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European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy: Comments by United Kingdom Government: Executive Summary |
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European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy: Comments by United Kingdom Government: Executive Summary |
Contents:
Strategic Planning of the use of Radio Spectrum
Harmonisation of Radio Spectrum Allocation
Radio Spectrum Assignment and Licencing
The Institutional Framework for Radio Spectrum Co-ordination
Issue 1
Issue 2
Issue 3
Issue 4
Issue 5
The Institutional Framework for Radio Spectrum Co-ordination
The UK Government welcomes the Commission’s Green Paper which raises important issues. The radio spectrum is a vital resource which makes a substantial and rapidly growing contribution to the economy, competitiveness and jobs. Growing demand and rapid change will place its efficient use and management at an even higher premium. The UK’s introduction of new economic spectrum management tools including spectrum pricing, the selective use of auctions, and in the longer term, spectrum trading, reflect the importance of optimising the use of this valuable resource.
2. Effective spectrum management involves seeking a balance between the many uses of the spectrum, commercial and non-commercial, through a strategic and coherent approach. The UK aims to achieve this through regularly publishing and consulting users on its own spectrum strategy. It has also set up new consultative arrangements to improve strategic spectrum management, through the UK Spectrum Strategy Committee and the Spectrum Management Advisory Group.
3. The management of the radio spectrum can never be a solely national concern, given the European-wide and global nature of many services. In its response, the UK Government’s main concern has been to consider how the efforts of the many interested parties at national, European and global level can most effectively be combined and co-ordinated to optimise spectrum management.
Strategic Planning of the use of Radio Spectrum
4. The UK agrees that spectrum planning is essential for technical reasons, and to obtain maximum benefit from a limited resource. A strategic approach is needed, given the long timescales that may be required to introduce changes and the need to coordinate them at European or global level. The UK Radiocommunications Agency (RA) regularly publishes and consults users on the UK Spectrum Strategy. This gives details of existing spectrum use and the key issues expected to impact on spectrum use over a 5-10 year period and sets out the Agency’s response to these, in the form of spectrum management objectives.
5. Because of the need to balance many different needs and interests, commercial and non-commercial, strategic spectrum planning is inevitably complex. International planning is vital for Europe-wide and global services. However, most radio services are local or regional. Within the broad framework laid down by the ITU, it is inevitable that there will be divergences in spectrum use between individual Member States who will need to use the spectrum optimally, taking account of local needs and circumstances.
8. Strategic spectrum planning may involve difficult choices between competing users, including potential future users. It is important that this process should be as transparent as possible. The UK seeks to achieve transparency by publishing Frequency Allocation Tables and its Spectrum Strategy and consulting users on specific proposals. Information on the regulatory requirements to be met by licensees is published and available on the RA’s website. The UK is not convinced, however, that it is practicable to provide this information centrally on an EU-wide basis. It also has reservations, particularly on grounds of commercial confidentiality, about publishing detailed information on individual assignments,
9. The UK believes that EU Member States should commit themselves to common action within CEPT on the allocation of frequencies but that it must be for each Member State to decide how they are made available and what approach is used for "refarming" of the spectrum, where necessary.
Harmonisation of Radio Spectrum Allocation
10. The UK supports the fullest practicable harmonisation within Europe but does not believe total harmonisation is a realistic or necessarily desirable goal as Member States’ spectrum use will need to reflect their own requirements The need for detailed harmonisation should be determined on a case by case basis, taking account of technical, economic and wider public policy considerations.
11. National spectrum managers should have an overview of Community policies with spectrum management implications. This might best be achieved through an informal high level advisory group for senior representatives of national spectrum management organisations, chaired by DGXIII. While conflicting demands must ultimately be resolved through the political process, such a group could play a valuable role in assisting more broadly-based and coherent decision taking.
12. The UK believes it is important to build on the strengths of the existing institutional arrangements for spectrum harmonisation. CEPT/ERC has important advantages, including its wider membership. As a general rule It is not desirable for ERC Decisions to be made legally binding since this would reduce flexibility and make agreement slower to reach. Member states should actively participate in the work of the ERC and, where appropriate, commit themselves to implementing ERC decisions. However, Where major Community interests are at stake the EU can play a key role in identifying areas where a concerted approach at Community level is likely to pay dividends, as has been done for third generation mobile telephony (3G) and satellite personal communication services (SPCS).
13. The UK agrees that there should be comprehensive and up-to-date information on national implementation of CEPT harmonisation measures and will support steps to improve the current situation.
Radio Spectrum Assignment and Licencing
14. Users should be given every incentive to use the finite spectrum resource efficiently. The UK believes that economic spectrum management tools can have a valuable role to play in this and has introduced new legislation on spectrum pricing and auctions through the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998. However, national circumstances differ and Member States should be free to chose the most suitable spectrum management methods within the overall requirements of the Licensing Directive.
15. Spectrum pricing relates the cost of a licence to the economic value of the spectrum. This is fairer and more rational than cost-based licensing and should encourage spectrum efficiency. However, fees should be strictly justified on spectrum management grounds. The UK is introducing spectrum pricing progressively, on the basis of full consultation with users. Public and private sector users will be treated on a comparable basis.
16. Where it is necessary to limit the number of licences, the UK believes that auctions offer major advantages, including economic efficiency and transparency, over the traditional "beauty contest". However, they are not suitable in all cases.
17. Market and technical developments in communications are proceeding at an unprecedented rate. Future success and growth will require effective and flexible spectrum management. Creating a market in spectrum licences could bring considerable economic and consumer benefits. However, market forces should supplement rather than replace regulation.
18. In October 1998, the RA issued a consultative document which sought views on a range of options for the introduction of spectrum trading. It also made clear that spectrum trading would have to take place within an effective framework of market regulation. The responses to the consultation indicated a high level of support for spectrum trading, including the selective introduction of the more complex forms. The Government intends to carry out further work in consultation with the industry and other interested parties to develop detailed proposals for the introduction of spectrum trading in the UK, provided that necessary changes are made to the Licensing Directive to remove apparently unintended obstacles.
19. The UK agrees on the need for close links between the procedures for the elaboration of technical standards and spectrum allocation and between the standards making bodies and the spectrum management organisations, in particular ETSI and CEPT. In the UK’s view, current arrangements, based on a Memorandum of Understanding, have proved generally workable.
20. Work within ETSI does not always take account of spectrum issues at an early enough stage. The UK would like to see greater European industry involvement at an early stage. User forums have an important contribution to make but should fully participate in the work of ETSI rather than operating in parallel.
21. The RTTE Directive will remove many regulatory barriers and ease the marketing of equipment. It will have important implications in the area of radio equipment and its full implications will not be known for a while. However the freer movement of equipment means that operators need access to information about radio spectrum allocations and the procedures to be followed by spectrum users. A one-stop notification procedure, though in theory attractive, could give rise to practical problems. The UK supports the continuing work on this and on the possibilities for Member States sharing information on market surveillance.
