Age checks helping make online experiences safer for UK children, but ‘job not done’ and tech industry must act to strengthen protections

• Significant progress in first few months of laws being in force, with proportion of children encountering highly effective age checks nearly doubling overall
• 8% of children attempt to access porn; half of these children only reached sites with age checks in place, while those visiting porn sites without age checks often go via search engines
• Serious doubts whether age inference methods currently used by some popular social media sites and apps are fit for purpose
• Ofcom sends clear message to industry that age inference methods will not be good enough to support under 16s social media ban
• Ofcom expects further innovation from app stores, operating systems and at device-level, ensuring whole industry plays part in improving protections for children

In just one year, age checks are being deployed at an unprecedented scale, ensuring the UK is at the forefront of global efforts to make online experiences safer for children.^[1] But, as the UK prepares to introduce a social media ban for under 16s, more action from the tech industry is needed to further strengthen protections for children across the system.^[2]

A new report published today by Ofcom reveals that age checks are now being deployed at an unprecedented scale across the pornography, social media, dating and gaming sectors. Many services are taking steps to ensure these checks are highly effective in practice, in line with Ofcom’s industry guidance.

The proportion of children being asked to prove their age who encountered highly effective age checks increased from 25% to 43% between July 2025 and January 2026. All of the UK’s top 10 and the majority of the top 100 porn sites now have age checks in place.^[3]

Among the minority of online children who attempt to access pornography (8%), the presence of age checks acts as an effective deterrent. ^[4] Half of these children only reached sites with age checks in place. Nearly nine in ten of these children’s visits (87%) to porn sites were for under 30 seconds, and 65% were for less than 10 seconds.

Checking up on age checks

Despite this significant progress, the job is not done. More action is needed from the tech industry to increase the effectiveness of age checks to protect children online, particularly with a view to the Government’s planned expansion of age assurance measures to restrict under 16s’ use of social media.

Specifically, Ofcom’s report identifies shortcomings in some services’ implementation of age checks, as well as areas requiring further collaboration and innovation from the wider tech industry.

We want to see action in the following four areas:

1. Too many porn sites still don’t have age checks in place

Many porn sites with age checks in place have experienced sharp declines in traffic, while some without have gained in popularity. Four per cent of children who participated in our study visited at least one porn service with no age checks in place.

Action:

All porn services without age checks must introduce them without delay, in line with our guidance.

So far, we have opened 23 investigations into the providers of 88 adult services. We will continue to take action against services which flout the law and put children at risk, using the full extent of our enforcement powers.^[5]

2. Children finding porn sites without age checks via search

In many cases, children are able to easily find porn sites without age checks via search engines.^[6]

We found that 33% of results returned on the first page of Google Search and 54% on Bing ^[7] were to pornography sites without age checks or other protections. ^[8]

Action:

Google and Bing will be working with us as a priority on practical solutions to tackle the discoverability of porn sites without age checks via their services.^[9]

3. Serious doubts about age inference methods used by some popular social media companies

Under our Children’s Codes, social media companies ^[10] must use highly effective age assurance to identify who their child users are to tailor their online experience and protect them from harmful material – including pornography, self-harm and suicide content.  

Some social media companies have chosen to rely primarily on age inference methods to identify their child users.^[11] This is despite them not being included in our guidance as methods that are capable of being highly effective for this purpose.

Evidence in our report reinforces our long-standing, serious doubts about the effectiveness of some of these models. In some cases, companies may be failing to correctly detect significant numbers of children on their platforms, meaning children risk being exposed to harmful content.

Action:

Our message to social media companies is clear: those which use age inference models to comply with their child protection duties should switch to other methods listed in our guidance as highly effective without delay. If they don’t, they must be able to prove using reliable and compelling evidence to Ofcom that their current method is highly effective.

4. Age checks need implementing more effectively, including by dating services

Despite having age checks in place to prevent children’s access, over one in ten 15 to 17-year-olds were continuing to visit and spend time on three of the most used dating apps in December 2025. This suggested that their age assurance methods needed to be improved and more closely aligned with our guidance.

Action:

All relevant services must ensure that their age checks are highly effective. That means following our guidance in full, conducting regular due diligence on any third-party vendors they use to deliver age checks and complying with privacy and data protection obligations.

Many dating services have started improving their age assurance processes following engagement with Ofcom. We expect them to continue to make further changes, in line with our guidance, including by introducing a ‘challenge age’ and ‘liveness detection’.^[12]

Next steps for under 16s’ use of social media

When implemented properly, highly effective age checks work, and they will be vital in underpinning future social media restrictions for under 16s.

