Contents

Draft
Direction
Explanatory Memorandum
Chapter
1 Summary
Chapter
2 Background
Chapter
3 Oftel’s methodology for calculating the Retail Uplift
Chapter
4 The Director’s draft decision
Chapter
5 Arrangements for making and viewing representations
Annex 1
DRAFT DIRECTION
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION 6(3) OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCONNECTION)
REGULATIONS 1997 OF BT’S NTS RETAIL UPLIFT CHARGE FOR CALLS TO OPERATORS’
NUMBER TRANSLATION SERVICES FROM 1 APRIL 2001
WHEREAS:
A) The Secretary
of the State granted to British Telecommunications on 22 June 1984 a
licence ("the
Licence")
under section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 ("the Act") for the
running of the telecommunication systems specified in Annex A to the
Licence;
B) By virtue
of Section 109 of, and paragraph 20 of Schedule 5 to, the Act, the Licence
has effect as if granted to British Telecommunications plc ("BT");
C) BT, in accordance
with Condition 45 of its licence, has entered into interconnection agreements
with a number of Operators. Those interconnection agreements include
provisions concerning Number Translation Services ("NTS").
The term "Operators" in this direction shall refer to those
operators that have entered into an interconnection agreement with BT;
D) By way of
a determination entitled Interim Charges for BT’s Initial Standard Services
for the year ending 31 March 1996 the Director General of Telecommunications
("the Director") determined a formula for NTS services where the call
originated on one operator’s network and terminated on another. This
formula ("the NTS Formula") may be summarised as follows:
Originating Network
Operator ("ONO") keeps P – D + C
Terminating Network
Operator ("TNO") keeps D – C
Where
"P" is the actual
retail price charged by the ONO to the customer
"C" is the pence
per minute charge for conveyance over a single tandem segment of
BT’s network determined in this determination (multiplied by the
number of minutes of the call plus an uplift ("the NTS Retail Uplift")
to allow for retail costs incurred by the ONO in handling these
calls.
"D" is the deemed
retail price for the call.
E) "C"
as described in the NTS Formula continues to apply (for the purpose
of assessing BT’s retention) in accordance with, inter alia, the November
1999 Direction concerning BT’s NTS Conveyance and the December 1999
Statement on the Relationship between Interconnection Charges and Retail
Prices for Number Translation Services.
F) The Director
has previously reviewed and set the NTS Retail Uplift for the financial
years commencing 1 April 1999 and 1 April 2000.
G) The Telecommunications
(Interconnection) Regulations 1997 ("the Regulations") inter alia implement
Directive 97/33/EC on interconnection in telecommunications with regard
to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application
of the principles of open network provision ("the Directive");
H) Regulation
6(1) of the Regulations provides that the Director shall encourage and
secure adequate interconnection in the interests of all users and that
he exercises his functions in a way that provides maximum economic efficiency
and gives maximum benefit to end-users having regard to the matters
set out in Regulation 6(1)(a) to (g) of the Regulations.
I) Pursuant to
Regulation 6(3) of the Regulations the Director may intervene at any
time, in order to make a direction specifying issues which must be covered
in an interconnection agreement, or to make a direction that specific
conditions be observed by one or more parties to such an agreement.
The Director may in exceptional circumstances make a direction that
changes be made to interconnection agreements already concluded where
it is justified to ensure effective competition or interoperability
of services for users or both;
J) A draft of
this direction and the explanatory memorandum was published on [….]
and comments invited by [….];
K) Comments
were received from [………..] and the main points made by those who responded
are summarised in Chapter …. of the explanatory memorandum which accompanies
and is published with this direction.
THEREFORE
Pursuant to the
provisions of Regulation 6(3) of the Telecommunications (Interconnection)
Regulations 1997, the Director General makes the following direction:
1. The NTS Retail
Uplift applied by BT to assess its NTS conveyance charge, namely "C"
as described in recital D, from 1 April 2001 until 24 July 2002 shall
be as follows:
(i) from 1 April
2001 to 31 March 2002 inclusive:
For Freephone
NTS calls (0800/0808), 0.1163 pence per minute; and
For all other
NTS calls, 0.2277 pence per minute; and
(ii) from 1 April
2002 to 24 July 2003 inclusive:
For Freephone
NTS calls (0800/0808), 0.1141 pence per minute; and
For all other
NTS calls, 0.2095 pence per minute; and
2. Any amount
payable by BT to an Operator as a result of this direction should be
paid together with interest calculated in accordance with Clause 13.13
of their interconnection agreement.
3. Any amount
payable by an Operator to BT as a result of this direction should be
paid together with interest calculated in accordance with Clause 13.13
of their interconnection agreement.