The Institutional Framework for Radio Spectrum Co-ordination
22. The UK fully agrees on the importance of openness, transparency and legal certainty in the framework for radio spectrum co-ordination, at national and European level, and on the importance of consulting users. The RA regularly publishes and consults users on its Spectrum Strategy which itself reflects extensive consultation between the Agency and users. The RA also carries out detailed consultation on proposed changes in the use of the spectrum.
23. Setting priorities for the use of the spectrum is a challenging task, whether at national or European level, because of the need to balance a number of different factors, including industrial, scientific, economic, social and cultural considerations. There are steps which can be taken to ensure that the decision-taking process is as well informed as possible. For example, the RA has commissioned studies on the economic impact of radio use which have helped to inform the spectrum management process.
24. Any conflicts between competing uses may ultimately need to be resolved through the political process. However, It is important to ensure that the potential for significant conflicting claims is identified and where possible, resolved, at an early stage, whether at national or European level.
25. At European level, the UK believes that it is important to build on the strengths of the existing arrangements for radio spectrum harmonisation through the CEPT. Much of the work of the CEPT is necessarily technical. However, there is scope for the CEPT to adopt a more strategic outlook. The ad-hoc group of the CEPT Plenary is considering how major strategic issues can more effectively be addressed by CEPT. The UK believes that the ad hoc group’s work is important and is fully committed to contributing to its success.
26. The creation of an informal high level advisory group, could also play a valuable role in enabling Member States to discuss, with the Commission, the wider EU implications of major spectrum management issues. It could also play a useful role in cases where the Commission needs to consult Member States urgently on spectrum issues in the trade context.
27. The UK considers that co-ordination between CEPT members has, in general, been successful. At recent WRCs, there have been relatively few divergences between EU Member States and none of these has seriously undermined the CEPT position. At the last WRC some of the European Common Positions were co-signed by all 43 CEPT administrations. Despite the need to co-ordinate and consult quickly with such a large number of administrations, CEPT has shown that it can respond quickly to the changing circumstances during a WRC. The UK therefore believes that it would be wrong to change what has been proved to be an extremely successful mechanism for co-ordinating European positions.
European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy: Comments by United Kingdom Government
Introduction
The United Kingdom Government welcomes the European Commission’s initiative in publishing its Green Paper on radio spectrum policy. It agrees that the issues raised in it are important for the future of the Community, in the light of the vital cultural, social and economic importance of the radio spectrum and the pace of current commercial and technological developments which are increasing demand for spectrum for a wide range of uses.
2. The value of the spectrum as an economic resource has been demonstrated by studies on the economic impact of radio use which the UK Radiocommunications Agency (RA) has commissioned. The most recent study "Economic Impact of the Radio Spectrum in the UK", published in May 1997, showed that, in 1995/96, the radio spectrum contributed around £13bn or around 2% of UK GDP.
3. The study also showed that GDP associated with radio based services was growing at a real annual rate of 11.5%, several times the rate of growth for the economy as a whole. In terms of employment, the study estimated that radio use was responsible for over 400,000 jobs in the UK and that this figure was growing at the rate of 1,000 a week.
4. There is every reason to believe that these trends will have continued or even increased since 1995/96 (a further study to assess the current position will be undertaken this year) and will also be reflected in other EU economies. In particular, the phenomenon of market and technological convergence between the traditionally distinct sectors of telecommunications, broadcasting and computing is likely further to increase the demand for radio spectrum, as the only medium for delivering mobile services, and for providing infrastructure competition with other platforms, and to increase the complexity of spectrum management as traditional service categories merge. These factors will place the efficient use and management of the radio spectrum at an even higher premium, as the UK Government stated in its Green Paper on Convergence: "Regulating Communications: Approaching Convergence in the Information Age".
5. The UK Government therefore agrees that the effective management of the spectrum is a high priority and its own policies reflect this. The new economic spectrum management tools which have been introduced through the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998, including spectrum pricing and the selective use of auctions, and its recent public consultation on the possible introduction of spectrum trading, subject to necessary changes to UK and EU law, reflect the Government’s wish to optimise the use of this finite and valuable resource.
6. The UK also recognises the vital importance of making spectrum available for non-commercial applications, including defence, the emergency services and cultural and scientific use. The Government agrees that it is necessary to balance the various uses of the spectrum and that this requires a strategic and coherent approach to spectrum management. It is for this reason that the RA publishes and consults users on its own spectrum strategy ("Strategy for the Future Use of the Radio Spectrum in the UK": June 1998) which seeks to describe both existing use and anticipated changes across the whole of the spectrum. It has also recently set up new arrangements to improve the strategic management of the spectrum, through the creation of the UK Spectrum Strategy Committee (UKSSC), which brings together all government policy interests in the use of the spectrum, and the Spectrum Management Advisory Group (SMAG), which represents all the main categories of spectrum users and provides independent strategic advice to Ministers. Terms of Reference of the UKSSC and SMAG are attached for information at Annex A.
7. Since radio waves do not stop at national frontiers, the management of the radio spectrum can never be a solely national concern, although national governments have a vital role to play. This is increasingly the case given the Europe-wide and global nature of many new radio-based services. The Commission’ s initiative in publishing its Green Paper is therefore timely. In its response, the UK Government’s overriding concern has been to consider how the efforts of the many interested parties, at national, European and global level can most effectively be combined and co-ordinated to optimise the management of the radio spectrum to the benefit of the European Community and all its citizens.
Startegic Planning of the use of Radio Spectrum
General Comments
8. The UK agrees that the use of the spectrum should be planned strategically. Spectrum planning is, of course, necessary for technical reasons, including the avoidance or minimisation of interference. Moreover, the spectrum is too valuable a resource for its use to be determined in a haphazard and uncoordinated way and it is essential for businesses and other major users to have as much certainty as possible about future arrangements for their own forward planning. While the Green Paper does not define this, in the UK’s view the essence of strategic planning is that it seeks to take both a broad and long-term view of the subject rather than simply reacting to events and short-term pressures. Such an approach is essential in the area of spectrum management, given the long timescales that may be needed to introduce changes that will require users to migrate to different frequencies and the need to seek agreed frequencies at a European or global level for those services which require international roaming.
9. It is for these reasons that the RA regularly publishes and consults users on its own Spectrum Strategy ("Strategy for the Future Use of the Radio Spectrum in the UK": June 1998). This sets out full details of existing spectrum use by frequency and licence class, describes the key issues which are expected to impact on spectrum use over a 5-10 year horizon and sets out RA’s proposed response to these, in the form of spectrum management objectives and proposals for action.
