Statement issued by the Director General of Telecommunications

September 2000

Contents

Summary

Chapter 1   Background

Chapter 2    Responses to public consultation

Chapter 3    A review of proposals

Chapter 4    ICSTIS’ views and the Code(s) of Practice

Chapter 5    Conclusions and the licence modifications

Chapter 6    Consultation: How to make comments

Glossary 

Appendix A    Draft licence modification

Summary

S.1 This statement sets out Oftel’s conclusions following the joint Oftel and ICSTIS (The Independent Committee for the Supervision of Standards of Telephone Information Services) consultation document The Regulation of Premium Rate Services published in August 1999.

S.2 Most respondents agree that effective regulation in the premium rate market is necessary for adequate protection of consumers and to ensure a level playing field for business.

S.3 In the light of responses, the Director General of Telecommunications has concluded that extending the regulatory regime by modifying telecommunications licences, is proportionate and appropriate regulation for the premium rate market. Strengthening the regime is in the interests of the public and the premium rate market sector. The proposed modification simply maintains the current rules. No significant changes or costs fall on service providers and network operators.

S.4 Telecommunications Act licences will be modified to apply the same regulations to most premium rate services. These now only apply to ‘Controlled Services’ (live premium rate services). These will be known as ‘Controlled Premium Rate Services’. The existing ICSTIS codes of practice will become a single, Oftel recognised, Code of Practice. ICSTIS will have power to recommend to the Director General that a network operator cease to provide a Controlled Premium Rate Service; and the Director General will have the power to secure this.

S.5 These proposals are in line with Oftel’s strategy that co-regulation is the appropriate route for premium rate services.

S.6 Oftel therefore intends to proceed with the licence modification.

S.7 This statement sets out the proposed changes to the draft licence condition and clarifies the definition of Controlled Premium Rate Services. It is proposed to link the definition to calls which are tariffed at a price which is equal to, or exceeds, the lowest price for a premium rate call from a fixed line (currently 10p).

S.8 This statement invites further comments on the policy and on the detail of the proposed licence modification.

Chapter 1

Background

1.1 Premium rate services (PRS) are special services commonly containing information or entertainment accessed by dialling special telephone numbers. Customers pay for services and the call, through their normal telephone bill. PRS are almost always more expensive than standard call tariffs. Most PRS are prefixed with the numbers 090.

1.2 Ever since PRS were introduced in the UK in the 1980s, they have been subject to safeguards. As it is the telephone company’s customer who is responsible for payment of bills whoever makes the calls, safeguards over the types of calls which can be made and over charges, are necessary.

1.3 The premium rate industry has voluntarily regulated itself through ICSTIS. ICSTIS supervises the promotion and content of PRS on behalf of the telephone companies. This voluntary arrangement covers most PRS. However, a small group of services – those which involve live conversations – are subject to regulation by Oftel and are defined in Telecommunications Act licences as ‘Controlled Services’. If the telephone company, or the provider of the live PRS, refuses to participate in the supervisory process run by ICSTIS, Oftel has the power to take enforcement action requiring the telephone companies to cease the service on which the live PRS is run.

1.4 Oftel and ICSTIS (August 1999) proposed that most PRS should be subject to the same regulatory arrangements which apply to live conversation services. Although the voluntary system has worked successfully, problems have occurred with harm to consumers and damage to the reputation of the industry.

1.5 Oftel and ICSTIS therefore consider that it is in the public interest to strengthen the regulatory regime so that ICSTIS can continue to supervise the premium rate industry to secure consumer confidence and sustain commercial viability. The proposals underpin the ICSTIS Codes of Practice and provide effective consumer protection – the Director General of Telecommunications having powers to intervene as a last resort – and to ensure a level playing field for the industry.

1.6 This statement reviews responses to the public consultation on proposals to extend the definition of ‘Controlled Services’ in both the Telecommunications Act licences and the ICSTIS Codes. These changes will have no effect on the vast majority of responsible PRS service providers and network operators. The control by ICSTIS will however extend to cover all PRS at or above the lowest tariff for a current premium rate call and for all sex content and chatline services, regardless of price. Oftel can intervene, if requested to do so by ICSTIS.

