

Reference: 02261394

Information Requests
information.requests@ofcom.org.uk

14 September 2026

Freedom of Information request: Right to know request

Thank you for your request for information about masts, licensing & radiation monitoring in Waterloooville. We have treated this as a follow-up to your [previous request](#).

We received this request on 14 August 2026 and we have considered your request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("the FOI Act") and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.

Your request & our response

I have now NARROWED my request to WATERLOOVILLE ONLY - This removes both of the barriers you claimed:

- 1. THE "COST LIMIT" EXCUSE IS NOW NULL AND VOID You claimed £450 / 18 hours for Hampshire-wide data. I now request Waterloooville only — a single defined geographic area. Filtering licence and EMF records by a single town is a basic database query. It takes minutes — NOT 18 hours. Section 12 FOI Act cost exemption no longer applies.*
- 2. THE "NATIONAL SECURITY" CLAIM IS ABSURD FOR WATERLOOVILLE Every mast in Waterloooville was approved by Hampshire County Council / East Hampshire District Council via public planning applications. The addresses are ALREADY on public record. Anyone can walk to these sites. You yourselves admit Ireland, France, and Australia publish identical mast locations publicly with no harm. A mast in a residential town is NOT a state secret. Regulation 12(5)(a) does not apply.*

We acknowledge your points. We had also recognised these points as factors in favour of disclosure of the requested information in the public interest assessment previously provided to you (as well as the limitations of information currently in the public domain).

As explained in our public interest assessment, we have also considered advice from HM Government on the potential implications of disclosure of information relating to the location of mobile sites in the context of national security. HM Government has raised significant concerns with Ofcom about the release of this type of information on national security grounds and has advised that disclosure of this type of information would adversely affect national security.

Government has also raised concerns that disclosure of information on mobile sites in a specific location would set a precedent for disclosure in response to requests about other geographic areas, resulting in further aggregation of information on mobile sites.

We further note that on 20 September 2024 the Information Commissioner's Office [upheld](#) Ofcom's decision to withhold the disclosure of mast locations on the grounds of national security in the context of an appeal of Ofcom's application of the national security exception.

3. WHAT I REQUEST — WATERLOOVILLE ONLY:

All spectrum licences, frequencies, power levels, dates for masts IN WATERLOOVILLE All EMF / field strength measurements taken IN WATERLOOVILLE All safety briefings, risk assessments, or correspondence discussing health impacts of high-frequency radiation — not location data, just the documents themselves

As provided in our previous response, the licences for mobile base station transmitters operated by Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) can be found [here](#) and [here](#). These include the date of issue of the licence and last version date. We do not issue licences for individual mobile base stations.

Information on other Ofcom-licensed transmitters can be found in our [Wireless Telegraphy Register](#). This information provides the location of the transmitter, maximum permitted power, antenna details and licence issue date. Following discussions with Government around 2014, our [current practice](#) is to publish the location of most licence types in our [Wireless Telegraphy Register](#) (WTR) unless a licensee has informed us that a specific licence is used for critical infrastructure such that its disclosure is likely to raise a national security risk. This means that we publish the location of most licence types, including the vast majority of fixed links used by MNOs.

We have carried out a number of EMF measurements in the Waterloooville area, published on our website as follows: [Denmead PO7](#), [Purbrook PO7](#), [Waterlooville PO7](#), [Cowplain PO8](#), [Wecock PO8](#) and [Waterlooville PO7](#)

Ofcom is not a public health body and does not have medical or health expertise. We do not hold information on any safety briefings, risk assessments, or correspondence discussing health impacts of high-frequency radiation. In the UK, the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) takes the lead on public health matters associated with radiofrequency electromagnetic fields (EMF), and has a statutory duty to provide advice to Government on any health effects that may be caused by exposure to EMF. UKHSA publishes information on the possible health effects of EMF exposure on its [website](#).