10. To produce a comprehensive spectrum strategy involves the need to reconcile the interests of the many different categories of spectrum user, and to balance commercial and other public policy objectives. Spectrum users include major commercial users such as public telephone networks, privately provided business systems, radio and television broadcasting, maritime and aeronautical; many large scale non-commercial users such as defence, science (for example radio astronomy) and public services, such as the police, fire and ambulance services, users of short range devices, and, finally, other non-commercial individual users such as amateur radio and citizens’ band. Because of the need to balance these many different needs and interests, the strategic planning of the spectrum is inevitably a complex matter.
11. It is worth pointing out that, as shown in Table 2 of the Green Paper, defence currently occupies more than 30% of the radio spectrum from 9kHz to 30GHz in the UK. The position is probably broadly similar in most EU countries, while in many Eastern European countries the proportion of spectrum reserved for defence purposes is believed to be significantly greater. While it is understandable that defence does not feature largely in the Green Paper, as it is a matter within national competence, it is a major area of spectrum use whose needs cannot be ignored in any consideration of strategic spectrum management. This needs to be kept in mind when reading the questions posed by the Green Paper.
12. While international planning is clearly necessary where Europe-wide and global services are concerned, there are many other major areas of spectrum use where the international dimension is much less important or non-existent. In the UK, for example, there are around 220,000 wireless telegraphy licences on issue. Only around 0.2% of these concern services which could be provided on a Europe-wide level, although these naturally account for a much greater percentage of spectrum use. The majority of the other licences relate to local or regional services, the planning of which, in the UK’s view, in accordance with principles of subsidiarity, must remain a preserve of individual Member States. These are best placed to ensure the optimal use of the radio spectrum in their territories in accordance with a diversity of national circumstances, topography, market developments and priorities.
13. As explained in its response on Issue 2 below, the UK believes that agreement on harmonised spectrum for Europe-wide or global services is best pursued through the CEPT and ITU. However, the UK considers that the European Community has a vital role to play in setting policy objectives for the introduction of Europe-wide services. This can be done by identifying those emerging services with a Europe-wide or global emphasis, where a concerted approach at Community level is likely to pay dividends, and seeking to co-ordinate the activities of Member States by, for example, encouraging common action on an early commitment to licensing or to identification of the necessary spectrum in CEPT and ITU. A successful example of such an approach was the Council Decision of 14 December 1998 on UMTS which committed Member States to licence UMTS within a set timescale and mandated CEPT to harmonise frequency use. A similar approach has also been successfully applied to satellite personal communication services(SPCS).
1 (a) Does the strategic planning of the use of radio spectrum respond to the needs of commercial and non-commercial uses, in particular in the areas of mobile and personal communications, broadcasting, transport, and R&D?
14. The strategic planning of the radio spectrum, even at national level, is a challenging task. Spectrum planning involves making sometimes difficult choices between competing users, including both current and potential future users. It is unlikely that all the large and growing range of radio users will always be satisfied with the decisions taken.
15. It is obviously desirable that the allocation of spectrum should be conducted in as transparent a way as possible in order to provide industry and other users with the maximum of information about planned allocations (and about why certain decisions were taken), and to enable them to plan their own business strategies. The UK seeks to meet this legitimate need of industry by publishing a full set of Frequency Allocation Tables together with its Spectrum Strategy, described in paragraph 9 above. This not only informs users of the Government’s view of the likely evolution of spectrum use but also invites their comments. The RA also consults users on specific proposals as described in paragraphs 77-78 below. On a European level, the CEPT is working towards the production of a European Common Frequency Allocation table, through the Detailed Spectrum Investigation (DSI) process.
16. Divergences between the radio spectrum planning of Member States exist for many good reasons. To some extent these reflect historical differences dating from an earlier era when there was much less drive for international harmonisation and for a Europe-wide or global approach. With the growth of Europe-wide and global services there is now much greater pressure for harmonisation. However, it is natural and inevitable that, within the broad framework laid down by the ITU, there will be continue to be some divergences in spectrum use between Member States. The spectrum is a valuable resource which each state will need to use optimally in a way that meets its own particular requirements and these will not be exactly the same from one country to another. To take one example of the many that could be chosen, maritime search and rescue (SAR) services will have an important claim on the radio spectrum in a country like the UK which has an extensive coastline. It would obviously not be reasonable to expect a land-locked country like Austria to allocate the frequencies used for maritime SAR in the UK in exactly the same way.
1 (b) What information on radio spectrum allocation, radio spectrum assignment, and licensing should be publicly available for industry and policy makers? Where should this information be collected and how should it be presented in the European Community?
17. The UK agrees that information on radio spectrum allocation and the procedures to be followed are needed by spectrum users. As stated in paragraph 15 above, the UK makes available full information on spectrum allocation through publication of Frequency Allocation Tables and its Spectrum Strategy. Full information on the requirements to be met by licensees is available in a series of information leaflets published by the RA which set out, for each individual licence class, the conditions for spectrum use and the other regulatory requirements which licensees must fulfil. This information is now generally available electronically on the RA’s website and is continually updated.
18. The UK believes that it would be helpful for users if other EU Member States and CEPT members were to make available information on spectrum allocation and their regulatory requirements in a similar way, in line with Commission Directive 96/2/EC (in the case of mobile and personal communications) and ERC Decision ERC/DEC/(97)01 of 21 March 1997 on the Publication of National Tables of Frequency Allocations. Given the speed and ease of modern electronic communications this should provide current and potential spectrum users with the information they need. The UK does not, therefore, believe that it is necessary to envisage the central provision of this information at Community level or that to do so would be necessarily be efficient or practicable given the need to continually update information relating to 15 (and eventually more) countries.
19. The RA also makes available full information on the numbers of licensees in each licence class. The UK does not, however, believe that it is appropriate to make available detailed information about individual licence assignments. In some circumstances, this could damage commercial confidentiality or have other undesirable effects (for example, in the case of security companies, disclosure of information on assignments could be of assistance to criminals). It is also obvious that it will not normally be appropriate to provide detailed information on the use of those frequencies reserved for defence use. However, the RA is continuing to study this question to see whether, in the light of new methods now available to access information, it may be possible to supplement the information currently provided, while still meeting the objectives outlined above.
1 (c) Should re-farming and substitution policies form part of the strategic planning of radio spectrum for Europe-wide services, what could be the modalities for this (e.g. actors to be involved, timing), and to what extent is a common Community approach required, for instance with regard to the phasing-out of analogue broadcasting and analogue mobile telephony services?
20. As stated in paragraph 13 above, the UK believes that in, appropriate cases, there is value in a common Community approach to the introduction of new Europe-wide services based on political agreement on a common timetable for action and a commitment to make available appropriate frequencies for the service concerned, on the basis of modalities to be defined in detail at CEPT level.
