
Question 4
What comments
do you have on the line powering requirement for one- or two- line telephony
as described in Annex BC of the draft Guidelines on the essential requirements
for network security and integrity? If this requirement were to be relaxed,
would it be sufficient as an alternative to warn consumers of the possible
impact at the time of installation?
Inclusion
of line powering in this consultation
Comment
B.56 Several respondents
did not consider that this consultation was the right place to debate
line powering requirements, as it was a matter for both Industry and
consumers to consider. There were concerns that consumers, manufacturers
and network operators may have overlooked this question, as it was embedded
in a consultation that primarily focussed on other matters. There were
calls for a wider and more visible debate.
Response
B.57 Oftel notes
these concerns, but would point out that Oftel was careful to draw this
issue to the attention of consumers and consumer organisations, both
in text of the consultation document and by means of proactive contacts
with consumer organisations when the consultation document was published.
Oftel has had a good selection of comments from consumers, operators
and manufacturers. However, as explained below, Oftel’s view remains
that no changes can be made at the moment to line powering obligations
in the absence of further fundamental work by interested parties to
identify alternative methods of meeting consumer expectations in this
area.
Line powering
requirement
Comments
B.58 In relation
to the desirability of a line-powering requirement for one- and two-line
telephony, the views of respondents were divided.
B.59 Most network
operator respondents (and one member of the public) considered that
these requirements should be relaxed. The arguments put forward for
relaxing this requirement included:
- provision for
power back-up increases the cost of network equipment sited on the
customer’s premises, which in turn discourages the adoption of new
services, in particular consumer broadband services;
- the increasing
availability and use of alternative means of accessing the telephone
emergency service in the event of mains power failure such as mobile
phones; and
- the apparently
arbitrary distinction between one- and two- line telephony (which
currently requires provision for line powering) and multi-line telephony
(which does not), and the fact that this could lead to workarounds
that would defeat the spirit of the line powering obligations.
B.60 Several respondents
suggested a variety of alternative measures for informing consumers
about the problems that might arise in certain circumstances if the
requirement for line powering for one- and two- line telephony were
to be relaxed. These measures included:
- product labelling;
- warning consumers
at time of sale, order and installation;
- reminding consumers
at suitable intervals of the issue and the need to maintain battery
back-up;
- making uninterruptible
power supplies (UPS) available to consumers to purchase on a commercial
basis; and
- Oftel should
use the Guidelines to alert consumes to the issues, and encourage
the Industry to develop more techniques to allow continued CPE operation
in the event of mains power failure.
B.61 On the other
hand, most consumer groups were strongly against any relaxation of these
requirements as it would adversely affect consumers, particularly vulnerable
consumers who might be more likely to make emergency calls in the event
of mains power failure. These respondents felt that warnings at the
time of installation would be insufficient, as the purchaser might not
be the end user, and the warning might not be passed on to subsequent
owners.
B.62 One consumer
group suggested that a consumer with DSL service could be advised to
use an ordinary analogue telephone in the event of power failure – possibly
both at the time of installation and with subsequent reminders.
B.63 Another respondent
noted that Commission Communication 2000/C369/03 states that ‘Voice
on the Internet’ does not lie within the definition of voice telephony,
and therefore that the annex on lifeline requirements (including the
requirements for line powering) would appear not to apply to ‘Voice
on the Internet’.
Response
B.64 Oftel has made
its position clear elsewhere as to when it regards a service to be public
voice telephony – see paragraph four of Oftel’s Frequently Asked Questions
on this subject (see reference 7). Oftel’s position does not depend
on the technology used, but rather on the service itself. A service
should be regulated as public voice telephony if any of the following
apply:
- the service is
marketed as a substitute for traditional Public Switched Telecommunication
Network (PSTN) voice services; or
- the service appears
to the customer to be a substitute for public voice telephony; or
- the service provides
the customer’s sole means of access to the traditional circuit switched
PSTN.
B.65 Some ‘Voice
on the Internet’ services may therefore be public voice telephony and
will be regulated as such by Oftel.