4. BT shall
alter the Carrier Price List so that it accords with this direction
and shall send a copy of the alterations to the Carrier Price List to
the Operators.
5. The terms
defined or described in the recitals to this direction shall have the
meaning so defined or described. All other words or expressions used
in this direction shall have the same meaning as in the Directive, the
Regulations, the Act or the Licence as appropriate.
Heather
Julie Clayton
Director of Investigations
A
person authorised under Paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications
Act 1984
[….] 2003
Explanatory
Memorandum
Summary
1.1 The Director
General of Telecommunications ("the Director") has issued
a draft direction, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 6(3)
of the Telecommunications (Interconnection) Regulations 1997 ("the
Regulations"), to review the methodology for setting BT’s Retail
Uplift within its regulated Number Translation Services (NTS) call origination
charge and to set BT’s NTS Retail Uplift for the following periods:
1.2 Oftel has
devised a methodology for calculating an uplift allowance for retail
costs consistent with the principles of cost orientation. In order to
meet this objective, the methodology re-visits the initial allocation
of costs that had, in the past, been implicitly allocated to NTS services.
This allocation is then updated over time to the current year, in order
to reflect economies of scale due to volume growth, cost reduction due
to BT’s efficiency in retail costs and inflation adjustments.
1.3 In reaching
his draft decision the Director has considered the requirements set
out in Regulation 6(1) of the Regulations, in particular the need to
stimulate a competitive market.
1.4 Accordingly,
the Director proposes that, with effect from 1 April 2001 until 31 March
2002 inclusive, the retail uplift for relevant retail costs applied
by BT to give its NTS Conveyance charge should be:
Freephone (0800/0808)
0.1163 ppm
All other NTS calls
0.2277 ppm
and with effect
from 1 April 2002 until 24 July 2003 inclusive, the retail uplift for
relevant retail costs applied by BT to give its NTS Conveyance charge
is proposed to be:
Freephone (0800/0808)
0.1141
ppm
All other NTS calls
0.2095
ppm
1.5 Comments on
this draft direction are requested by 30
January 2003 and
will be taken into account in making a final direction. Details of how
to submit comments are given in Chapter 5.
1.6 The Director
has today published related directions as follows:
- Draft Amended
Direction of a dispute between Energis and BT concerning BT's method
of calculating its NTS retail uplift charge since April 1997
- Draft Re-Amended
Direction of BT’s retail uplift charge for calls to operators’ Number
Translation Services from 1 April 2000
- Draft Direction
of a dispute between Cable & Wireless and BT over a bad debt surcharge
relating to calls to Premium Rate Services

Chapter
2
Background
2.1 In previous
determinations of NTS charges Oftel has given a detailed description
of the NTS revenue sharing arrangements and how they were arrived at.
Most operators are now familiar with this narrative and it is not, therefore,
repeated in this document. Anyone wishing to read the detailed description
can refer to Oftel’s earlier NTS directions (also known as determinations)
which can be found on Oftel’s website.
2.2 Oftel first
established the principle of a supplemental charge to meet BT’s relevant
retail costs in providing access to NTS services, in the first ICAS
Determination
of Interim Charges for BT’s Initial Standard Services for the year ending
31 March 1996 ("the
1996 Determination") published on 30 January 1996. The original
charging methodology for calculating BT’s retail uplift has become known
to the industry as the ‘broad brush’ methodology.
2.3 In 2001,
Oftel reassessed the methodology for calculating BT’s NTS retail uplift
and a draft direction proposing to set the retail uplift for NTS calls
for the year 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2001 was issued in October 2001.
A final direction was issued on 28 March 2002 and amended on 5 April
2002. A further amendment has been proposed to that direction at the
same time as publication of this draft direction. This direction is
referred to as the "April 2000 direction".
2.4 On 1 May
2002 Energis gave notice to the Director of its intention to appeal
the April 2000 decision. On 30 October 2002 Energis withdrew its appeal
in the light of its understanding of Oftel’s work programme for NTS.
2.5 On 19 September
2002 Oftel issued the "Direction
under the provisions of Regulation 6(6) of the Telecommunications (Interconnection)
Regulations 1997 resolving a dispute between Energis and BT concerning
BT’s method of calculating its NTS Retail Uplift charge since April
1997".
This followed a
referral, on 8 February 2002, by Energis of a dispute with BT over the
recalculation of the retail uplift charge back to 1997. The decision
in this direction was to set BT’s NTS Retail Uplift charge from 1 April
1999 and is therefore referred to as the "April 1999 direction".
2.6 In the April
2000 direction Oftel stated its intention at that time to consult on
a mechanism for updating BT’s retail uplift using a price cap. Oftel
intended that this price cap should apply from 1 April 2001. Oftel put
some of this work on hold pending the outcome of the Energis appeal.