21. The UK believes that EU Member States should commit themselves to common action within CEPT on the allocation of frequencies for new services, and that the Community has a valuable role to play in providing a political impetus to this process. However, the precise methods by which frequencies are made available must be a matter for each Member State in the light of its particular circumstances. The matters which Member States will need to take into account will include the nature and intensity of existing use of the spectrum concerned, the extent to which it may be possible for existing users to co-exist with the new service, whether and to what extent users may be able to provide new services within their existing frequencies, the alternative frequencies available for migration of existing users, where this is required, and the amount of notice which can be given to existing users. These circumstances may differ considerably from one Member State to another. The UK does not therefore believe that a common approach to re-farming of spectrum is practicable, though the requirements of the Licensing Directive will need to be met in all cases. In its view, Member States should commit themselves to make available the appropriate spectrum within the timescale specified by the relevant international agreements, but should then be able to ensure the availability of that spectrum in whatever way is most appropriate in the light of national circumstances.
22. The Green Paper asks whether regulatory intervention is needed to support the introduction of spectrum efficient technologies. This is an issue on which it is extremely difficult to generalise. In the case of new services, such as Third Generation Mobile Telephony (3G), the essential requirement is to make available spectrum of the appropriate quality as quickly as possible. Since this spectrum will, in any event, be limited, users will have a commercial incentive to use the most spectrally efficient technologies which are available to them. In the case of some existing services using older technologies, it is less likely that the spectrum will automatically be used to optimum efficiency. In these cases, the UK believes that spectrum pricing, under which licence fees equate to the economic value of the spectrum, can have an important role to play, as could spectrum trading. The UK’s approach to these issues is explained in more detail in its answers on Issue 3, Radio Spectrum Assignment and Licensing.
Issue 2
Harmonisation of Radio Spectrum Allocation
2 (a) Are specific Community measures necessary to ensure radio spectrum availability for Europe-wide applications in the areas of telecommunications, broadcasting, transport, and R&D, or should criteria be established which determine when radio spectrum harmonisation is required?
23. The UK supports the fullest practicable degree of spectrum harmonisation within Europe. However, for the reasons explained in paragraph 16 above, total harmonisation of spectrum use is not realistic. The case for detailed radio spectrum harmonisation at European level needs to be determined on a case by case basis, taking account of a wide range of considerations. These will include technical considerations (to what extent is harmonised spectrum necessary for a service to operate to its full potential?), economic factors (what are the likely benefits to users in the Member State and the Community of providing harmonised spectrum on an EU-wide basis?), and also wider public policy considerations, including areas such as defence, social and cultural policy.
24. The case for harmonisation is clearly particularly strong in the case of mobile services, like GSM, 3G and SPCS, which offer the possibility of European-wide or global roaming. In the case of other radio-based services the need for harmonisation may be somewhat less strong, though there are obvious advantages for European industry if services operate on similar frequencies throughout the Community, thus permitting manufacturers to produce for a European rather than a national market.
25. These are the kind of considerations which, de facto, already underline the frequency harmonisation activities which are taken forward in the framework of the CEPT. However, given the rapid evolution of the radio sector and the inherently unforeseeable nature of major technical advances, the UK believes that it would be inappropriate to seek to set down pre-defined regulatory criteria for spectrum harmonisation.
26. The UK agrees that it is important that those responsible for spectrum management in Member States should have a coherent overview of the whole range of Community policies which may have spectrum management implications. This is particularly necessary in relation to areas such as transport where the spectrum management aspects, although potentially important, may not necessarily be to the fore in those specialised Community fora dealing with the subjects. The UK considers that there should be a single point within the Commission which is able to put forward a co-ordinated view on the spectrum management implications of the whole range of Community policies and that this role naturally falls to DG XIII.
27. The most appropriate way in which the current decision-taking processes could be supplemented to ensure an overview of Community spectrum requirements might be for DGXIII to consult on a regular basis with Member States. The best way to achieve this might be to set up an informal high level group chaired by DGXIII which would be attended by senior representatives of national spectrum management agencies. Such a group could consider priorities for harmonisation and whether there is a need for a concerted EU approach in specific cases. It could provide a forum for considering the spectrum management implications of the whole range of Community policies, including those outside the telecommunications field. The existence of such a group should help to ensure that the representatives of the Member States in CEPT fora were aware of the broader Community implications of their work.
28. In the UK’s view, an advisory group on these lines could effectively complement the current work by CEPT, discussed in response to Issue 5, aimed at giving the work of CEPT a more strategic thrust and direction.
2 (b) Where and on the basis of what criteria should priorities be set and arbitration take place where radio spectrum requirements for Community policies on telecommunications, broadcasting, transport, and R&D are in conflict? How can it be ensured that commercial and public interests are defined and appropriately balanced in this process?
29. The radio spectrum is a limited resource and the demands on it are constantly increasing. Accommodating as many as possible of these demands and, where necessary, choosing between them, is at the heart of spectrum management. The spectrum manager has to balance a wide range of technical, economic and social considerations and to consider both the national, European and global dimensions of the issue.
30. If there are conflicting demands, these conflicts must ultimately be resolved through the political process at national and, where appropriate, Community level, through the Council of Ministers. However, an informal high level group of the kind proposed in paragraph 27 could play a valuable role in identifying conflicting priorities at Community level at an early stage, and providing a basis for more broadly-based and coherent decision taking.
2 (c) Can the implementation of radio spectrum harmonisation measures, necessary for the provision of Europe-wide services, be left to voluntary decisions by Member States or is there a need for legal obligation in that respect? Should the European Community collect and publish relevant information in both cases?
31. The UK believes that it is important to build on the strengths of the existing arrangements for radio spectrum harmonisation. The CEPT has important advantages. Its 43 country membership means that it is able to offer a wider degree of spectrum harmonisation than would be possible within the 15 Member States of the EU. The 43 CEPT members also represent a powerful bloc able to represent European interests in the ITU context, particularly at World Radio Conferences (WRCs). The UK therefore believes that the CEPT represents the best forum for securing agreement on spectrum harmonisation, as recognised by Council Resolution 318/01 of 1992.
32. Since the CEPT is not a Treaty-based organisation, it is not possible for ERC Decisions to be legally binding. Indeed, their non-binding nature has certain advantages of speed and flexibility. Council Resolution 318/01 of 1992 invites Member States to actively participate in the work of the ERC and, where appropriate, to commit themselves to implementing ERC decisions on frequency bands and the UK agrees that this must be a priority for national administrations.