But we are clear that social media firms’ current age inference methods are insufficient in preventing children from accessing a service at the point of entry to implement a ban, nor can they be used to enforce minimum age restrictions effectively. As such, sites and apps must strengthen their approach.

Building on our existing guidance, Ofcom will deliver to Parliament by the end of October a rapid assessment of what highly effective age checks look like in practice to determine whether someone is over 16. This will help inform parliamentary debate ahead of potential age restrictions coming into force in 2027.

The wider industry should also be prepared to play their part in strengthening protections for children. We have already seen action in this space, including from Apple, and expect to see further innovation including from app stores, operating systems and at a device level.

We will publish a statutory report about the role of app-store level protections by January 2027.^[13] 

Ofcom’s Chief Executive, Dame Melanie Dawes, said: “Age checks are a cornerstone of the UK’s online safety laws. When implemented properly, our evidence shows that age checks are helping to create a safer life online for children in the UK.

“But the job is not done and tech companies need to go further. Too many services have no or inadequate age checks in place, which is not good enough. And search engines must urgently work with us to solve the problem of children finding porn sites without age checks too easily via their results pages.

“As the UK prepares for further new social media restrictions at 16, the age check landscape is already shifting towards a stronger, whole-of-system approach, which is important to avoid any single point of failure. We want to see continued innovation from the wider tech industry to strengthen protections for children - including from operating systems and at an app store and device-level.”

Notes to editors:

1. Over 69 million age checks were completed across a small sample of 32 services operating in the UK between July and December 2025 – a 23-fold increase on the previous six months.
2. Under the Online Safety Act, Ofcom is required to produce and publish a report assessing how online services have used age checks and how effective it has been. The report focuses on highly effective age assurance to determine whether a user is over 18, in line with existing age assurance duties under the Act. Our findings are based primarily on evidence from the first six months of the protection of children duties coming into force in July 2025.
3. 64 out of the top 100 most popular pornography services in the UK have deployed age assurance as of June 2026, with a further 10 geo-blocking UK users.
4. While 8% of children age 8 to 14 who participated in our Children’s Passive Online Monitoring study visited pornography services, half of these children only visited sites with age checks in place. Nearly nine out of 10 visits (87%) to pornography services were for under 30 seconds, and 65% were for less than 10 seconds. The number of visits and low visit duration suggests many participants were moving quickly between sites, via short, transient visits – potentially in search of a site they could access without an age check.
5. Enforcement remains a top priority for Ofcom. We are analysing thousands of adult services active in the UK to understand user migration and the popularity of the services, including emerging services with rising popularity. We are identifying non-compliant services and taking appropriate action. So far, we have opened 23 investigations into the providers of 88 adult services, resulting in the majority of services (73%) either implementing age assurance or blocking UK users. We have fined 7 providers of 24 sites so far – 8579 LLC (£1.35m), AVS Group Ltd (£1m), Kick Online Entertainment S.A. (£800k), the provider of Fapello (£630k), Youngtek Solutions Ltd (£500k), First Time Videos LLC (£80k) and Itai Tech Ltd (£50k). Enforcement has prioritised action against providers based on the risk of harm posed by the services, including focusing on services who are growing their user numbers as a result of failure to put age checks in place. When it comes to deciding how to calculate the level of a penalty in cases where we find a breach, we consider (among other factors) the seriousness and duration of the non-compliance and the extent to which they have benefitted commercially from the breach.
6. Sixty-two per cent of children who visited pornographic services in our study used a search engine immediately before visiting pornography services, at least once.
7. Based on analysis which aimed to replicate the experience of logged-out users.
8. ‘Other protections’ would include where a geo-block preventing UK users’ access is in place.
9. Search services are not required under the Act to use highly effective age assurance to prevent access to pornographic content by children.
10. Those which do not ban harmful content, and those at higher risk of it being shared on their service.
11. Age inference methods involve analysing a user’s activity and behaviour on a platform to estimate whether they are a child or an adult.
12. A challenge age approach is where a user who is estimated to be below a specified age must then undergo a second age assurance step. Liveness detection reduces the risk of children using still images of adults or prerecorded videos to circumvent age checks.
13. This report will assess what role app stores play in children encountering harmful content, the extent to which app store providers use age assurance and how effective it is and whether children’s online safety would be enhanced by greater use of age assurance or particular kinds of age assurance by app store providers, or by other measures. Any changes to the law in this area would ultimately be a matter for Government and Parliament.
14. Visit Ofcom’s website for further data on experiences of age assurance, VPN use, and attitudes towards Protection of Children measures.