Oftel has recently announced a series of market reviews in preparation
for the implementation of the new EU Directives on midnight 24 July
2003.
Regulation in this
new regime must, in most cases, follow a market review. Given the delay
to Oftel’s work on the retail uplift and the requirements of the new
EU Directives, Oftel currently considers that it is not appropriate
to proceed with a consultation on a price cap at this time. Instead,
Oftel proposes to proceed by way of this draft direction to set the
retail uplift for the remaining period from 1 April 2001 up to 24 July
2003. Consideration as to obligations concerning the NTS retail uplift
and a possible price cap for the new regime is something which will
be considered in parallel with the market review process occurring separately.
2.7 At the same
time as publishing this draft direction, the Director has also published
Draft
Direction under the provisions of Regulation 6(6) of the Telecommunications
(Interconnection) Regulations 1997 resolving a dispute between Cable
& Wireless Communications (Mercury) Limited ("C&W")
and British Telecommunications plc ("BT") over Premium Rate
Service calls bad debt surcharge.
2.8 In considering
the above dispute, the Director discovered an error in the calculation
of the NTS Retail Uplift in the April 1999 and April 2000 Directions.
Some PRS bad debt costs were inadvertently included in the data underlying
the calculations. The Director has therefore today published draft amendments
to the April 1999 and April 2000 retail uplift Directions. These amendments
are draft amendments which will not be confirmed until this document
and the PRS bad debt decision are finalised. The Director considers
that all documents should be finalised together because of the links
between them. This document should therefore be read in conjunction
with the explanatory memoranda that accompany those draft amended directions
and the draft direction resolving the dispute about PRS bad debt. Figure
1 below illustrates the work which has been carried out by Oftel to
date in relation to the NTS retail uplift and current pending work.
Figure
1: Three draft retail uplift directions, a draft direction on PRS
bad debt surcharge and the EU market reviews

Chapter 3
Oftel’s methodology
for calculating the Retail Uplift
Historic
methodology
3.1 Prior to
April 2000, the retail uplift was calculated using the "broadbrush"
methodology set by the 1996 Determination. This entailed deriving the
charge by estimating an allowance for retail costs from BT’s annual
accounting data on network and retail costs. This was done by dividing
BT’s total retail costs by BT’s total network costs. This percentage
ratio was multiplied by the charge of BT’s single tandem network costs.
Operators were concerned about the simplicity of the broad brush methodology.
Oftel agreed to carry out a review which culminated in the April 2000
direction followed by the April 1999 direction. There are two main reasons
why Oftel departed from this broadbrush methodology following its review:
- the broadbrush
methodology does not explicitly identify retail costs incurred in
providing an NTS call origination service but uses a simple ratio
of total retail and network costs. In reality, retail costs are not
dependent on conveyance costs; and
- the broadbrush
methodology was devised at a time when BT’s accounts were prepared
on the basis of Historic cost Accounting ("HCA"). After
August 1998, BT moved from HCA to Current Cost Accounting ("CCA").
This change leaves the broadbrush methodology open to a number of
interpretations, with no obvious clear way forward. Those difficulties
in interpretation following the change to CCA were discussed in paragraphs
5.15 to 5.17 of the April 1999 direction. The link to the April 1999
direction is:
Current
methodology
3.2 Given the
inadequacies of the broadbrush methodology, Oftel devised a new methodology
used in the April 1999 and April 2000 directions. This methodology is
based on relevant retail costs. Oftel’s methodology starts with an initial
cost allocation (established during the 1996 retail price control review
("1996 PCR") - as explained below). This allocation is then
updated over time using up to date information for the relevant year
for which the NTS retail uplift charge is being considered. The update
takes into account estimated economies of scale due to volume growth,
cost reduction due to BT’s efficiency in retail costs and inflation
adjustments.
3.3 In BT’s Financial
Statements, retail costs caused by NTS calls are mainly located in the
Local and National call category of BT’s regulatory accounting business,
the Retail Systems Business ("RSB"). The relevant retail costs
in those categories are common between geographic and NTS call types.
(see paragraphs 3.18 to 3.23 and Annex 1 which further elaborate on
this). Consequently, the relevant retail costs need to be shared between
geographic and NTS calls. Local and National calls, which are geographic
calls, were regulated under the 1996 Price Control Review ("the
1996 PCR"). Those costs which had been allocated by the 1996 PCR
to geographic calls were therefore relevant to the allocation of costs
to NTS. This is because by allocating costs to geographic calls there
was an implicit allocation of BTs retail costs to NTS calls – ie: by
logic what was left over from the allocation made to geographic calls
at the 1996 PCR, should be allocated to NTS calls. This allocation was
made on the basis of relative volumes, which underpinned the calculations
setting the 1996 PCR.