33. The UK believes that, in appropriate cases, where major Community economic and commercial interests are at stake, it will be appropriate for the EU to adopt specific measures mandating the adoption of harmonised frequency measures through the machinery of the ERC, as has been done through the UMTS decision. However, the UK does not believe that it will be normally be appropriate for the Community to seek to impose legal obligations on Member States to harmonise spectrum usage. This would risk slowing down the process of agreement within CEPT as Member States might be more reluctant to agree to CEPT measures. Moreover, the experience of the ERMES Directive (90/544/EEC) demonstrates that mandatory frequency harmonisation on an EU-wide basis provides no guarantee of the successful roll-out of Europe-wide services.
34. The UK agrees that it is desirable for comprehensive and up-to-date information to be available as to which Member States have implemented CEPT harmonisation measures. CEPT is currently undertaking a study of how ERC decisions are implemented and the reasons why the performance of CEPT members is this respect is somewhat variable. The UK will fully support any proposals which follow from this work which seem likely to lead to an improvement in current practice.
Issue 3
Radio Spectrum Assignment and Licensing
3 (a) Where there are differences in Member States as regards radio spectrum availability for Europe-wide services, what is the overall impact on competition?
35. As explained in paragraph 16 above, the UK believes that it is inevitable that, even where there are harmonised spectrum allocation arrangements, individual Member States will not necessarily wish to assign the same amount of spectrum to particular services. This reflects the principle that licensing must always take account of particular national requirements. The UK does not accept that the divergences which currently exist should have a significant impact on competition. Nor does the UK believe that diverging licensing conditions should have an adverse effect on competition provided that, in each individual national market, licensees are treated on a non-discriminatory basis, as required by the Licensing Directive.
3 (b) Is there a need to agree in the European Community on which radio spectrum assignment mechanism leads to the most efficient use of radio spectrum for the different types of services?
36. The UK believes that it is desirable, in principle, that licence fees should provide an incentive for efficient spectrum use. This is why it has brought forward new legislation to introduce spectrum pricing, described in more detail in paragraphs 42-48 below. It is important to make clear that spectrum pricing does not necessarily entail higher licence fees, but rather a refocusing of fees to encourage efficient spectrum use. However, the UK recognises that individual Member States have different needs and priorities and does not suggest that its own approach should be mandatory for other countries.
37. There have been some suggestions that Europe should be working to harmonise the approach to fee setting. The UK believes that spectrum pricing is not inconsistent with that aim, provided it is recognised that there will be differing demands for spectrum in different Member States for different services, depending on the maturity of the markets and the degrees of congestion. In principle, spectrum pricing is fairer and more economically efficient than licensing based on the cost of administration (which appears generally to be much higher in countries where demand and maturity is less). One of the major factors that currently results in differences in approach is the fact that many administrations apply an initial assignment fee in addition to an annual fee. These factors are being currently examined in the CEPT’s Working Group on Radio Regulation (RR) and the UK is actively supporting that work.
38. In those cases where it is necessary to restrict the number of licensees because of spectrum scarcity, the UK believes that auctions can offer advantages over the traditional "beauty contest", for reasons explained in paragraphs 52 and 53 below, and is preparing to assign licences for third generation mobile telephony by auction. It understands that several other Member States are also likely to favour this approach, while others will probably assign 3G licences by more traditional methods.
39. The UK believes that there is advantage in the sharing of information on the licensing approaches followed by different Member States, on the lines of the work currently being carried out by the ERO. In due course, national experience of licensing 3G may provide the material for an interesting case study on the relative advantages and disadvantages of different approaches. However, the UK does not believe that it is feasible or necessary to seek to agree at the present time on a single EU-wide approach to licensing and that Member States should be free to use whatever methods best suit their own circumstances, within the parameters laid down by the Licensing Directive.
3 (c) What is the impact on Europe-wide services of diverging national mechanisms to assign radio spectrum, which mechanism is most suitable to support Europe-wide services, and to what extent is a Community approach required in this regard?
40. The UK believes that where the availability of radio spectrum is limited, as is increasingly likely to be the case for European-wide services, there may be strong advantages in the use of auctions, for the reasons outlined in paragraphs 49-54 below. However, this is a matter which should be left to the discretion of individual Member States, taking account of the competitive demands of their own national markets, provided that the method of assignment adopted complies with the requirements of the Licensing Directive.
3 (d) What is the impact of charges and fees, including relocation costs, associated with the use of radio spectrum on the development of services and on the competitive situation?
41. Since the spectrum is a valuable and finite resource it is important that users should have every incentive to use it with optimum efficiency. The UK believes that economic spectrum management tools can have a valuable role to play in bringing about greater spectrum efficiency. The following paragraphs describe why and how the UK is introducing spectrum pricing and auctions.
42. The UK has recently enacted new legislation, the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998, permitting it to introduce spectrum pricing. Under the new arrangements the fee payable for a wireless telegraphy licence may relate to the economic value of the spectrum made available rather than the administrative cost of licensing. Previously, licence fees for users had to be set by reference to the RA’s costs, which bore little relationship to the value of the spectrum.
43. From a spectrum management point of view, this situation was unsatisfactory. Since licence fees did not reflect the value of the spectrum, users had little incentive to improve spectrum efficiency. In some cases it led to hoarding as users were able to hold on to unused or under-used spectrum in anticipation of changing market conditions and had no financial incentive to relinquish it. This led to inefficient spectrum use and discrimination against potential new entrants in those highly congested bands where new assignments had to be refused. The situation also distorted the market for radio-based services, since small users paid disproportionately more than large ones for the spectrum they occupied.
44. The principal aim of the new legislation is to provide a fairer and more rational basis for pricing spectrum, taking into account the value of the resource used, and to provide incentives for spectrum efficiency. Under the provisions in the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998, the Secretary of State may charge licence fees for the use of radio spectrum which exceed the RA’s administrative costs.
45. However, it is important to emphasise that, under the new legislation, fees must be strictly justified on spectrum management grounds (as, in the UK’s view, Article 11.2 of the Licensing Directive also requires). The matters which Ministers are required to take into account in setting fees include:
competition.
46. Consistent with these criteria, the RA is introducing spectrum pricing in a targeted fashion, on the basis of full consultation with users. Licence fee increases will be focused on those services, and those geographical areas, where demand for spectrum is likely to exceed supply. Around 80% of licensees are expected to pay no more, or less, under spectrum pricing than under current arrangements. This reflects the fact that the majority of the 220,000 licences issued in the UK are issued to users who share spectrum, and most increases will only occur where spectrum is required for exclusive use or there is strong demand for services. Public sector users, including defence, even where not formally subject to licensing, will pay for spectrum on a comparable basis.
47. Wherever possible, the UK seeks to introduce a light licensing regime or even licence exemption for services which are either low powered/low coverage (eg PMR 446) or complement a licensed network (eg. subscriber terminals for terrestrial or satellite services). Light licensing regimes (eg On-site paging/Citizen’s Band radio) only attract very low fees under spectrum pricing, and it is intended that an administrative minimum threshold price be applied in such circumstances.