1.7 Subject to further views on this statement, Oftel and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) will proceed with modifications to the relevant licence conditions. Along similar timescales, ICSTIS will make appropriate changes to its Codes of Practice which will require formal recognition by Oftel. Oftel anticipates that the modified conditions could take effect in early 2001.

1.8 Details on how to comment are explained in Chapter 6.

1.9 Comments are invited by Friday 3 November 2000.

Chapter 2

Responses to public consultation

2.1 There were 62 responses to the joint consultation document. 11 were from network operators and 51 from other organisations, including service providers and consumer organisations.

2.2 There was general consensus that effective regulation of the premium rate industry is necessary in order to create a level playing field. There was less consensus about how, exactly, this should be achieved.

2.3 The consultation document invited comments on certain specific questions. These were:

Do you agree that services paid for by credit card do not need to be regulated?

2.4 Most responses agreed that such services should not be regulated. A minority felt that such services should be subject to the same rules as premium rate services, and a slightly larger minority also felt that the advertising of the service should be subject to the same rules as premium rate services.

Do you agree that separately billed services should not be controlled?

2.5 There was broad agreement that such services should not be controlled, with some taking the view that the level of consumer concern and of actual harm should be monitored and that a regulatory response might eventually be needed.

Do you agree that, generally, only more expensive PRS should be controlled?

2.6 There was broad agreement that price is a crucial determinant of whether a service should be controlled or not. Respondents argued variously that calls at over national rate, or over a nominal figure, should be controlled. Many respondents pointed out that the increasing prevalence of revenue-sharing arrangements on other non-geographic numbers means that the distinction between these and premium rate services is being eroded.

Do you agree that the characteristics [outlined in the consultation document] adequately describe the features of PRS which should be subject to regulatory control? Do you have any different suggestions?

2.7 There was a wide range of responses, including those who believed that all non-geographic services were (and should be) captured by the definition, those who believed that the definition did not capture services which should be covered, and those who believed that the definition covered too many services. Respondents generally wanted further clarification on the intended scope of the definition.

Do you agree that the proposed regime and enforcement procedure provides satisfactory control over the activities of providers of PRS?

2.8 Concern was expressed by several respondents about the Director General’s discretion to withdraw his recognition of the Code of Practice following a notice period of one month. Respondents felt that this was a power disproportionate to any potential harm the industry might cause. Individual respondents felt that certain of ICSTIS’ powers were either too strong or not strong enough in relation to particular types of service, but no overall pattern emerged from these responses.

2.9 A majority of network operators’ responses were in favour of the amendment in principle, though some raised concerns about specific issues and most commonly about whether the licence amendment under consideration was consistent with Oftel’s policy of applying proportionate regulation. There was general acceptance that, where self-regulation can work, it is the best regulatory solution.

2.10 Respondents stressed that consistency across the industry was important and that all ‘traditional’ PRS should be subject to the same rules. Some expressed concern that the definition of premium rate services might unintentionally capture other non-geographic services, such as mobile and national rate numbers.

Chapter 3

A review of proposals

Principles

3.1 The main purpose of regulation in the premium rate sector is to secure the adequate protection of consumers from unexpected high bills which they can not afford to pay.

3.2 Oftel’s principle is to keep regulation to the minimum necessary to obtain appropriate outcomes. Regulatory intervention should be proportionate and necessary to address market failure. Self- and co-regulation should be used where possible.

How is this protection currently provided?

3.3 The primary role of protecting consumers falls to ICSTIS. It maintains control through two Codes of Practice. One covers live PRS (ie live one-to-one conversation services) – the ‘Live Code’. This is recognised by the Director General and its existence is a prerequisite to the running of live PRS under the ‘Controlled Services’ condition in operator licences. It also includes a fund from which consumers may receive compensation for unauthorised calls made to live services. The Director General can, where appropriate, require an operator to cease to provide a live service.