3.4 The use of
a baseline consistent with the 1996 PCR was chosen for the Oftel methodology
used in the April 1999 and April 2000 directions rather than a starting
point based on retail costs from BT’s current accounts (eg 1999/2000
accounts for the April 2000 direction). Oftel used the 1996 PCR as a
baseline in order to avoid the possibility of BT over recovering its
common retail costs by recovering within the 1996 PCR and again in the
retail uplift. This would happen because the enormous growth in NTS
call volumes would, under BT’s FAC methodology, lead to a reallocation
of costs towards NTS calls. Thus the same costs would be allocated to
both PCR services in the 1996 allocation and to NTS services in the
1999/2000 allocation
3.5 In earlier
retail uplift directions Oftel rejected the broadbrush methodology (for
the reasons set out in paragraph 3.1) in favour of the methodology based
on the explicit identification of relevant retail costs and the allocation
of costs to NTS consistent with the 1996 PCR. An alternative starting
point for the calculation of the retail uplift is BT's most recent FAC
numbers. However, one of the key advantages of Oftel's methodology is
that it properly captures the economies of scale effect due to past
volume growth in NTS calls. BT's FAC figures allocate costs according
to volumes and therefore a retail uplift calculation based on these
costs would only partly capture, in the NTS uplift calculation, the
economies of scale due to the growth in NTS calls. Oftel therefore considers
that its methodology used in the April 1999 and April 2000 Directions
remains the best approach for the calculation of the retail uplift up
to July 2003.
Details
of the methodology
Baseline
3.6 As explained
above, the starting point for the retail uplift cost allocation is the
implicit allocation of retail costs to NTS services made by the 1996
PCR. In order to estimate the baseline figure for NTS retail costs,
the unit retail cost figure is obtained by dividing the total retail
costs (i.e. those shared between geographic and NTS services), by total
volumes (Local, National and NTS Volumes) and multiplying this by BT’s
NTS call volumes for the relevant year.
3.7 An allowance
for the rate of return on capital employed (ROCE) is added onto the
baseline figure for total relevant retail costs to allow BT to earn
a reasonable return for providing retail services. (Article 7(2) of
the Interconnection Directive 97/33 recognises that a reasonable rate
of return is permitted in a cost oriented interconnection charge). This
is BT’s real cost of capital multiplied by the mean capital employed
of Local and National calls. This pro-rata methodology of devising the
charge is underpinned by the assumption that the unit retail cost between
geographic and non-geographic calls is the same.
3.8 Oftel considers
this assumption to be reasonable, because Oftel believes that retailing
activities are very similar between geographic and NTS call types. Oftel
also believes that all such costs, or at least the vast majority of
them, are therefore common between those call types. This is explained
in greater detail in paragraphs 3.19 to 3.26.
The baseline calculation
is summarised below:
(Total
retail costs in Local & National call categories 1994/5) x NTS call
volumes 1994/5
(Local,
National and NTS call volumes 1994/5)
3.9 A further
adjustment is made to the baseline costs to reflect the fact that BT
terminated NTS costs are found in the "Other" category of
the RSB, not the Local and National call categories. Therefore, the
total retail cost figure must be suitably increased to reflect these
costs. This ensures that the cost and volume data are consistent. The
actual baseline calculation is the following with the adjustment in
italics:
Unit cost calculation
=
Costs
of local and national calls including BT to other operator and BT to
BT NTS costs
Volumes
of local, national, BT to other operator and BT to BT NTS calls
The unit cost figure
obtained from the above is multiplied by NTS volumes in 1994/5 to obtain
the baseline allocation of costs. The adjustment is made using confidential
BT terminated NTS volume data.
Methodology
to update the allocation to the current year
3.10 As explained
earlier, this initial baseline allocation is updated to reflect the
NTS volume growth, inflation and efficiency savings between 1994/1995
and current year of the charge being directed. Each adjustment is explained
in turn below.
Volume adjustment
3.11 Since the
volume of calls has significantly increased it is reasonable to expect
that costs are now higher (i.e. a positive Cost Volume Relationship
("CVR")). Oftel considers that if any element of cost is variable
with the level of production, total costs rise with output. This would
not be the case only if all costs were fixed costs.
3.12 Oftel does
not believe that retail costs would increase on a one to one ratio with
volume (eg so that a 100% increase in volume would lead to a 100% increase
in costs, giving a CVR of 1). Oftel recognises that retail costs in
the telecommunications sector exhibit substantial economies of scale,
although the extent of scale economies varies with the precise cost
being considered. For example, Oftel considers that costs such as marketing
and sales (M&S) are unlikely to significantly increase with volumes,
implying a very low CVR. Whereas, costs for activities such as customer
services are likely to increase more in line with volumes, implying
that a higher CVR could be expected.
