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The Agency is considering two alternative procedures for awarding broadband fixed wireless access licences – comparative selection (or beauty contest as it is commonly known) and auction. Below is a brief description of the two procedures and notes on the advantages and disadvantages of each. The consultation document Wireless in the Information Age asked for views on the relative merits of the comparative selection or auction approaches. A majority (of 60%) favoured comparative selection. Their reasons are examined below. Beauty contest – key features |
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| a.Description | |||
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Under a beauty contest applicants set out their cases for being awarded licences on the basis of the criteria set out in the invitation to bid. Criteria might include, for example, speed of deployment, project viability, spectrum efficiency and ability to stimulate competition. The criteria could be weighted. The awarding authority is reponsible for designing and running the award procedure. It decides which criteria should be used in the selection process and how they should be weighted. It prepares the invitation to bid and follows up with applicants any points arising from their applications. It selects licensees by judging the quality of applicants’ responses against the criteria. Payment for licences awarded by beauty contest are made on the issue of the licence and at annual intervals. Licence fees will be set on the basis of administrative pricing, as required by the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998, taking into account spectrum management factors. These include the balance between the spectrum available and future demand, and the desirability of promoting, among other things, efficient spectrum use, the development of innovative services and competition. Applicants are required to submit information in support of their application. This would include company details, description of services to be offered, roll out plans, business projections and costings, and a technical description of the network used to supply services. |
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| b.Advantages & Disadvantages | |||
| Advantages | |||
| A beauty contest allows the allocation of licences on the basis of detailed plans submitted by applicants. | |||
| The procedure is well established and understood by industry. | |||
| The majority of respondents to the Consultation Document favoured this approach. | |||
| Disadvantages | |||
| It is difficult to keep the selection procedure objective, non-discriminatory and transparent, as required by the EC Licensing Directive. Because of this there is the possibility of appeal against non-selection, leading to judicial review which would delay the award of licences. | |||
| Setting selection criteria and evaluating against them can both be difficult processes. | |||
| A beauty contest tends to favour established companies, who can cite a track record in support of their case. | |||
| The selection procedure can be a lengthy process, particularly where a large number of licences are on offer. | |||
| Because it is a subjective process there is no guarantee that it will place spectrum in the hands of those best able to use it to maximum economic advantage. | |||
| Auction – key features | |||
| a. Description | |||
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There are many varieties of auction and their design is a specialised skill. In order to meet the auction’s objectives there will be detailed auction rules governing such things as pre-qualification, reserve prices, participation in each round and the number of licences a bidder might be allowed to win. But the essential feature of an auction is that licences are awarded to those that bid the highest price for them. Payment of the fee may be required on issue of the licence, in instalments or by royalty payments. The awarding authority is responsible for designing the auction, setting up the procedures for running the auction, ensuring that all potential bidders have full knowledge of the rules and procedures and for running the auction to a conclusion. Auctions may be run on site with all bidders in attendance or they may be run remotely. The 3G auction is being run remotely with bids and auctioneers’ reports being exchanged by secure fax. An alternative would be to run a remote auction via the internet. The applicant’s role in relation to the awarding authority is relatively straightforward, in that applications to enter the auction will be simple and require to be supported by only limited information. However, the applicant will need to make extensive preparations for the auction, e.g. ensuring that it understands the rules, developing a suitable strategy, putting in place sufficient finance and ensuring that it is able to fulfil the licence obligations, should it win. |
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| b. Advantages & disadvantages | |||
| Advantages | |||
| Selection of licensees by auction is open, non-discriminatory and transparent. | |||
| It places spectrum with those who value it most and are therefore likely to develop it most effectively. | |||
| It provides a fair opportunity for new entrants when competing alongside incumbents. | |||
| Carefully designed and well run auctions, with well informed bidders, will achieve market prices. | |||
| Disadvantages | |||
| Auctions are not appropriate where the number of bidders is likely to be less than the number of licences. | |||
| An auction requires careful preparation by both the awarding authority and applicants if it is to be successful. | |||
Responses to the consultation document Wireless in the Information Age
There were four main reasons for opposition to auctions: auctions would delay licence issue; they favoured those with the deepest pockets; they encouraged speculative purchase of spectrum; and, they drained finance from operators at a time when investment was needed. The Agency have looked carefully at these objections and does not consider that they undermine the case for an auction. Each is examined below:
| auctions delay licensing process – we have looked closely at the time it would take to run both an auction and a beauty contest. There are preliminary policy issues that need resolution irrespective of the procedure to be followed. Once they have been resolved, a beauty contest would take longer to run, because of the time needed to prepare and assess applications. Overseas experience suggests that up to three months extra might be needed to run a beauty contest. | |
| auctions favour those with deepest pockets – all bidders will need to convince financial backers of the soundness of their business cases and those with the best technical qualities and marketing plans are likely to attract backing. They will not necessarily be those with the deepest pockets. Assuming efficient capital markets, size of financial resources should be irrelevant. | |
| auctions encourage speculative purchase of spectrum – spectrum trading may not be a possibility for three or four years and sitting on spectrum for that length of time would be discouraged where licensees have paid a large sum at auction. This is particularly so where there is a market that offers a reasonable return on investment. Use it or lose it obligations can also be placed on licensees. (Awarding licences by beauty contest is not of itself a safeguard against speculative hoarding.) | |
| auctions drain financial resources at a time when investment is needed – spectrum fees are only one part of total development costs and a sound business case should attract the financial backing needed to cover all costs. Bidders should not bid more than they consider justified by potential profits. Financial markets are there to help them exploit opportunities. There is also the possibility of offering instalments or royalty payments. |
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