48. It is too early to assess the impact of spectrum pricing, though there are some encouraging early indications that major spectrum users are critically assessing their needs. The UK believes that spectrum pricing will lead to a more effective use of the spectrum as users will have a strong economic incentive to seek ways of using spectrum more efficiently, either through better planning of their spectrum use and/or investment in new technology, or by relinquishing under-used spectrum.
49. The Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998 also provides the power to auction Wireless Telegraphy Act licences. The UK believes that, in certain circumstances, auctions can be a highly efficient method of assigning spectrum. They have a number of important benefits, including economic efficiency and transparency, compared to alternative assignment methods. A well-designed auction with well prepared bidders should ensure that licences go to those who value them most and will use them most valuably. This is in part achieved because a well-designed auction forces disclosure of information from bidders on their true valuations as part of the bidding process. Additionally auctions enable the price of spectrum to be set directly and objectively by the market.
50. Auctions are not suitable for all circumstances. An auction only has major advantages where there are more potential licensees than can be accommodated in the available spectrum. The licences also need to be sufficiently large in value to justify the complexity and expense of organising an auction. UK Ministers have said that they do not intend to require existing operators to enter an auction for the right to continue to provide their existing services within their current spectrum assignment. In practice, therefore, auctions are likely to be used only for new national or regional services. The Government has announced that, subject to market and other developments and to final decisions nearer the time, it expects to auction licences for third generation mobile communications in the second half of the financial year 1999-2000.
51. The UK notes the criticisms of auctions that have been advanced, in particular the contention that the cost involved in acquiring a licence through auction will reduce the readiness of telecommunications operators to invest in networks and lead to higher consumer prices. The UK does not accept this assessment. The pace of roll-out of services will be determined by the competitive situation in the market and will, in any event, have to comply with licence conditions. Other things being equal, an operator who pays a substantial sum for the use of radio frequencies will wish to roll out services quickly and maximise its commercial return as quickly as possible. Nor does the UK accept that auctions will lead to higher consumer prices for services, provided that a sufficient number of licences are auctioned to ensure the existence of a competitive market. In such conditions, the level of prices will be determined by supply and demand rather than producer sunk costs. In other words, the amount paid at auction will have little or no effect on prices charged to consumers in a competitive market.
52. It is also important to note that the alternative selection procedure, where licensees are chosen by comparative selection (also known as "beauty contest"), is by no means straightforward and likely to become increasingly problematic. In the light of the liberalisation of the telecoms market and the continued globalisation of the industry, it is likely that there will be large numbers of potential licensees competing for the right to provide new services such as 3G. The growth of convergence means that these may come from a variety of sectors other than telecommunications.
53. To decide between such competing bidders, on the basis of administrative criteria, and to be able to demonstrate the fairness of such a decision, is likely to be extremely difficult. Indeed, studies show that this method of assignment is inherently likely to favour incumbent operators with an established track record. At worst, it could lead to judicial challenge by unsuccessful applicants, which could substantially delay the roll out of new services. This was the experience of the Federal Communications Commission in the USA and was one of the main factors which led them to introduce their programme of auctions which has, in general, proved extremely successful.
54. In conclusion, the UK considers that, in suitable circumstances, a well-designed auction with well-prepared bidders represents the best means of compliance with the requirement in Article 10.3 of the Licensing Directive that "Member States should grant... licences on the basis of selection criteria which must be objective, non-discriminatory, detailed, transparent and proportionate".
3(e)(i) Should the awarding of radio spectrum be separated from the granting of service authorisations or licences?
55. In the UK, service authorisations for telecommunications or broadcasting services are administratively separate from radio spectrum assignments. The service authorisation takes place under either the Telecommunications Act 1984 or the Broadcasting Acts 1990 and 1996 and the radio spectrum assignment under the Wireless Telegraphy Acts 1949 and 1998.
56. In the UK’s view, the important consideration is not so much the nature of the licence which is issued, as the process of deliberation undertaken by the national administration. Service authorisations necessarily take account of such factors as competition, customer choice, coverage and so on. It is, however, essential that, whether or not a separate spectrum licence is issued, the authorisation process takes full account of the spectrum aspects of the service concerned.
57. These include the frequencies at which the service can operate and the amount of bandwidth to be made available. In addition to the assignment of frequencies, it is also normally necessary to include such matters as geographical coverage which may be defined geographically in the case of national services, or by reference to technical criteria such as power output and antenna height, in the case of local service. It will normally also be necessary to specify other technical characteristics of the service to be provided including equipment parameters. It is necessary that the licensing process should be both dynamic and detailed, in order to ensure that the service licensed can co-exist with other services and to ensure the optimum use of finite spectrum resources. In many cases, different services are able to co-share spectrum if the parameters are sufficiently defined and clear. The need for such an approach to assignment is likely to increase rather than diminish as the pressures on the spectrum continue to grow.
3(e)(ii) What would be the impact of creating a secondary market for radio spectrum for the provision of similar or different services and which safeguards are needed in this regard?
58. Market and technical developments in communications are proceeding at an unprecedented rate. The phenomenon of convergence of digital information technology, broadcasting and telecommunications, is one of the main manifestations of this trend. It is impossible to predict what the outcome will be.
59. Spectrum is an essential raw material for the radio-based industries that are making a large, and rapidly increasing, contribution to economies and competitiveness throughout the EU. Future success and growth will increasingly depend on the effective management of the radio spectrum resource and, in particular on the ability of spectrum management authorities to make spectrum available speedily for innovation and growth.
60. At a time of rapid change, regulation by itself is not sufficiently agile or flexible to achieve optimal use of the finite spectrum resource. If licences can be varied or transferred only by administrative means, the process of adapting to technical and market change will be slowed down. Creating a market in spectrum licences so that licensees may transfer licences to other users who can make better use of the spectrum could bring considerable economic and consumer benefits. The market is a proven mechanism for allocating a finite resource to maximise economic welfare. Regulation is slower and more unwieldy and, because regulatory decisions have to be made on the basis of incomplete information, is less likely to achieve the optimal outcome. However, for the reasons given below, it is not suggested that market forces should replace regulation. Spectrum trading would have to take place within an effective framework of regulatory safeguards as described in the following paragraph.
61. In October 1998, the RA issued a consultative document, Managing Spectrum through the Market, which sought views on the introduction and application of spectrum trading. The document sought views on a range of possibilities for spectrum trading, ranging from simple change in identity of the licensee to more complex possibilities in which spectrum assignments could be sub-divided or combined with possible changes in the use made of the spectrum. It made clear that the more complex forms were unlikely to be suitable for all licence types, for example for large volume, low value licences such as are issued for private business radio of the type used by taxi firms. It also made clear that spectrum trading would have to take place within an effective framework of regulation in order to:
62. Compliance with regulatory requirements could be ensured by requiring the national authority to be notified in advance of spectrum transactions and to have a power of veto if necessary for reasons of compliance with international obligations, broader spectrum management strategy, interference prevention or competition.