3.13 In
the 1996 PCR, Oftel took the view that a volume increase of 100% would
entail an increase in retail costs of 25% on average. This results in
a CVR of 0.25. Oftel believes that this continues to be a reasonable
weighted average value for all costs except for bad debt which it treated
slightly differently, as explained below. This figure for the CVR has
been consulted on in previous Retail uplift Draft Directions, and consultation
responses have been unable to submit evidence to suggest that 0.25 is
unreasonable. Indeed, Oftel notes that the CVR of 0.25 combined with
bad debt gives a weighted CVR of 0.43. This is considerably lower than
a CVR of approximately 0.5 which several operators have previously submitted
to Oftel is the correct figure.
3.14 Oftel considers
that retail bad debt costs vary more closely with revenue (price), rather
than volume. This is because the bad debt amount owed by a retail customer
depends directly on the price of calls. The expected amount of bad debt
is higher for an expensive call rather than a cheap call. Accordingly,
Oftel considers that a Cost Revenue Relationship ("CRR"),
rather than a CVR, should be applied to bad debt. Oftel further takes
the view that the CRR is one (ie: costs of bad debt increase directly
with revenues on a one to one ratio). This is because there are not
likely to be any economies of scale associated with bad debts expensed.
Oftel applies the CRR to actual bad debts written off, which is 66.9%
of BT’s Finance and Billing category. This figure has been derived
from information provided by BT, during the time of the April 2000 Direction.
BT provided a confidential statement giving revenue written off due
to bad debt as a function of its total retail costs for local and national
calls, including some NTS, for the period 1997/98 to 2000/01. This showed
that bad debt formed, on average, 69.2% of BT’s finance and billing
costs which equates to approximately 2.3% of turnover for these calls.
Having reviewed BT’s submission Oftel considers that it is not unreasonable
to rely on this evidence in calculating the final charge. In removing
the PRS bad debt costs that had originally erroneously been included,
Oftel has adjusted this figure to reflect this fact, and this figure
is now 66.9%.
Efficiency Adjustment
3.15 Oftel then
makes adjustments for efficiency savings that are independent of volume
changes. In other words, this recognises that BT’s Retail Systems Business
("RSB") has become more efficient since 1994/1995 so that
retail costs have reduced. These efficiency savings can be attributed
to technical progress in retail activities; i.e. the discovery of lower
cost methods of undertaking the same retailing functions. More generally,
this is why one can observe that, although volumes of all call categories
have increased over the time period, total retail costs have reduced,
because the efficiency effect that reduces costs outweighs the volume
and revenue induced cost increases.
3.16 Oftel calculated
an annual efficiency factor for retail costs from retail cost and volume
data for local and national calls. It did this by calculating the level
of costs that would be expected in the current year as a result of volume
increases (ie: by applying the cost volume relationship of 0.25 referred
to above). Oftel then compared this estimate of total retail costs for
local and national calls holding volumes constant. From these two figures
Oftel derived an average annual reduction in costs due to improved efficiency.
The formula behind this adjustment is presented in Annex 1. Oftel applied
the efficiency savings factor to all retail costs except bad debt, because
Oftel took the view that there is limited scope for additional efficiency
savings in bad debts expensed.
3.17 Finally,
Oftel adjusts the cost allocation with
the Retail Price Index (RPI) to allow for inflation.
Composition
of BT’s retail costs
3.18 The NTS
retail uplift allows BT to recover a properly attributed portion of
the relevant retail costs that it incurs, i.e. an allocation of costs
that is cost oriented. BT has three main categories of direct retail
costs. These are 1) customer service, 2) finance and billing and 3)
marketing and sales. Oftel takes the view that customer services and
finance and billing costs are directly relevant to NTS services, because
BT incurs these costs whilst undertaking the retail billing functions
of NTS calls. The Director therefore proposes to include these costs
in the retail uplift charges.
3.19 Marketing
and sales costs make up around 50% of the baseline retail costs. Oftel
also takes the view that these costs are relevant to NTS services. These
activities are treated as common between NTS calls and geographic calls,
for the reasons given below.
3.20 BT’s marketing and sales costs can be sub-divided
into three categories:
- The
first category captures marketing and sales activities that are aimed
at increasing call revenue from existing customers;
- The second category
comprises activities aimed at getting more people connected in the
UK, either by connecting new customers or connecting customers who
move from another operator to BT, sometimes referred to as "winback";
- The third category
of marketing and sales activities relate to non-UK customers.