B.66 Oftel acknowledges
that the distinction between one- and two- line telephony and multi-line
telephony is to a certain extent arbitrary, but it is an attempt to
distinguish residential from business consumers, and reflects current
residential consumer expectations based on the historical precedent.
It does not appear to Oftel that the cost of battery back-up is slowing
the development of broadband services in the UK.
Clarification
Comment
B.67 Another consumer
group requested clarification as to whether the power backup requirements
referred to failure in line power or domestic power.
Response
B.68 Oftel can confirm
that when the Guidelines discuss power backup for terminal equipment,
this refers to steps that may be necessary to allow consumers to access
telephone services in the event of local mains (ie domestic) power failure.
Use of inappropriate
terminal equipment
Comments
B.69 One respondent
was concerned that the network operator might be in breach of line powering
obligations if the customer obtained non-compliant equipment.
B.70 Another respondent
also noted that (for example) a DECT cordless telephone could be a customer's
sole telephone instrument. In such a case, there is no obligation on
a user of a DECT system to have a traditional telephone in reserve in
the event of mains power failure.
Response
B.71 Oftel can confirm
that should the customer obtain equipment that relies on local power
(eg a DECT telephone), the network operator would not be considered
in breach of its obligation to provide line powering, as long as such
line powering was in place for normal POTS and basic rate ISDN equipment.
B.72 Oftel also
notes that it is true a user can choose to use terminal equipment that
will not work in the event of power failure. If, however, he uses terminal
equipment which is line powered then he has attempted to mitigate the
risks associated with local mains failure. If there is no line powering
then this security is lost.
Local loop
faults
Comment
B.73 One respondent
pointed out that any failure of the local loop would result in loss
of access to all services. In such an event, the consumer would be expected
to be mobile to a certain extent to seek out alternative means of accessing
the telephone emergency service if necessary.
Response
B.74 Oftel appreciates
that local loop faults do occur and that they frequently cause a total
loss of access over the area affected. Oftel notes that provision of
priority repair to residential customers with disabilities who may not
be mobile and who have a bona fide need for urgent repair is already
covered through SI 2410/2000 (see reference 6) and therefore does not
need explicit mention in these Guidelines.
Length of
back-up period
Comment
B.75 One consumer
group that responded felt that one hour back-up for exchange equipment
would on its own be inadequate, unless this meant that one hour of service
can be taken over a period of (say) three days.
Response
B.76 Oftel notes
this concern, but would point out that the one hour back-up requirement
relates particularly to network equipment sited at customers’ premises.
It was drawn from the former approval requirement of one hour in the
seven hour following disconnection of power source. Manufacturers of
such equipment have always been at liberty to provide more than the
minimum requirement. Exchange equipment would normally have a far greater
period of resilience.
Conclusion
B.77 Oftel welcomes
the detailed suggestions made by several respondents as to alternative
methods of alerting consumers about this issue, in the event that line
powering requirements for one and two line telephone were to be relaxed.
Oftel does not consider that the Guidelines themselves would be an appropriate
vehicle for doing this, as the final version of the Guidelines is intended
for a network operator audience, not for consumers. Oftel would also
point out that the provisions of the Radio Equipment & Telecommunications
Terminal Equipment Directive (RE&TTED) (see reference 8) prevent
the use of mandatory product labelling.
B.78 If the requirements
for line powering were to be relaxed, further detailed work would clearly
be required to determine what would be sufficient warning for consumers,
how consumer awareness could be raised and how the costs for doing this
could be covered.
B.79 On balance,
Oftel’s view is that no change can be made at the moment to the policy
requiring that provision be made for line powering for one and two line
telephony services, as this reflects current consumer expectations.
Any change would require further and wide-reaching work to identify
appropriate alternative protections for consumers.
Question 5
What comments
do you have on the draft Criteria for the restriction of access to and
use of the fixed Public Telephone System on the grounds of network security
or integrity presented in this document?
Principle
of publication
Comment
B.80 Most respondents
supported the Criteria and several had suggestions for reformatting
the Criteria to make them clear and easier to use.
Response
B.81 Oftel has been
able to adopt most of these suggestions in the final version of the
Criteria without material changes to the substance of the document.