63. Within such a framework, spectrum trading would have the following important potential benefits:
64. The existence of safeguards to ensure compliance with international requirements on spectrum use would prevent the introduction of spectrum trading from compromising Europe-wide harmonisation of spectrum allocations.
65. The responses to the consultation indicated a high level of support for spectrum trading, including the selective introduction of the more complex forms. The Government intends to carry out further work in consultation with the industry and other interested parties to develop detailed proposals for the introduction of spectrum trading in the UK, provided that necessary changes are made to EU law as advocated in the following paragraph.
66. At present, the Licensing Directive has the apparently unintended effect of severely restricting the forms spectrum trading can take. Unless the Directive is amended, the potential benefits of spectrum trading in terms of facilitating innovation, growth and competitiveness will be lost. The provisions of the Directive are aimed at the issue of general authorisations and individual licences by national authorities and are an important contribution to completing the Single Market in telecommunications. However, it does not appear necessary or desirable for the Directive to apply in the same way to private transactions between radio spectrum users after the initial grant of the licences. The UK would strongly encourage the Commission to bring forward amendments to the Directive to enable those Member States wishing to do so to introduce spectrum trading, subject to Community requirements on frequency harmonisation and EU competition rules.
Radio Equipment and Standards
4 (a) Is there a need to improve the link between the elaboration of standards and the harmonisation of radio spectrum allocation for Europe-wide services in the areas of telecommunications, broadcasting, transport, and R&D?
67. The UK agrees on the need for close links between the procedures for the elaboration and agreement of technical standards and the allocation of harmonised radio spectrum. In order to permit the speedy introduction of services it is important that there is close relationships between the standards making bodies eg ETSI and the spectrum management organisation eg CEPT. This co-operation is reflected in the agreements drawn up between the two organisations. Within CEPT/ERC arrangements are also in place for nominated representatives from ETSI to attend relevant meetings of the ERC, its working groups and project teams which provides valuable input to the CEPT decision making process. It should also be pointed out that ETSI has a broader remit than the elaboration of telecommunications standards, since it is the competent organisation for all radiocommunications standards.
68. In the UK’s view, these arrangements, based on a Memorandum of Understanding, are generally adequate and have proved workable. However it is noted that work within ETSI on specific applications can originate at many levels within the organisation and does not always take account of spectrum issues at an early enough stage. Attempts to secure more broadly-based early identification of key spectrum issues through the establishment of the Business Development Group were unfortunately unsuccessful due to a lack of active support from operators and manufacturer members of ETSI.
69. The UK would like to see greater European industry involvement at an early stage. For example, while user forums have an important contribution to make, it is important that they should fully participate in the work of ETSI rather than operating in parallel. It should also be noted that competition for spectrum between operators will also be reflected in the activities of the standardisation bodies.
70. Participation of nominated representatives from relevant standards making bodies in appropriate discussions of the proposed high level advisory group could be a useful means of addressing the need for closer co-operation.
4 (b) Which practical arrangements are needed to ensure that the full potential of Community policy on radio equipment is supported by appropriate action at the level of radio spectrum management?
71. The UK notes the comments in the Commission’s Green Paper on this important topic and agrees that the Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment (RTTE) Directive will remove many regulatory barriers and ease the marketing of equipment. The UK has participated in the Commission Steering Group and related ad Hoc Groups which were set up in advance of the Directive coming into force and looks forward to participating in the Directive’s Advisory Committee - TCAM- when it is constituted.
72. The RTTE Directive has profound effects in the area of radio equipment, and its full implications will not be known for a while. However the freer movement of equipment means that operators need access to information about radio spectrum allocations and the procedures to be followed by spectrum users. The means by which the UK ensures this are described in paragraphs 77 and 78 below.
73. The UK believes that the idea of a one-stop notification procedure, though in theory attractive, gives rise to a number of problems . It would be difficult and impracticable to envisage a central database for the provision of information at European level; in particular there are concerns about its resourcing and maintenance since, without very frequent updating, it would rapidly fall into disuse and could in fact result in the provision of misleading information.
74. The UK has been pleased to have the opportunity to participate in the Ad Hoc Groups looking at these issues. The work of Ad Hoc Group A investigating ideas for a one-stop notification procedure and the possibilities for Member States sharing information on market surveillance matters will provide useful information but will need to be looked at in more detail by TCAM. The UK believes that this work is important in the context of this Directive’s impact on the management of the radio spectrum and would be willing to support any arrangements which lead to more effective surveillance without weakening the essential responsibility placed on individual member States by the Directive itself.
75. The UK agrees with the Green Paper assertion that "ad hoc mutual recognition arrangements between Member States" will no longer be needed. However, we would take this opportunity to register our concern that the advent of the RTTE Directive will also create mutual recognition problems within CEPT. Arrangements for mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures between CEPT Administrations, previously covered by ERC Decision, will no longer be able to apply. This in turn will cause difficulties for equipment being marketed and circulated between the EU and non-EU administrations in Europe. CEPT/ERC has plans to address this.
The Institutional Framework for Radio Spectrum Co-ordination
5 (a) In view of the need to have a predictable environment in the European Community for the use of radio spectrum, is the framework for the co-ordination of radio spectrum sufficiently open, transparent, and legally certain? Is it clear where and on the basis of which principles the need for radio spectrum harmonisation or for Community positions is established?
76. The UK fully agrees on the importance of openness, transparency and legal certainty in the framework for the co-ordination of radio spectrum, both at national and European level.
77. The UK also agrees on the importance of consulting new and existing users about the arrangements for the management of the radio spectrum and any significant changes that may be envisaged. In the UK this consultation has a high priority and is carried out in a number of ways. The Radiocommunications Agency regularly publishes its Spectrum Strategy which sets out full details of existing spectrum use, lists major issues for each part of the spectrum and seeks to outline a strategy for future use. The document reflects the ongoing dialogue which the RA’s Business Units have with spectrum users in their particular sector, through standing consultation groups in the case of the major sectors. The views of all classes of radio user are invited on the Strategy itself.
78. In addition, the RA carries out specific consultation on major proposed changes in the use of the spectrum, whether these involve existing or new services. For example, the RA, jointly with the Department of Trade and Industry, issued a consultation document in 1996 on the strategy for phasing out analogue cellular telephony and the possible use to be made of the spectrum thus made available, and in 1998, jointly with the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, issued a consultation document on action to promote the take-up of digital TV . With regard to new services, RA will shortly issue a consultation document on the possible introduction of broadband interactive multimedia services in the 40.5-43.5 GHz bands. RA has also set up comprehensive consultation arrangements with industry on its proposal to issue licences for third generation mobile telephony through an auction.