3.21 Marketing
and sales costs which relate to non-UK customers (the third category)
are not included in the retail uplift charge. Paragraph 5.5 of the April
2000 Direction stated that Oftel had included such costs into the final
charge. This was an error. The relevant accounting categories from which
the marketing and sales costs were extracted were the "local"
and "national" call categories of BT’s Retail Systems Business.
BT's cost attribution methodologies do not appear to Oftel to attribute
marketing and sales costs related to non-UK customers into the local
and national call categories.
3.22 In regard
to marketing and sales costs attributable to the other two categories,
Oftel takes the view that an appropriate portion of these costs should
be included into the retail uplift charge. The reasons for this are
set out in Annex 1.
3.23 Having considered
the matters described above, and which are described in detail in Annex
1, Oftel identified BT’s relevant retail costs (common between geographic
and NTS calls) as:
- Finance and billing
costs, 66.9% of which are due to retail bad debt, derived from an
average figure over the period from 1997/98 to 2000/01, from information
provided by BT – (see paragraph 3.14)
- Customer service
- Marketing – aimed
at getting more people connected to BT in the UK
- Marketing – aimed
at increasing call revenue
- Billing enquiries
- Fault report
- Complaints
- Indirect retail
costs
Updating
the retail uplift charge
3.24 In order
to update the allocation of costs in the 1994/5 baseline to derive a
retail uplift charge applicable from April 2001 to March 2002, and a
further update from April 2002 to July 2003, Oftel has used BT originated
NTS volume data provided by BT, which excludes all the volumes for unmetered
services. Specifically, for the charge applied from April 2001, Oftel
uses volume data for the financial year 2000/01. For the charge applied
from April 2002, Oftel has used volume data for the financial year 2001/02.
In addition, Oftel has updated the efficiency calculation with cost
data from the relevant financial statements, and relevant years’ volume
data from BT.

Chapter 4
The Director’s
draft decision
The
relevant market and the position of BT
4.1 BT’s retail
uplift forms part of the price for an interconnection product. For the
purposes of the Interconnection Directive (97/33) (the ICD), BT has
been determined as having Significant Market Power (SMP) in the markets
for fixed public telephone networks and services, and is therefore required
to offer interconnection to operators with Annex II status. Article
7(2) of the ICD requires BT to show that its charges are cost oriented
and for the national regulatory authority (i.e. the Director) to require
that charges be amended where they are not cost oriented. The Director
has a general responsibility in Article 9(1) of the ICD to encourage
and secure adequate interconnection in the interests of all users, exercising
his responsibility in a way that provides maximum economic efficiency
and gives the maximum benefit to end-users.
4.2 The Director’s
draft decision is made in accordance with Article 9(3) of the ICD (as
implemented in Regulation 6(3) of the Telecommunications (Interconnection)
Regulations 1997 in pursuit of these aims taking into account the matters
listed there (as implemented in Regulation 6(1)).
Exceptional
circumstances
4.3 Article 9(3)
of the ICD and Regulation 6(3) of the Regulations state that "The
Director may intervene at any time and that he may in exceptional circumstances
make a direction that changes be made to interconnection agreements
already concluded where it is justified to ensure effective competition
or interoperability of services for users or both."
4.4 The exceptional circumstances justifying
this proposed direction are:
- a history of
long running disputes about BT’s retail uplift;
- the need to ensure
cost orientation and economic efficiency by adoption of a specific
Oftel methodology to meet these aims in order to calculate the retail
uplift year by year;
- the legitimate
expectation of the industry that Oftel would continue to control BT’s
retail uplift from April 2001; and
- the interaction
and timing of the resolution of the disputes and this own initiative
investigation with the EU market reviews and the change in regime
in July 2003.
The
Director’s draft decision
4.5 The Director
will consider all relevant submissions made to him in response to this
draft direction. As noted at the beginning of this explanatory
memorandum, operators may wish to consider the other three related proposals
regarding the NTS retail uplift and PRS bad debt which have been issued
simultaneously.
4.6 The Director’s
proposed decision is that, with effect from 1 April 2001 to 24 July
2003 inclusive, the methodology for calculating BT’s NTS Retail Uplift
shall be as described in Chapter 3 of this explanatory memorandum and
the revised charges having used that methodology shall be:
from 1 April 2001 until 31 March 2002
inclusive
For Freephone NTS calls (0800/0808), 0.1163
pence per minute ("ppm")
For all other NTS calls, 0.2277ppm
from 1 April 2002 to 24 July2003 inclusive
For Freephone NTS calls (0800/0808), 0.1141
ppm
For all other NTS calls, 0.2095
ppm
4.7 As expressed
to the NTS focus group recently, it was Oftel’s original intention to
propose the retail uplift charge for the year 1 April 2001 to 31 March
2002, the year 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003 and for the period 1 April
2003 to 24 July 2003. The latter period is a shortened period recognising
that a new legal regime will enter into force on 25 July 2003. What
the obligations will be under that regime from 25 July 2003 are currently
the subject of market reviews which are being carried out as preparatory
work to that new regime.