3.4 The Director General withdrew his recognition of the Live Code in respect of chatlines in 1992. Oftel is currently involved in discussions with ICSTIS and the premium rate industry with regard to the re-introduction of chatline services.

3.5 The second code – the ‘General Code’ – is a voluntary arrangement. It is only effective if operators sign up to it, contribute to ICSTIS’ funding requirements, act on ICSTIS’ decisions and ensure that reference to code compliance is covered in contractual relationships with service providers.

3.6 Both Codes include rules designed to meet Oftel’s public interest concerns about the easy accessibility of PRS, inadequate control over the types of call which can be made using the customer’s line and inadequate control over the costs or charges that the customer may incur. The Codes also include rules on the nature of the content itself. Oftel has no involvement in controlling the content of the ‘service’ being provided via PRS.

Current proposal

3.7 The proposal for extending the current ‘Controlled Services’ condition to cover not just live PRS but most PRS, regardless of the nature of the service is a pragmatic response from Oftel and ICSTIS to a change in the market.

Market failure and argument for intervention

3.8 However, as some responses argued that this was essentially interventionist Oftel and ICSTIS have considered again the original reasons for their proposals.

3.9 The rationale for intervention is different from that of ten years ago. The market has changed. The ICSTIS model of self-regulation has been historically successful because of the support of the big network operators. These established players (such as BT and Vodafone) recognised the balance between the revenues to be made in terminating PRS traffic (deals with service provider clients) and the concerns of calling customers (also network customers). However, many newer entrants to the market have no domestic customer base. These players may seek a shorter term commercial advantage by not acting promptly on ICSTIS’ recommendations in cases where consumers’ interests have been harmed. Examples of this have arisen and are likely to recur.

3.10 Five areas have been identified which threaten the model of self-regulation:

• Increased numbers of networks terminating PRS;
• Changing nature of network operators;
• Network operator/service provider combinations;
• Network operator resistance to voluntary sign-up; and
• Increasing resistance to terms of ICSTIS agreement.

3.11 These do potentially threaten compliance with ICSTIS’ General Code which covers most publicly accessible PRS which are not live services. There has also been a case where a network operator failed to apply ICSTIS’ toughest sanction of ceasing to provide a competition service found to be in breach of the Code. Upon referral by ICSTIS, Oftel lacked formal powers to intervene in the public interest because the nature of the PRS did not fall within the definition of ‘Controlled Services’. The Director General succeeded eventually (at the second attempt) in persuading the network operator to remedy this problem, although customers suffered during the intervening period.

Increased number of networks terminating PRS

3.12 In 1995, only four networks offered PRS. By 1999, this was 25. At least 35 network operators will be active by the end of 2000. Whilst this may be evidence of increasing competition amongst terminating carriers, the benefit of competition (in, for example, better rates offered to service providers by terminating network operators) primarily falls to the PRS providers. There has been some evidence of new service types being offered to customers, but no identifiable fall in premium rate tariffs, except in isolated service areas. The tariff trend in most PRS is upwards. Hence, the risks to consumers of higher than expected bills remain.

3.13 To maintain the effectiveness of the regime, ICSTIS has to contact and persuade each new operator voluntarily to sign up to the regulatory model. Some new operators entering the market are less inclined to comply with voluntary rules, particularly given the cost attached to doing so (including the financing of ICSTIS). And potentially some service providers might stand to profit – at the expense of the calling customers – from this regulatory gap.

Changing nature of network operators

3.14 Most new entrant network operators have a minimal domestic consumer base and gaining market share takes precedence over the needs of another network’s domestic customers. Earlier entrants, by contrast, tended also to be call originators and therefore had a more balanced view of their relative responsibilities towards their customers and service provider clients.

Network operator/service provider combination

3.15 A growing number of service providers are acquiring International Simple Voice Resale (ISVR) licences, which permit the running of PRS. This raises potential conflicts of interest where decision with sanctions against the service provider would be directed to the carrier (the same company) for action.