79. At European level, the CEPT also seeks to involve users in decisions taken about the management of the spectrum. For example, user groups have observer status at meetings of the CEPT working groups, and CEPT is seeking to obtain a wide range of views on major strategic spectrum management issues through its programme of Detailed Spectrum Investigations which is being carried forward on the basis of broad consultation with users. The CEPT-ERC and ERO also hold a number of workshops and the CEPT Radio Conference, all of which are open to users.
80. Given the wide range of bodies involved in radio issues at European level and the range of different services involved, the arrangements for spectrum management have a high degree of complexity, which is perhaps inevitable. In the UK’s view, this is not the same thing as a lack of transparency or openness.
81. The UK agrees that the establishment of priorities for the use of the radio spectrum is a challenging task, whether at national or European level, because of the need to balance a number of different factors, including industrial, scientific, economic, social and cultural considerations.
82. There are steps which can be taken to refine the decision-taking process and to ensure that it is based on objective data as far as possible. For example, the UK has commissioned studies on the economic impact of radio use. These have helped to identify the extent to which the various uses of radio contribute to the development of the economy and to job creation. This information is helpful in informing the spectrum management process but has not eliminated the need to make difficult choices between conflicting claims on the radio spectrum where the respective benefits may be primarily economic, cultural or social.
83. In the UK’s view, such choices, whether at national or European level, can ultimately only be made through the political decision-taking process. It is, nevertheless, important to ensure that the potential for significant conflicting claims is identified and, where possible, resolved at an early stage, whether at national or EU level. It is for this reason that the UK has set up the UK Spectrum Strategy Committee which brings together those within Government responsible for all categories of radio use. The Spectrum Management Advisory Group, which contains representatives of all the main categories of radio use, has also been created to ensure that strategic thinking on spectrum management is informed by a wide range of non-Government views, across the whole range of radio use.
84. A strategic approach to spectrum management is necessary in order that the claims of providers of new services can be assessed against the needs of other spectrum users, who may not be in a position to publicise their claims in the same way as the providers of major new Europe-wide services. The UK agrees that it is likely that the providers of such services may seek to influence the spectrum allocation process at Member State, CEPT and EU level. However, in the UK’s view, this is not the result of a lack of clarity about the criteria for access to spectrum, but rather reflects the different roles of those involved in the spectrum allocation and assignment process which works through consensus building at national, European and ITU level as appropriate.
5 (b) Is the establishment of a priori Community agreement necessary to achieve radio spectrum harmonisation or is it sufficient to co-ordinate the positions of the Member States in CEPT on an ad hoc and technical basis?
85. As stated in its response on Issue 2(c) above, the UK believes that it is important to build on the strengths of the existing arrangements for radio spectrum harmonisation through the CEPT.
86. The UK agrees that the CEPT’s working can be made more effective. In particular, its decision-taking processes need to become more strategic and to take more account of wider political and economic factors. However, its decision-taking cannot accurately be described as purely ad-hoc and technical. It is true that much of the work of the ERC, particularly its Project Teams, is necessarily primarily technical in emphasis. Technical studies are an essential pre-requisite for effective spectrum harmonisation. However, in the broader discussions at the ERC itself and in its main working groups, representatives of Member States should, in general, have a broader understanding of the economic and political context of their work. Moreover, the Commission participates in the work of the ERC and its working groups and is in a position to provide a broader prospective if it feels that this is lacking.
87. The UK nevertheless accepts that there is scope for the work of the CEPT to become more strategic. The ad-hoc group of the CEPT Plenary, which was set up towards the end of 1998, has the remit of considering, inter alia, how major strategic issues can be addressed by CEPT, without disrupting the ongoing work of the committees. The UK believes that the ad hoc group’s work is important and is fully committed to contributing to its success.
88. However, the UK believes that the creation of an informal high level group, chaired by the Commission, as proposed in paragraph 27 above, could also play a valuable role in ensuring that EU Member States are able to discuss, with the Commission, the broader EU implications of major current spectrum management issues.
5 (c) In which fora should Community positions be developed where needed in discussions on radio spectrum between the European Community and its trading partners?
89. In practice, European Common Proposals are heavily influenced by the views of the EU members within CEPT and generally reflect EU priorities. With regard to discussions between the European Community and its trading partners, the Commission, because of its Counsellor status in ERC, should have at its disposal much information on current spectrum issues. However, the informal high level group proposed by the UK could play a useful role in cases where the Commission needs to consult Member States urgently on spectrum issues in the trade context.
5 (d) Should procedures be introduced to ensure that the Member States support CEPT positions for ITU/WRC, particularly in view of the need to uphold Community interests in the international arena?
90. The UK considers that co-ordination between CEPT members has, in general, been successful. At recent WRCs, there have been relatively few divergences between EU Member States and none of these has seriously undermined the CEPT position. At the last WRC in 1997 the European Common Proposals were co-signed by all 43 CEPT countries. Despite the difficulties of co-ordinating such a large number of countries, CEPT was able to respond quickly to the changing circumstances of the WRC negotiation. The WRC-97 is generally recognised to have been an extremely successful conference from a European perspective. The Commission’s participation and support to the process in response to the Council Conclusions of 3 February 1992 and 22 September 1997 contributed to this success. The UK believes therefore that it would be wrong to contemplate any change to what has been proved to be an extremely successful mechanism for co-ordinating European preparations and negotiations.
Terms of Reference of UKSSC and SMAG
UK Spectrum Strategy Committee
(i) to draw up policies and strategic plans for the future allocation of the spectrum in such a way as to meet the needs of users in both the public and private sectors and in industry, with emphasis on the provision of vital services and the generation of national wealth;
(ii) to oversee the management and regulation of the radio spectrum, to ensure that agreed plans are correctly implemented, that efficient use is made of the available capacity, and that spectrum is used to the best national advantage.
(iii) to determine positions in line with national interest to be taken by the UK on international fora.
Spectrum Management Advisory Group
The role of the Spectrum Management Advisory Group (SMAG) is to provide independent, strategic advice on spectrum management policy issues to the responsible DTI Minister and the Radiocommunications Agency.
In particular the SMAG should advise on:
(i) the RA’s spectrum strategy, major national allocation decisions and the application of spectrum pricing; and
(ii) the policy objectives to be pursued in relevant international fora (e.g. ITU, CEPT and ETSI).
In undertaking this role SMAG will need to take account of Government policy on telecommunications, broadcasting and defence and international treaty obligations.
RA1/SSU
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