Yours sincerely,

Information Requests

Request an internal review

If you are unhappy with the response you have received to your request for information, or think that your request was refused without a reason valid under the law, you may ask for an internal review. If you do, it will be subject to an independent review within Ofcom. We will either uphold the original decision, or reverse or modify it.

If you would like to ask us to carry out an internal review, you should get in touch within two months of the date of this letter. There is no statutory deadline for us to complete our internal review, and the time it takes will depend on the complexity of the request. But we will try to complete the review within 20 working days (or no more than 40 working days in exceptional cases) and keep you informed of our progress. Please email the Information Requests team (information.requests@ofcom.org.uk) to request an internal review.

Taking it further

If you are unhappy with the outcome of our internal review, then you have the right to [complain to the Information Commissioner's Office](#).

Regulation 12(5)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004

Regulation 12(5)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 – a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that its disclosure would adversely affect international relations, defence, national security or public safety.

The regulation is engaged because disclosure of this information would adversely affect national security.

The public interest test

Regulation 12(5)(a) is subject to the public interest test.

Key points:

- Ofcom can refuse to disclose information under this exception only if in all the circumstances of the case the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. In assessing this, under regulation 12(2), Ofcom must also apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.
- In carrying out the public interest test, Ofcom should consider the arguments in favour of disclosing the information and those in favour of maintaining the exception, attaching the relative weight to each argument (for and against disclosure) to decide where the balance of public interest lies.
- We have set out the matters Ofcom have considered in reaching its decision with respect to the public interest below.

Factors for disclosure	Factors for withholding
• Transparency: There is always a general public interest in transparency. The EIR implements EU Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information. Recital 1 of the preamble to the Directive states this public interest: <i>“Increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment.”</i> • Accountability: Mobile sites produce electromagnetic fields (EMF) or radio waves. At high enough levels, EMF can impact public health. As a result, the UK Health Security Agency (previously known as Public Health England (PHE)), an expert health body, advises that spectrum users should ensure that EMF levels comply with the internationally	HM Government has advised Ofcom that: • Disclosure of this type of information raises significant concerns on national security grounds and would adversely affect national security. • Specifically, disclosure of this type of information would create an increased threat to the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). CNI is those critical elements of infrastructure (including assets, facilities, systems, networks or processes), the loss or compromise of which could result in major detrimental impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of networks, or delivery of essential services (including those of the emergency services). • Government has strong concerns about publishing this type of information and has advised that publishing information on mobile sites constitutes a security risk (in particular, publishing aggregated information in a single dataset).

agreed levels in the ICNIRP Guidelines. Some individuals may have concerns about the potential health effects of EMF and want to know the location of any mobile site in their local area and whether the EMF levels from such mobile sites comply with the levels in the ICNIRP Guidelines. • Information already in the public domain: Some local planning authorities have published information on the location of mobile sites (including on proposed sites). Information on mobile site locations is also available on some open-source websites and mobile network operators' (MNOs) websites may indicate the general location of some masts (as well as future roll-out plans). • The location of mobile sites and other technical data is published in some other countries including in Ireland, France and Australia¹.	• Government's concerns centre on four areas: 1. Espionage/sabotage: Publishing this type of information could enable an attacker to remotely survey which mobile sites would be of interest from an espionage, sabotage or disruption perspective (in particular if we were to publish information relating to a large number of mobile sites in the UK). 2. Jamming: Publishing this type of information could enable the jamming of radio signals. 3. Physical security: Information relating to hub sites (mobile sites that act as their own radio coverage site and also serve to 'daisy chain' other sites), switch sites, and data centres would be of particular concern from a national security perspective. The physical security of hub sites will become even more important as features such as Mobile Edge Computing become widely available. 4. Developments in emergency services communications: In the future, knowledge of commercial networks could help enable an attacker to target the UK's emergency service communications network to a degree that knowledge would not have enabled in the past. This is due to the Emergency Services Network programme switching emergency service communication from the private Airwave network to a commercial network. • Government has acknowledged that where detailed technical information is not requested, an attack is more difficult. However, site location provides the starting point for an attack to gain and build additional and more detailed information that may then make any subsequent attack more likely to succeed.
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¹ <http://siteviewer.comreg.ie/#explore> (Ireland);
<https://www.cartoradio.fr/index.html#/cartographie/stations> (France);
https://web.acma.gov.au/pls/radcom/site_proximity.main_page/ (Australia).