Network operator resistance to voluntary sign-up

3.16 Over the past year, two network operators were terminating PRS who had not approached ICSTIS. These services were running in a completely unregulated environment. This demonstrates the potential weakness of the model.

Increasing resistance to terms of ICSTIS agreement

3.17 In the last 12 months, three operators were initially unwilling to agree to ICSTIS’ standard terms, agreed with existing terminating network operators. A fair regulatory model must be based on a level playing field; significant differences in terms undermine the credibility and fairness of the regime.

Other issues

3.18 The historic reasons for mandating a Code of Practice for ‘live’ PRS is set out in the August 1999 consultation paper. Numbers of complaints about live services are tiny in comparison to other non-live PRS: in 1999, ICSTIS received a total of 7,079 complaints, of which only 446 (6.3%) related to live premium rate services.

Chapter 4

ICSTIS’ views and the Code(s) of Practice

4.1 Comments were also invited on the draft merged ICSTIS Code of Practice (incorporating the Live and General Codes). No substantive changes were proposed to the two Codes.

4.2 Comments on the proposed licence modification and the Code of Practice together have been dealt with at Chapter 2. There were few comments about the draft Code. Some comments were received about the Codes in their existing form, suggesting that they could be made more user-friendly. ICSTIS will review this and will be consulting in Autumn 2000 on proposed amendments to the Codes. Any amendments agreed following consultation will be incorporated into the merged Code once the licence modification procedure is complete.

Chapter 5

Conclusions and the licence modifications

5.1 Oftel considers that the proposals in this document are a proportionate response to changes in the markets and a reasonable and justifiable response. The proposed approach is in the public interest. It is in line with Oftel’s published strategy intention of moving to focussed regulation. In the case of premium rate services covered by the ICSTIS General Code, the existing regime is self-regulation by the premium rate industry. We are moving to a regime which is co-regulatory, since Oftel’s involvement remains in reserve.

5.2 During the consultative process (both in responses to the original consultation and informal consultative talks with interested parties), no workable alternative proposal has emerged which addresses the problem.

5.3 The Director General has therefore decided that he will proceed with the proposed licence modification.

5.4 Draft licence conditions were included in the initial consultation and in the light of comments made these have been revised and are set out in Appendix A. Comments are invited on the text of Conditions 22 and 23 (referred to as Conditions 33A and 33B respectively in the August 1999 consultation document). In addition to standard PTO licences, the conditions are found in other licences including ISVR and TSL.

Separately billed services

5.5 Most responses to the consultation supported Oftel’s view that services, which may seem similar to PRS but are not charged to customers via their telephone bills, should not be controlled. Services are accessible via telecommunications networks, but which are paid for by the customer using, for example, a credit card or are separately invoiced, pose no direct risk to customers in terms of high phone bills and possible disconnection. This conclusion is reflected in Condition 22.11(a)(i).

The price of PRS calls

5.6 There was broad agreement amongst respondents that price is a crucial determinant of whether a service should be classified as controlled or not. The relatively high price of premium rate calls, combined with the relative ease with which a telephone can be used by someone other than the bill-payer, can lead to circumstances where the bill-payer cannot afford to pay the bill. The more expensive the premium rate calls, the more likely this is to happen.

5.7 Oftel and ICSTIS proposed that only PRS calls over a particular price (which was related to a standard national tariff) should be included in the definition of Controlled Premium Rate Services. There was broad support for this from respondents. However, there was some concern that this threshold, above which PRS calls would fall within the definition, might unintentionally capture services which are not normally considered to be PRS. This was related to services which may have shared revenue, such as ‘Find me Anywhere’ (07) and ‘Special Services’ (08). Oftel and ICSTIS agree that there is no justification for extending the range of prefixes or services which require, in the context of this proposal, supervision by ICSTIS. Neither Oftel nor ICSTIS wants to include within the definition, tariffs or services which do not require regulatory intervention within the context of this proposal. All that will alter is the extent to which ICSTIS’ current remit is statutorily supported by Oftel.