4.8 However,
Oftel has had difficulty in attempting to forecast with any certainty
the volumes in 2003 so as to calculate a retail uplift charge for 1
April 2003 to 24 July 2003 based on those forecasts. This is because,
being forward looking, there is no reliable way of forecasting the unknown
extent that calls to metered NTS internet services will migrate to unmetered
and broadband services in the year 2003/2004. The alternative option
of waiting for the relevant data to become available is likely to be
impractical because a new legal regime will have entered into play before
that data is available. Oftel therefore proposes that the retail uplift
charge derived for the year 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003 should be
extended to apply until 24 July 2003. In light of the new regime entering
into force on 25 July 2003, the desire to move away from dealing with
issues on a backward looking basis, and to move towards certainty, Oftel
considers that this is a reasonable proposal in these circumstances.
Implementation
4.9 Oftel is
aware that there currently exists some delay in the implementation of
previous Oftel directions because of a failure of BT and operators to
agree amendments to their contracts.
4.10 In accordance
with paragraphs 13.11 and 13.15 of the Standard Interconnection Agreement
between Operators and BT, this draft Direction proposes that as soon
as reasonably practicable following the making of this direction BT
shall make the necessary, correct and accurate, alterations to the Carrier
Price List. BT shall then send a copy of the alterations to the Carrier
Price List to the Operators and no further agreement between BT and
the Operators will be required in order to implement this

Chapter
5
Arrangements
for making and viewing representations
Arrangements
5.1 The Director
General’s proposed draft decision is being made available to interested
parties, together with the Director General’s reasons, so that they
may have a reasonable opportunity to make representations. Having considered
any such representations, the Director General will, if appropriate,
make the direction and will notify BT and interested parties of that
direction and his reasons for making it. The closing date for submitting
representations on this draft decision is
30 January 2003.
5.2 Where possible,
comments should be made in writing and sent by e-mail to:
However, copies
may also be posted or faxed to the address below. If any stakeholders
are unable to respond in one of these ways, they should discuss alternatives
with the Oftel manager named below:
Geoff Brighton
Oftel
50 Ludgate Hill
London
EC4M 7JJ
Tel: 020 7634 8925
Fax: 020 7634 8943
Further
copies of this document
5.3 This document
can be viewed in the Publications section of Oftel’s website (www.oftel.gov.uk),
under classification Pricing and price control. Paper copies and more
accessible formats such as large print, Braille, disc and audio cassette
can be made available on request. Please contact Oftel’s Research and
Information Unit by phoning 020 7634 8761 or by sending an e-mail to
infocent@oftel.gov.uk.
Publication
of representations made by stakeholders
5.4 On this occasion,
Oftel is not programming a formal period during which interested parties
may comment on the representations made by others. However, in the interests
of transparency, all representations will be published, except where
respondents indicate that a response, or part of it, is confidential.
Respondents are therefore asked to separate out any confidential material
into a confidential annex which is clearly identified as containing
confidential material. Oftel will take steps to protect the confidentiality
of all such material from the moment that it is received at Oftel's
offices.
5.5 Non confidential
representations can be viewed on Oftel's website in the Publications
section under classification Responses to Oftel consultations. They
can also be viewed at Oftel's Research and Information Unit. Appointments
must be made in advance by phoning 020 7634 8761 or sending an e-mail
to infocent@oftel.gov.uk
Why
Marketing and Sales costs should be included in the Retail Uplift
1. Oftel initially
sought to identify which marketing and sales costs were incremental
to particular services. The test for whether a particular element of
cost is incremental to a service is to consider the difference in costs
between the situation in which the service is provided and the situation
in which it is not provided. This difference is the cost which is incremental
to that particular service. Costs which are not incremental to any particular
service must logically be regarded as common among a number of services.
2. Oftel has
previously sought information from BT from which it could be established
that marketing and sales costs should be included into the retail uplift
charge. BT’s response stated that it was not possible to provide conclusive
evidence of the kind that Oftel had requested. BT submitted that the
only way to prove such causality would be to run a controlled test under
precisely the same conditions but without running the campaign, and
then to observe the differences in volumes. BT said that marketing campaigns
do not lend themselves to such an approach.