	Taking into account the factors in favour of disclosure, and Government's advice, we have also taken into account the following: • We consider the national security risks associated with disclosing the location of mobile sites in a single, aggregated and user friendly data set to raise a different and higher national security risk than the ad hoc disclosure of some mobile site locations as part of a planning process. We also consider that relying on information published by planning authorities is, for example, likely to make it much harder for a bad actor to coordinate an attack. This is because there may be incomplete information held by planning authorities, information may be difficult to obtain from the planning authorities and it is likely to take a significant amount of time to build up any meaningful dataset. For example, some local planning data has not been updated for several years. Further, MNOs' websites only provide general location information and do not disclose specific site locations. • Current open-source options are of much more limited use to a potential attacker than the data being requested - the data set being requested has the potential to be more damaging due to both its granularity and authoritative status. • On accountability, we do not set EMF safety levels, but we do carry out proactive testing of EMF levels near to mobile sites to check they comply with the internationally agreed levels in the ICNIRP Guidelines. Our website provides information on recent testing and measurements of EMF levels that we have taken near mobile sites. Our published measurements have consistently shown that EMF levels are well within the internationally agreed levels in the ICNIRP Guidelines. We also provide a service where individuals can request Ofcom to carry out EMF measurements near mobile sites.
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	• There have been a significant number of attacks on mobile sites in recent years and publishing information on the location of sites risks further sites being attacked. Such attacks always have an adverse impact such as customers losing mobile signal and mobile operators incurring additional costs but they can have severe consequences, for example, where a mobile site that supports critical communications for the emergency services is attacked; the impact can be particularly serious in the current climate if there is disruption to a hospital's communications systems. Such attacks can also cause physical harm to employees of mobile operators, emergency services personnel and the general public.
Reasons why public interest favours withholding information	
• The greater likelihood of the adverse effect, the greater the public interest in maintaining the exception. This is affected by how extensive the adverse effect is – in this case the adverse effect on national security has the potential to affect the security of the United Kingdom and its people, and the opportunity for the adverse effect to arise is ongoing. • The impact of the adverse effect on national security also has the potential to harm the United Kingdom and its people and is therefore severe. • The open-source information that provides similar data may present inaccurate, partial or out-of-date data, which makes them of much more limited use to a potential attacker. Using these open-source information websites would not yield the same level of accuracy as would be contained in the information requested. • Much of the other publicly available data does not disclose specific site locations or has not been updated for several years and is similarly likely to be inaccurate and incomplete. • The security risk is also materially higher when all of the requested information is aggregated into a single user-friendly dataset, and published. • We have carefully considered whether the arguments around transparency and accountability may outweigh the arguments in favour of withholding the information. In doing so, we have taken into account the national security risks identified above as well as (i) the fact all of our EMF measurements to date have shown that EMF levels are well within the internationally agreed levels in the ICNIRP Guidelines; and (ii) the high risk of attacks on mobile sites which can have significant adverse consequences. • On balance, the arguments against disclosure – including the likelihood and severity of the adverse effect on national security, and the increased threat to national security in respect of the requested information when compared to the information already in the public domain - carry greater weight than the arguments in favour of disclosure. Therefore, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosure.	

- We also note that on 24 September 2024 the Information Commissioner's Office [upheld](#) Ofcom's decision to withhold the disclosure of mast locations on the grounds of national security in the context of an appeal of Ofcom's application of the national security exception.