5.8 The definition of Controlled Premium Rate Services caused some concern as this could unintentionally lead to a broadening of ICSTIS’ remit, which is not the aim of the proposal. After considering these comments, Oftel now proposes that only calls which are charged at a price which equates to or exceeds the lowest price for a PRS call from a fixed landline (currently 10p) are included in the definition of Controlled Premium Rate Services. Such a price threshold will be kept under review and prevailing market conditions taken into account should a change be considered as necessary. These conclusions are set out in Conditions 22.11(a)(iv)(A) and 22.9.

Services of a sexual nature

5.9 The definition of services of a sexual nature is revised from "sexually titillating or suggestive" to "sexually suggestive or explicit". This definition is considered better to reflect generally accepted standards. See Condition 22.11(c).

Revocation

5.10 Oftel noted the concerns about the Director General’s power to effectively withdraw his recognition of a Code of Practice in respect of all Controlled Premium Rate Services. However, the specific provision in the draft licence condition deals specifically with the period of notice given by the Director General to the body applying and administering the Code (ie ICSTIS). This provision does not diminish the Director General’s responsibilities to act lawfully and reasonably, nor does it override existing safeguards such as the provisions of Schedule 1, Part I, Paragraph 4 of the standard Public Telecommunications Operator (PTO) licence concerning the consultative procedures for determinations and directions etc. In the unlikely event that Oftel were to consider the revocation of Code recognition across all Controlled Premium Rate Services, widespread consultation with interested parties would be a requirement. Oftel proposes that Condition 22.5 remains unchanged.

Exemptions

5.11 Oftel invites comments on what existing services should not be treated as Controlled Premium Rate Services (and may be determined as such under Condition 22.8), even though they may fall within the definition set out in Condition 22.11. Certain directory enquiry services may be an example.

Anticipated outcome of the proposal

5.12 In operational terms, the existing regulatory regime would remain largely unchanged. ICSTIS’ activities and procedures need not change, except it would have the added ability to request the Director General’s intervention in a situation where a network operator failed to enforce its recommended sanctions, following due process. Provided that the service is covered by the extended definition of ‘Controlled Services’ (ie Controlled Premium Rate Services), the Director General could issue an order under section 16 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 for breach of a licence condition, if a network operator refused to comply with the direction and that he is satisfied that the operator is likely to contravene this condition.

5.13 If ICSTIS were to investigate complaints about, say, a premium rate competition line where callers never received their prizes, its sanctions (eg recommending the immediate cessation of the service) would have the statutory backing of Oftel under the proposed regime. If a network operator, for whatever reason, were slow or unwilling to effect ICSTIS’ recommended sanction (as has happened previously), ICSTIS would have the option of referring the matter to Oftel. Unlike now, Oftel would have powers of enforcement.

5.14 The biggest impact of the proposal is to address the key concern about new entrants failing to voluntarily sign up to the ICSTIS Code. This gives more adequate protection to consumers, and provides for a fair and level playing field for competing operators and service providers. In effect, the proposed licence modification requires network operators to sign up to a single Code (covering live and non-live PRS) and to ensure that their service providers adhere to the Code. Licensed operators which fail to support the Code may be found to be in breach of licence. In such circumstances, the Director General can require the licence holder to comply by making an order. This is enforceable by third parties or the Director General through civil action.

Chapter 6

Consultation: how to make comments

6.1 Oftel seeks views on the policy conclusions and draft licence condition contained in this Statement. The deadline for comments is Friday 3 November 2000. A further two weeks will be allowed to submit comments on comments.

6.2 Comments should be made in writing and sent to:

Jo Ibegbuna
Regulatory Policy Directorate
Oftel
50 Ludgate Hill
London, EC4M 7JJ

Tel: 020 7634 5303
Fax: 020 7634 8784

e-mail: josephine.ibegbuna@oftel.gov.uk

6.3 Confidential responses should not be sent via the Internet. Written comments will be made publicly available in Oftel’s Research and Intelligence Unit, except where respondents indicate that their response, or parts of it, are confidential. Respondents are therefore asked to separate out any confidential material into a confidential annexe which is clearly identified as containing confidential material. In the interests of transparency, respondents are asked to avoid confidentiality markings wherever possible. Appointments to view written comments in Oftel’s Research and Intelligence Unit, which must be made in advance, can be arranged by calling 020 7634 8761.