Local loop
unbundling
Comment
B.82 Several respondents
suggested that more detailed information on the handling of security
issues for LLU should be included.
Response
B.83 Oftel considers
that the Criteria are not in any way inconsistent with LLU guidance
produced by Oftel separately. However, such separate guidance may address
certain detailed issues in more depth than is possible or appropriate
in the Criteria, in which case the detailed separate guidance
should be referred to in the first instance.
Inclusion
of relevant text of licence
Comment
B.84 One respondent
suggested that the document would benefit from some re-formatting, such
as the inclusion in full of the relevant licence conditions and a note
on its legal status (rather than referring out to another document).
Response
B.85 Oftel has added
these to the document.
Network management
concept
Comment
B.86 The same respondent
suggested that the section Network management concepts be included
as an annex rather than in the body of the Criteria.
Response
B.87 Oftel has not
taken up this suggestion as Oftel considers that providing some context
and explanations of terminology prior to describing the specific scenarios
is useful.
Textphone
access to emergency services
Comment
B.88 One consumer
group commented that any restriction on access should safeguard access
to the 999/112 emergency service for text access users.
Response
B.89 Text access
to the emergency service does not currently use the same routing as
normal voice calls and may not be able to be treated the same as voice
999/112 calls. However, the list of ‘safety of life’ numbers in the
lifeline telephony annex includes the 18000 access code for this service.
Question 6
Do you agree
that it is appropriate for Oftel to assume network operators are using
these criteria if network operators do not identify their own criteria
in advance?
Default use of
Criteria
Comment
B.90 The majority
of respondents agreed that it would be appropriate for Oftel to assume
that network operators were using the Criteria if operators did not
identify their own criteria in advance.
B.91 Only one respondent
did not consider that it would be appropriate for Oftel to make this
assumption, but did not give any reasons.
Response
B.92 Oftel will
therefore assume that operators which do not identify their own criteria
in advance are using the Criteria as published by Oftel.
Trigger limits
for implementation
Comment
B.93 One respondent
noted that the trigger levels at which different operators would implement
restrictions on network access were not clear, and suggested that Industry-wide
standard procedures might be feasible.
Response
B.94 Oftel considers
that the development of traffic management standards across Industry,
whilst it would clearly provide greater transparency, is unlikely to
be realistic, considering the wide variations in network size and topology
between different operators. Such standardisation is clearly beyond
the scope of the Guidelines and Criteria, which aim to
set out principles to be followed and examples of best practice.

Annex
C Glossary
Abbreviations
CLI – Calling Line
Identity
DECT – Digital European
Cordless Telephone
DSL – Digital Subscriber
Loop
ERTG – Essential
Requirements Task Group
LLU – Local Loop
Unbundling
NICC – Network Interoperability
Consultative Committee
PNO-IG – Public
Network Operators Interest Group of the NICC
POTS – Plain Old
Telephone Service
PSTN – Public Switched
Telephone Network
PTO – Public Telecommunications
Operator
RE&TTED – Radio
Equipment & Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive
RVTD – Revised Voice
Telephony Directive
SSPE-IG – Special
Systems and Public Equipment Interest Group of the NICC

Annex
D References
1.Guidelines
on the essential requirements for network security and integrity,
Oftel.
2. Criteria for
the restriction of access to and use of the Fixed Public Telephone System
on the grounds of network security or integrity, Oftel.
3. Directive
98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council of 26 February
1998 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony
and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment,
OJ L 101, 1.4.1999, p.24.
4. Telecommunications
(Open Network Provision) (Voice Telephony) Regulations 1998 – SI No
1580/1998, The Stationery Office Limited, London.
5. Directive
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council of 7 March
2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services, OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p 51.
6.Telecommunications
(Services for Disabled Persons) Regulations 2000 – SI 2000 No 2410,
The Stationery Office Limited, London.
7. Frequently
Asked Questions on the regulation of Voice over Internet Protocol Services,
Oftel, www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/internet/2002/voip0402.htm.
8. Directive
1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council of 9 March 1999
on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the
mutual recognition of their conformity, OJ L 91, 7.4.1999, p.10.

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