3. Oftel was
persuaded by BT’s response as to the impracticality of establishing
causality in this case. The precise identification of all of BT’s marketing
and sales campaigns would not be sufficient in itself to enable an assessment
of causality to be made. In addition, a controlled test would need to
be carried out so that an assessment could be made of the impact of
the campaign on call volumes and call type. Oftel considers that it
would be impracticable and disproportionate for BT to carry out such
controlled tests, particularly since (as explained in the next paragraphs)
it was not expected that such tests would establish that a substantial
part of such costs were other than common between geographic and NTS
calls.
4. Oftel has
considered the various categories of marketing and sales costs and considered
that all, or at least the majority, are common to both geographic and
NTS. BT has submitted to Oftel that its marketing and sales costs were
divided between price-related campaigns and general call-stimulation
campaigns. Oftel was satisfied that marketing campaigns like "Friends
and Family" are common to both geographic and NTS calls. Under
these campaigns, BT’s subscribers may, for example, include NTS calls
or geographic calls as their "Best Friend" telephone numbers
and hence receive a discount on calls to those numbers. General call-stimulation
campaigns are aimed at the stimulation of all calls, whether geographic
or NTS, and whether voice or data calls.
5. It was against
this background that Oftel has had to take a view on the inclusion of
marketing and sales costs into the retail uplift charges.
6. Oftel proposes
to include a reasonable portion of all retail costs in the NTS retail
uplift (ie: to treat them all as common for the reasons set out above),
rather than attempt to assess in minute detail which costs (if any)
were incremental to which services. Oftel is not aware of any robust
evidence that particular costs were incremental to particular services.
Accordingly, Oftel has treated all retail costs as common and allocated
a portion of those common costs to NTS. Oftel is not aware of any marketing
and sales campaigns which are incremental only to geographic calls.
7. Marketing
and sales costs feature only very slightly in the final charges proposed
in this direction. This is because, even though marketing and sales
costs are included in the baseline, Oftel has applied a very low CVR
to them (ie: a weighted average of 0.25). As explained in paragraph
3.12, Oftel considers that marketing and sales costs are more similar
to those of a fixed nature, and therefore do not significantly increase
in line with volume. This has the effect of significantly decreasing
their proportion of the retail costs alongside the volume induced increase
in retail costs. This can be explained through a simple numerical example
using dummy numbers.
8. Consider a
1994/1995 baseline cost allocation of £100, with an initial volume of
10 in 1994/1995. Assume that 50% of these costs are marketing and sales
costs. Assume marketing and sales has a CVR of 0.05, and this is reflected
in the overall CVR of 0.25, which is applied to the entire allocation
of costs. Assume volume has grown from 10 to 600 over 6 years. This
is an implied growth of 2900%. After 6 years, the costs will have grown
by:
0.25*2900% = 725%
The cost allocation
at the end of the 6 years will be:
10*(1+7.25) = £825
Marketing and sales
has implicitly been inflated with respect to volumes only slightly over
these years, because it has a low assumed CVR. Assuming that the CVR
for M&S is 5%, M&S has inflated to the following after 6 years:
0.05*2900% = 145%
50(1+1.45) = £122.5
Therefore, the proportion
of the final pot of costs made up by marketing and sales is:
£122.5/£825 = 14.8%
9. This illustration
indicates that the low CVR has the effect of significantly reducing
the proportion of total costs made up by marketing and sales from 50%
to 14.8%. In this proposed retail uplift direction, the relevant figures
are 50% in the base year, down to 11.6% in 2000/01. The figure is roughly
the same for all the year for the which the charge is being Directed.
It can therefore be seen that, even though marketing and sales costs
are included in the baseline, in actual fact they have a much smaller
impact in the retail uplift charge than what is actually perceived
at face value.
10. In this draft
retail uplift direction, the relevant figures are 50% in the base year,
down to 11.6% in 2000/01 assuming a CVR for M&S of 0.05. The figure
is roughly the same for all the years for the which the charge is being
directed. It can therefore be seen that, even though marketing and sales
costs are included in the baseline, in actual fact they have a much
smaller impact in the retail uplift charge than what is actually
perceived at face value.
11. Removal of
these costs from the baseline would require an adjustment of the CVR
to ensure that it was consistent with the basket of costs that it was
applied to. Given that marketing and sales is assumed to have an individual
CVR of 0.05, if it was removed, the overall CVR for the remaining costs
would have to be increased to a figure greater than 0.25. So in other
words, even if marketing and sales costs or any other cost category
was removed from the baseline, the final retail uplift would vary very
little due to corresponding adjustments in the CVR.
Calculation
of efficiency savings in retail costs
12. In order
to determine the adjustment, the following formula extracted from the
recent Price Control Review (Oftel February 2001) is applied:

where x = efficiency
savings, i.e. year on year gain in underlying efficiency net of volume
effects.


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