Internet

6.4 This document is also available at Oftel’s website at www.oftel.gov.uk as are other documents referred to in this statement.

6.5 Oftel would like to set up a link between this statement on Oftel’s Web site and any responses on respondents’ own Internet pages. Please contact Jo Hamilton at Oftel on 020 7634 8755 or by e-mail: web.oftel@gtnet.gov.uk to arrange this.

6.6 Oftel has a free e-mail based mailing list to help people stay informed about the work that Oftel is doing. Each time an Oftel document is published and placed on Oftel’s website, subscribers to the list receive an e-mail informing them about the document. If you would like to join, then please use the electronic form on the website to add yourself to the list. There is a link to the form from the What’s new? section of the site.

Alternative formats

6.7 Copies of the full statement are available on disc.

6.8 The summary can be made available in large print, Braille and tape formats. Please contact the Oftel Research and Intelligence Unit on 020 7634 8761, or by e-mail: infocent.oftel@gtnet.gov.uk or call textphone 020 7634 8769 for more information.

Glossary

Call barring – The ability to programme a Public Switched Network access line so that outgoing calls to certain related groups of numbers such as special charge rate, international or mobile services cannot be made.

Calling line identification (CLI) – A facility that enables identification of the number from which a call is being made.

Chatline – A service which allows more than two persons simultaneously to conduct a telephone conversation with one another and where the persons concerned are normally strangers to each other to begin with.

Controlled Premium Rate Services – Those premium rate services defined in the proposed licence modification as being subject to controls.

Controlled Services – Those premium rate services which are currently defined in licences as being subject to controls. They comprise of chatlines and live conversation services.

International number – The number to be dialled following the international prefix to obtain a called party in another country.

International Simple Voice Resale (ISVR) – An international service provided by an operator to customers using the international facilities owned by other operators. In the case of an outgoing call, the operator collects traffic from the public telecommunications network, transfers it to a line leased from a facilities operator, and then hands it over to a Public Telecommunications Operator in an overseas country who will deliver the call to its destination. It therefore involves breakout onto the public telecommunications network at both ends, but with the international leg of the call being carried on leased circuits. ISVR traffic bypasses the accounting rate system

Live conversation services – A definition of the group of premium rate services which includes the provision of live telephone conversation either between the provider of the service and the caller or two callers to the provided service.

National numbering scheme – A scheme for the allocation and re-allocation of numbers which is specified by the Director General and made available by him for public inspection.

Numbering conventions – The rules by which numbers are allocated.

Premium rate services (PRS) – Services, including recorded information and live conversation, run by independent service providers. All calls to these companies are charged at a higher rate than ordinary calls to cover the companies’ costs in providing the content of the call and the operator’s cost for the special network facilities needed.

Public Telecommunications Operator (PTO) – network operator providing services to the public with powers granted by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under the Telecommunications Act 1984 to enable them to install their systems on public and private land, property etc.

Service provider – Provider of telecommunication services, or services with a telecommunication service component, to third parties whether over its own network or otherwise.

Telecommunications Services Licence (TSL) – A class licence under which individuals can offer certain telecommunications services including a private payphone service. The licence authorises the connection of up to 20 sites by self-provided lines, or an unlimited number by leased lines.

Appendix A

Draft licence modification

CONDITION 22

CONTROLLED PREMIUM RATE SERVICES

22.1 The Licensee may only provide a Controlled Premium Rate Service in whole or part by means of the Applicable Systems (whether or not Messages comprised in, or resulting from the provision of, such Services have previously been or are subsequently conveyed by any other public telecommunication system) where the Relevant Condition is satisfied.

22.2 The Licensee may only provide a telecommunication service to another person by means of the Applicable Systems by means of which that person, to the knowledge of the Licensee, provides a Controlled Premium Rate Service (whether or not Messages comprised in, or resulting from the provision of, such services have previously been or are subsequently conveyed by any other public telecommunication system) where the Relevant Condition is satisfied.

22.3 The Relevant Condition is that there is in effect at the time the Controlled Premium Rate Service concerned is provided, a Code of Practice governing the provision of such a Service, which has been recognised by the Director for the purposes of this Condition after consultation with the Licensee and with any body which he considers to be representative of those wishing to provide such Services.

22.4 A Code of Practice shall only be recognised for the purposes of paragraph 22.3 if the Director is satisfied that:

22.5 A Code of Practice is recognised for the purposes of this Condition where it is specified as such in a determination made by the Director, and the Director may, at any time after such a Code is recognised and after giving not less than one month’s notice in writing of his intention to the Body applying and administering the Code, determine that its recognition be revoked if he is satisfied that its provisions are not capable of properly regulating the provision of the Controlled Premium Rate Services to which it relates or that it is not being properly applied and administered (whether, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, due to lack of funding or otherwise).

22.6 For the purposes of this Condition, the Director may recognise a Code of Practice in relation to any description of Controlled Premium Rate Service or to all Controlled Premium Rate Services and the provisions of this Condition shall apply accordingly.

22.7 If:

the Director may direct the Licensee to cease to provide, or, as the case may be, not to provide that person or any other person with any service facilitating or enabling the provision of the relevant Controlled Premium Rate Service or Services or, as the case may be, itself cease to provide, or, as the case may be, not to provide the relevant Controlled Premium Rate Service or Services.

22.8 The Director may determine, subject to such conditions as he thinks fit, that:

and where a determination of the kind specified in sub-paragraph (b) above is made the provisions of this Condition shall apply to such a Service from the date specified in the determination.

22.9 For the purposes of ascertaining whether a service is a Controlled Premium Rate Service, the Director shall determine, from time to time, in accordance with the procedure set out in paragraph 22.10 below, an amount for the charge of the Call by means of which the service is obtained or the rate according to which such Call is charged or both which, when exceeded, means that sub-paragraph 22.11(a)(iv)(A) of the definition of Controlled Premium Rate Services is satisfied. In making such a determination, the Director shall have regard to the prevailing standard rates for premium rate calls of the Licensee and other licensed operators providing Controlled Premium Rate Services from time to time.

22.10 Where a determination is made pursuant to paragraph 22.9 the procedure shall be as follows:

22.11 In this Condition:

22.12 An International Call which terminates on a telecommunication system outside the United Kingdom is not a Controlled Premium Rate Service. For the purposes of this Condition, an "International Call" means the conveyance of any Message by means of the Applicable Systems which has been or is to be conveyed by means of any telecommunication system outside the United Kingdom but, for the avoidance of any doubt, an International Call does not include any call terminated on a telecommunication system within the United Kingdom.

22.13 The Licensee shall allocate Numbers to Controlled Premium Rate Services which it provides in accordance with this Condition in accordance with the National Numbering Conventions published by the Director in accordance with paragraph 26.5(a) of this Licence.

CONDITION 23

PROVISION OF SPECIAL FACILITIES

23.1 The Licensee shall comply with any direction made under this paragraph which requires the Licensee to make available such of the facilities listed in paragraph 23.2 as are specified in the direction. A direction under this paragraph shall be made by the Director after consultation with the Licensee and shall specify only facilities which the Director considers it will be technically and economically practicable for the Licensee to provide. The direction shall specify the date by which each facility is to be provided and the class or description of customer (whether described by reference to area or otherwise) to whom it is to be provided and shall be subject to such conditions as the Director thinks fit.

23.2 The facilities referred to in paragraph 23.1 are:

23.3 The services to which this Condition applies are those Chatline Services and Message Services in respect of which:

23.4 In this Condition, a "Chatline Service" and a "Message Service" have the respective meanings given to those terms in Condition 22.